International Trade – British Foreign Policy Group

What Joe Biden’s victory means for the UK & Global Britain

Sophia Gaston — Sun, 08 Nov 2020 11:54:41 +0000

1. Biden’s ‘transatlantic project’ is not about the special relationship, but the UK will be a part of it.

Biden’s administration has made clear that restoring the US-EU relationship, and relations between Washington and key EU nations, such as France and Germany, will be one of its most significant priorities. They recognise that the destabilisation in the Western alliance exacerbated under Donald Trump has rendered the alliance less capable of addressing global challenges, and countering the rise of authoritarian China. While Westminster focuses specifically on the ‘special relationship’ between the UK and the US, Washington will be regarding the UK as an important, but not singular, member of the European neighbourhood and a crucial partner, alongside France and Germany, in advancing common interests.

2. It is no secret that Biden’s administration believes Brexit is a mistake, but that doesn’t mean they will marginalise the United Kingdom.

Like many of the UK’s allies, the Washington establishment was concerned about the possibility that Brexit could weaken the strategic cohesion in Europe, and precipitate a period of domestic dysfunction that sapped energy away from Britain’s capacity to lead on the world stage. Washington long saw Britain as the ‘gateway’ to Europe – a role that afforded a special degree of influence. However, they accept the decision has been made, they recognise that the UK continues to hold substantial ambitions for its Global Britain project, and hence their principal interest moving forward is to ensure that the UK and the EU work productively together.

The challenge here, of course, is that the UK Government has made clear that at least this first period of the Global Britain project is driven by a desire to ‘rebalance’ our foreign policy, pivoting away from our European neighbourhood. The US and other allies, such as Australia, will welcome the UK playing a stronger role in the Asia Pacific, but they will not want this to come at the expense of our strategic and security leadership in Europe.

3. Biden’s victory is not a game-changer for the Brexit negotiations, but it will present some challenges for the UK Government in their aftermath.

The direct impact of the outcome of the US elections on the UK-EU trade negotiations is relatively minimal. Washington, Brussels and Westminster all recognise the individual and collective benefit of a UK-EU trade deal – particularly one that facilitates a close relationship on security matters. Although much has been made of Biden’s comments in the past regarding his Irish heritage, it is important to recognise the distinction between his position as an opposition candidate and his diplomatic choices as President. His administration does not regard respect for Ireland, as an EU Member State, and the United Kingdom, as mutually exclusive – however, it is clear that, should a deal not be forthcoming, the perception of belligerence will be regarded as having been led from the UK side.

The most significant consequences of the change of power for the UK on Brexit, is the fact that Donald Trump spoke as an enthusiastic advocate for Brexit, and strengthened the UK Government narrative of sunlit uplands waiting ahead. Biden will be pragmatic, but considerably less evangelical or convinced about the Brexit dividend – precipitating moments of tension. That said, it is important to remember that the astonishing collapse in favourable UK public opinion towards the United States under Trump’s leadership has forced the UK Government to downplay the reach and impact of Donald Trump’s personal advocacy for the Brexit project, lest it became tainted by the nationalist and isolationist framing he embraces, and which this Government is at pains to avoid.

4. Biden’s victory neither imperils nor smoothly facilitates a UK-US trade deal.

There was a clear intention from the UK Government to position a United States trade deal as a key prize of the Brexit vote, and as a means of rebalancing the consequences of the friction that the UK would necessarily be imposing on its trading relationship with its largest partner, the European Union. A combination of the growing toxicity of Donald Trump’s brand with the British people, and the unexpected groundswell of concern around issues of food standards, animal welfare and environmental protections, diminished the persuasive power of a UK-US trade deal as a totem of the UK’s new independence – especially as it became clear that it could not be secured within Donald Trump’s term.

With Biden at the helm, some of the symbolic value underpinning these public anxieties are likely to diminish, as support for a US trade deal becomes decoupled from an endorsement of Donald Trump’s presidency. Biden’s commitment to action on climate change, will also help to alleviate environmental concerns. However, many of the other issues that have become obstacles to public support will continue to remain sticking points, and, having resisted calls to enshrine such protections in law, the UK Government will need to carefully manage public and industry perceptions.

5. Despite these caveats, there is no doubt that a Biden victory is the best outcome for the Global Britain project.

Although areas of tension lie ahead, principally around the UK’s choices in its relations with the European Union, there is no question at all that Joe Biden’s victory in the US elections represents an important step forward for the Global Britain project. Should Donald Trump have won a second term, the United Kingdom faced significant pressures to have to step up and assume a much more significant role in the guardianship of the liberal alliance, and the stewardship of international institutions. Although the realities of America’s domestic position and the limitations of its foreign policy mandate will necessitate the United Kingdom playing a robust and active role in global leadership, the scale of the responsibility will be tempered, as it will be shared.

In many ways, the enduring strength of the ‘special relationship’ has been exemplified under Donald Trump’s unconventional leadership, with the two nations still managing to find areas of cooperation – such as the expansion of the Magnitksy sanctions. With Biden in the White House, a host of new areas of collaboration are opened up. Climate change policy is an obvious starting point, with Biden’s team eager to re-join the Paris Climate Agreement, and Johnson committed to ensuring the UK’s hosting of the COP26 environmental summit charts an ambitious course. With America’s moral mission restored, partnerships on advancing human rights, the spread of democracy, media freedoms, and the rule of law, suddenly all become possible once more. With the UK at the helm of the G7 next year, the emphasis on our common interests, the strengthening of old alliances, and the opening up of new ones such as the D10, will conjure a tone of mutual respect and sober ambition, which has been missing in recent years.

Conclusion

Both nations are emerging from a period of significant domestic upheaval, and there will be significant constraints on their domestic mandates to pursue agendas of openness without also balancing these with investments in security and resilience. There will be some moments of friction in the coming years as new power dynamics evolve and the United Kingdom crystallises its new mission. Ultimately, however, both the United Kingdom and the United States understand that their individual successes and combined strength are integral to the advancement of global peace and security. With both eyes on the prize, the special relationship will earn the rights to its name.

Sophia Gaston’s recent paper on the consequences of the US elections for US foreign policy is available to download here.

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5 things we learned from Liz Truss’ speech setting out her UK trade policy vision

Evie Aspinall — Wed, 04 Nov 2020 17:11:20 +0000

On the 29th October, Secretary of State for International Trade, Liz Truss, gave a keynote speech to set out her vision for the UK’s global trading policy – calling for trade to be ‘firmly anchored in Britain’s core values’. It has been a turbulent first year of the UK’s new independent trading policy, as we have moved towards our departure of the European Union, with the highs of early successes – such as the UK-Japan agreement – matched by a bruising political debate around emotive issues, such as the future of the UK’s agricultural standards.

Here are five things we learned from the speech about how the Trade Secretary seeks to take her brief forward:

1. The UK will not pursue a “Britain First” approach to free trade. In a rebuke to the slogan pursued by US President Donald Trump in his rather aggressive reframing of American trade policy, Liz Truss ruled out “an autarkic Britain First approach” to trade – suggesting that the UK will approach its trading policy as a mutually beneficial collaboration between partners. She argued that the UK is learning “from the twin errors of values-free globalisation and protectionism” but must balance this against the inherent importance of trade, in and of itself, as “a lean, green, value-creating machine”. Truss gave scant detail of how the UK’s trading policy will address concerns citizens hold about globalisation, or how it will be balanced with other domestic economic policies.

2. Values will be at the heart of the UK’s trading policy. The overwhelming message that Truss sought to convey was that the UK’s trading policy will be “values-generating” and “values-driven”. By this, she means that not only will the UK Government only pursue agreements in line with its own values, but that the UK will also seek to spread its fundamental values – defined as “sovereignty, democracy, the rule of law and a fierce commitment to high standards” – through its trading policy. However, in practice, a values-based trade policy may prove difficult to achieve, especially in light of the combined economic and political pressures created by Brexit and the coronavirus pandemic. For example, the UK is said to be “very close” to securing a free trade agreement with Turkey, whose recent aggressions in Syria, Libya and the East Mediterranean, and its belligerence towards France following a spate of recent terror attacks, challenge the legitimacy of the values-first argument.

3. The UK will seek to challenge China on trade. Although Truss made no direct reference to China, in a number of thinly-veiled comments she repeated criticisms often levied at China, criticising states who “artificially promote state-subsidised products” and engage in forced technology transfer. She argued that “mistakes when the World Trade Organisation allowed new and large economies to join in the early 2000s without being subject to the same disciplines as existing members.”. As such, she committed to using the UK’s G7 presidency next year “to lead the global fightback for free and fair trade, challenging those who won’t play by the rules”. However, as ever, the UK’s willingness and capacity to challenge China as a global trading actor will be tempered by the careful balance to be struck in maintaining positive economic relations with the authoritarian state and keeping China ‘at the table’ on climate change – a key UK foreign policy priority.

4. The UK Government recognises the need to build public support for Free Trade Agreements. Pointing towards the three million signatures that were gathered in Europe opposing the EU’s ascension to TTIP, Truss highlighted the importance of building trust and public support for free trade. She also criticised politicians for not “fully engaging in the concerns the public have”. BFPG research shows that whilst Britons are broadly supportive of free trade and globalisation, they have an extensive range of concerns including over the impact on the NHS, food standards, workers’ rights and animal and environmental protections. The Trade Secretary was seeking to signal that HMG will be looking to build some form of engagement into its trade policy machine.

5. The UK Government continues to resist legislative guarantees for the standards it promises to protect. Truss spelt out explicitly where the UK Government believes the red lines for securing free trade agreements will fall. She pledged that the “NHS remains off the table”, that “food standards must not be undermined and British farming must benefit” and that “any trade deal must help ‘level up’ our country”. However, she refused to impose “blanket bans on any food produced differently from the UK” arguing that to do so would have a “devastating effect on economies which we want to see benefit from free trade”. Activists and many citizens remain suspicious as to why the Government is resisting efforts to enshrine standards in legislation, and this area is clearly going to remain one of the most contentious and difficult communications aspects of the UK’s trade policy moving forward.

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The Global Community Must Cooperate to Tackle Coronavirus

Flora Holmes — Wed, 01 Apr 2020 08:58:04 +0000

As the Coronavirus has spread from China and Asia, to Europe, to North America, it is now reaching the shores of the African continent. As of 30th March, Africa had reported 5,252 infections. The continent, home to over one billion people, is the world’s poorest. Increasingly, Coronavirus is becoming an issue for the entire global community.

One in three deaths in Africa every year is from an infectious or parasitic disease (compared with one in 50 in Europe), so to some extent countries are equipped to deal with an outbreak. The recent Ebola outbreak is illustrative of that (insert some Ebola information)

The fact remains, however, that poorer countries in general are less equipped than many in the global community to deal with a large number of COVID-19 cases, first and foremost because they lack the medical equipment to do so.

The number of doctors, hospitals, and intensive care beds, is generally much lower in poorer countries than in rich ones. Sub-Saharan Africa has roughly one doctor for every 5000 people. In Europe, there is one for every 300 people.

Measures taken to prepare for outbreaks have been promising, with many countries introducing lockdown measures much before their numbers of infections reached European levels. South Africa, for example, introduced a lockdown before the UK, despite having a lower level of infections. Pakistan, which introduced a lockdown last week, spends one two-hundredth the amount on health of what the US does.

The efficacy of these measures, however, is in doubt. In Europe, citizens – for the most part – have been induced to stay at home, isolated from others, safe in the knowledge that generous state safety nets will guarantee their basic needs. In many other countries, this is not the case. More than half of city dwellers in Africa live in crowded slums, making social distancing impossible. In India, hundreds of thousands of migrant workers have returned to their home villages on foot as the state closed air, rail and bus services, risking their lives, as well as further spreading the virus.

Some countries have introduced measures to protect livelihoods, with South Africa announcing a tax holiday for businesses to encourage them to keep paying workers. Other countries do not have the funds. Since the start of the crisis, $83 billion has been withdrawn from emerging markets, meaning that public spending, consumption, and governments’ tax receipts will be lower.

As Western countries scale the peak of their own crises, poorer nations will need assistance. Ehtiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has already asked the G20 for an emergency package worth $150 billion to boost health spending and protect social safety nets.

Rich countries, especially in the West, appear more divided than ever. In Europe, leaders are squabbling over the economic response to the crisis. In the US, President Donald Trump is too focused on the domestic crisis and in scoring political points against China to orchestrate international action.

Other countries – and individuals – are stepping into this void left by the key institutions in the global community. Jack Ma, founder of Alibaba, and one of China’s richest people, has donated 20,000 tested kits,100,000 masks and 1,000 protective suits to each African country. State-led action from China is likely to follow. China has already shipped massive amounts of medical equipment to European nations like Italy and Hungary. Russia has made similar moves. Sophia Gaston, BFPG Director, argued for our blog last week how states’ actions in the coronavirus crisis will shape others’ perceptions of them. It is a challenge that China and Russia appear to be seizing, leaving the West trailing behind.

Levels of international cooperation in dealing with the pandemic thus far have been low. If the West wants to avoid a Chinese domination of the response to the coronavirus crisis, it should act to assist poor countries in navigating their own outbreaks.

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Why the UK-Africa Investment Summit is an opportunity for Britain

Matt Gillow — Fri, 17 Jan 2020 11:25:01 +0000

When John Bolton was President Trump’s National Security Adviser, he argued that Africa would soon be home to a new phase of great power rivalries – with the United States, France, China and Russia vying for investment opportunities in the continent. Britain should heed this warning ahead of the UK-Africa Investment Summit.

In the first eight years of last decade alone, China’s top officials made 79 visits to Africa. Emmanuel Macron personally visited the continent nine times since his election victory in 2017. Vladimir Putin turned on the charm last year, in the inaugural Russia-Africa Investment Summit.

All of which makes next week’s UK-Africa Investment summit all the more important. It’s absolutely essential that post-Brexit Britain plays a key investment role in Africa – as we shape our post-EU independent foreign policy and cut bespoke trade deals – but also to act as a break on the worst excesses of the great powers in the region.

This month, International Development Secretary Alok Sharma launched East Africa’s first ‘green bond’ on the Kenyan securities exchange – which will will help Acorn Housing raise local currency to build environmentally-friendly houses for students in Nairobi – a great example of how British soft power can help coordinate action on pressing issues without expending masses of resources or interfering massively abroad.

By 2050, one in four global consumers will be African. Africa is home to eight of the fifteen fastest growing economies in the world. Yet only 4% of foreign direct investment is actually focussed on the continent – despite British plans to become the largest G7 investor in Africa by 2022.

The UK-Africa Investment Summit should serve as a springboard, not just to greater investment in Africa, but the start of serious relationships with major African governments. The Department for International Development has made clear that they want to make it easier for African governments to access, and make the most of, trade and investment opportunities – but articulating a post-Brexit, independent foreign policy means more than that, and the UK can now begin to present itself as the central convener on global conversations on the pressing issues of today.

There is a wider picture. European countries are stepping up their presence in Africa with the aim to challenge Islamic terrorism – and stem the flow of migrants from Africa. This is in response to a void left by the United States – which seems so set on withdrawing from the world and its traditional role as geo-political rivals China and Russia expand theirs. At the end of 2018, the US announced plans to reduce 10% of their security presence in the continent.

Stronger relationships with African states is popular amongst the general public in the UK as well. According to British Foreign Policy Group research, developing greater ties with Commonwealth nations (of which nineteen are African) should be a key priority in British strategic foreign policy. Nearly 9 in every 10 Conservative voters polled argued that the Commonwealth was a good thing (more than any other institution surveyed,) as did 7 in every 10 Labour voters.

Working towards greater relations with African governments, therefore, may not just be good for the global economy, for trading relationships, and for stymying the threat of terrorism – but it’s in tune with the foreign affairs views of the British public.

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Boris Johnson’s Cabinet: Who are the internationally-facing Ministers?

Flora Holmes — Tue, 30 Jul 2019 13:51:28 +0000

Britain’s change of Prime Minister has brought with it a total change of the four internationally-facing cabinet Ministers: Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs has changed from Jeremy Hunt to Dominic Raab; Liam Fox has been replaced in his role of Secretary of State for International Trade by Liz Truss; Alok Sharma has replaced Rory Stewart as Secretary of State for International Development; and Ben Wallace is the new Secretary of State for Defence, replacing Penny Mourdant. Who are these new Ministers, and what does their appointment mean for Britain’s foreign policy?

Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs: Dominic Raab

MP for Esher and Walton since 2010, Dominic Raab was Brexit Secretary until November 2018 when he resigned in disagreement with the draft Withdrawal Agreement. Before entering Parliament, Raab worked as a lawyer at the Foreign Office. Here, he worked on a number of issues: bringing war criminals to justice in The Hague, the Arab-Israeli conflict, the EU, and Gibraltar.

What we know:

Raab has consistently voted for the use of UK military forces in combat operations overseas, and has generally voted against more EU integration, becoming a vocal supporter of ‘No Deal’ since his resignation as Brexit Secretary. Raab was the first to suggest the controversial prorogation of Parliament in order to push no deal through the house, during his own bid to become Conservative Party leader.

In terms of his style as Foreign Secretary, Raab has spoken in favour of merging the Department for International Development into the Foreign Office, calling for a “spending review…cut down the number of Whitehall departments, cut the bureaucracy”. Raab’s own foreign policy expertise has been questioned in the past, as he appeared to confuse the Red and Irish seas when discussing trade barriers with Europe, admitted he hadn’t read the Good Friday agreement from start to finish, and revealed that he “hadn’t quite understood” the importance of Britain’s trading relationship with France and the Dover-Calais crossing.

What we predict:

Raab will face a number of immediate challenges as Foreign Secretary, most notably the crisis in relations with Iran, which threatens to escalate further in the coming days. A staunch supporter of Israel, Raab might be tempted to take a hard line on Iran. In terms of longer-term questions in the Middle East, such as the UK’s relationship with Saudi Arabia, and the Arab-Israeli conflict, Raab is likely to take a ‘realpolitik’ approach. He told Andrew Marr in 2017, following the murder of Jamal Khasoggi, that we should not terminate relations with Saudi Arabia because of ‘the huge number of British jobs that depend on it but also because if you exert influence over your partners you need to be able to talk to them’.

Based on other statements, including his declaration that he does not believe in ‘economic and social rights’, it is likely that Raab will generally favour this realist attitude over a liberalist projection of British values. On Trump, Raab has said ‘he’s been a contentious figure but if you want strong relationships between the people of this country and the people of the United States, if we want to get from the back of the queue to the front of the queue for a trade deal, I think it’s good to have warm relations’. Raab may well prioritise repairing the UK-US relationship, damaged since the leak of US Ambassador Sir Kim Darroch’s memos.

From Raab, we can expect a tack towards realpolitik and a strengthening of Britain’s alliances in order to boost our international standing and trade, regardless of the confrontation this may present to British values.

Secretary of State for International Trade and President of the Trade Board: Liz Truss

Previously second-in-command at the Treasury, Truss has also served as Environment Secretary before taking on her current role. Before becoming an MP in 2010, Truss served as Deputy Director of the Reform think tank.

What we know:

Along with Dominic Raab, Priti Patel and two other Conservative MPs, Liz Truss authored the 2012 booklet ‘Britannia Unchained: Global Lessons for Growth and Prosperity’, that described Britons as ‘among the worst idlers in the world’, placing her towards the right of the Conservative Party. Truss has consistently voted for the use of UK military forces in combat operations overseas, against investigations into the Iraq War, and against more EU integration prior to the 2016 EU referendum.

What we predict:

Truss may tend towards a ‘Britain First’ approach to international trade. In a speech to the Conservative Party conference in 2014, Truss claimed it was ‘a disgrace’ that the UK imports two thirds of its cheese, two thirds of its apples, and three quarters of its pears. Truss may well pursue a more protectionist stance, favoured by the US, to protect British industry and products. Her writing of ‘Britannia Unchained’, which advocated for a relaxation of labour laws, suggests international trade negotiations are unlikely to expand beyond the core matters of trade.

Secretary of State for International Development: Alok Sharma

Previously a chartered accountant, Sharma became an MP in 2010. Sharma was born in India and moved to Reading with his parents when he was five.

What we know:

Having campaigned to remain in the European Union, Sharma has since said he would be prepared to leave the EU with no deal if it “proved impossible” to negotiate a new one before 31st October. Sharma has consistently voted for the use of UK military forces in combat operations overseas, and voted against investigations into the Iraq War.

What we predict:

Sharma is one of Boris Johnson’s lesser-known promotions to the Cabinet, so his actions as International Development Secretary are difficult to predict. On his appointment to the position, Sharma said he will work with the Department to ‘make sure UK aid is tackling global challenges that affect us all, such as climate change, disease and humanitarian disasters’. He spoke in favour of continuing to invest 0.7% of GNI on international development to show ‘we are an enterprising, outward-looking and truly global Britain that is fully engaged with the world’. This suggests he is likely to pursue a continuation of Rory Stewart’s work in DfID of prioritising global challenges of climate change and humanitarian disasters.

Secretary of State for Defence of the United Kingdom: Ben Wallace

An MP since 2005, Wallace previously served as a member of the Scottish Parliament following an eight-year stint in the army. He trained at Sandhurst before joining the Scots Guards as a platoon commander. During his time in the Army, Wallace served in Northern Ireland, Germany, Cyprus and Central America.

What we know:

Wallace was previously the Minister of State for Security and Economic Crime before taking on the position of Secretary of State for Defence. Wallace campaigned to remain in the EU, and has warned that a no-deal Brexit would hit UK-EU security ties and will have a “real impact” on protecting the public. Wallace has consistently voted for the use of UK forces in combat operations overseas, including airstrikes against the so-called Islamic State in Syria and Iraq. He voted against the requiring of UN conditions to be filled out before any military action in response to the use of chemical weapons in Syria.

What we predict:

Wallace, alongside Raab, will have to immediately begin work on the Iran crisis. His time in the Army may well have given him a realist perspective of crises, and an appreciation of the importance of a strategic approach, thus he may proceed with caution. Wallace may also be responsible for implementing Johnson’s campaign pledge to protect military veterans from prosecutions, something that has gained increasing traction following the decision to charge Soldier F in relation to the killing of two protesters on Bloody Sunday. Given his voting record Wallace is likely to support this action.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the views of the BFPG. The BFPG is an independent not for profit organisation that encourages constructive, informed and considered opinions without taking an institutional position on any issue.

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China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Towards a British Response Strategy – Student Ambassador Series

BFPG Admin — Wed, 10 Apr 2019 13:31:10 +0000

Since its inception in 2013, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has seen enormous expansion over 2018 and the first quarter of 2019. It has become President Xi Jinping’s foreign policy ‘brand’. At present, the BRI aims to connect 71 economies through Europe, Asia and Africa, with a vast ‘belt’ of overland economic corridors and a corresponding maritime ‘road,’ ostensibly promoting trans-continental cooperation whilst maximising Chinese prosperity. Estimates for cost differ as the BRI expands, although the Asia Development Bank has estimated it will cost around $8 trillion. It already involves 65 countries to varying extents, around 63% of the world’s population and 29% of global GDP.

Most significantly for Britain, the official opening in October 2018 of the ‘silk motorway’ presaged its tangible appearance on the fringes of Europe. The increasing impact the BRI will have on global geopolitics makes it a priority for British foreign policy; Britain needs a coherent, forward-thinking strategy to engage with the BRI. Currently, British policy is an inconsistent one of economic support combined with a non-committal political stance. However, determining what approach should be taken instead remains complex.

What opportunities and challenges does the BRI present for Britain?

On one hand, the BRI presents a wealth of opportunities. British expertise in project management, technology, legal services and finance is enormously valued by China; this creates economic benefits for the UK. Currently, DfID actively encourages British businesses to invest, and in June 2018 freed £25bn of funds to support British exports. The China-Britain Business Council has estimated that the UK could gain £1.8bn a year from participation in BRI projects. After Theresa May’s trade delegation visit to Beijing a year ago, UK-China deals worth £9.3bn were signed, with the Chinese Ministry of Commerce pledging to use this as a ‘platform for deepening cooperation between China and UK under the Belt and Road initiative framework.’ These figures are likely to grow as the BRI expands not just in economic terms (China’s GDP is forecast to grow at an average of 6.3% over the remainder of 2019), but in geographical terms too. These arguments are more compelling in a post-Brexit world. There is the additional advantage of not just enhancing Britain’s trade and economic prospects after leaving the European Union, but Britain’s international status too. Maintaining support for the BRI is a channel to achieve the vision of ‘global Britain,’ especially given the current uncertainty surrounding Brexit’s direction. The BRI could, in theory, provide a strong bilateral relationship with one of the world’s biggest economies.

However, British cooperation with the BRI (even if it is not backed by overt political support) is potentially short-sighted. The challenges and long-term implications of the BRI need to be recognised. Whilst President Xi places emphasis on the BRI’s capacity for mutual advantage, this is ambiguous in many instances. The creation of ‘debt colonies’ as a result of BRI loans to economically less developed countries – for example, Sri Lanka and Tonga – has led to accusations of a Chinese ‘debt trap diplomacy’ as an implementation strategy. Instead of creating strong, bilateral, co-dependent relationships, the BRI may be creating unequal dependencies.

The question is whether this ‘debt-trap diplomacy’ is economic mismanagement or part of broader Chinese geopolitical manoeuvring. The BRI is not just an economic project: it is a ‘smart power initiative’ designed to maximise Chinese cultural and strategic influence. For example, it includes building deep water ports along the East African coast; the continuing reclamation and militarisation of the Spratly Islands; and expansion of China’s Indo-Pacific military footprint. With continued success, it could radically change the global geopolitical landscape; a successfully integrated BRI Asia would effectively be a sphere of Chinese influence. At a time when the US is increasingly distancing itself from China, the geopolitical landscape looks set to be increasingly polarised. These geopolitical challenges are compounded by China’s human rights record and its security breaches. Whilst Britain has been taking an increasingly strong stance on China’s activities in recent months, Britain needs to question whether moving towards a policy of increasing economic support for the BRI is a good strategy.

What could Britain’s approach be?

The BRI is undoubtedly here to stay. However, increasing economic investment, even when only used for projects with high ethical standards, may contribute to the wider political and economic problems the BRI presents. Therefore, Britain should work towards coordinating a coherent, comprehensive strategy which encompasses a number of policies to engage with the challenges it presents.

Firstly, Britain could work to explore and promote BRI alternatives. The EU has already begun to prepare such a response, with its ‘Asian Connectivity Strategy’ which could be a model for Britain. Creating and investing in British financed and British led medium and small-scale infrastructure projects across the BRI region would be one way of emulating this model and promoting alternatives. It would provide similar mutual benefits, increase global status, strengthen bilateral and multilateral ties, allow the export of British expertise and best practice, and provide long term British influence and investment in some of the fastest growing regions and economies in the world. Where this is not feasible, Britain could promote and invest in projects run multilaterally; working with, for example, the EU, Japan, and the US. Similarly, given the expansion of China’s security reach, Britain could explore multilateral cooperation agreements with countries in the Indo-Pacific region.

Secondly, Britain should advocate and promote more organic regional integration by supporting multilateral intra-regional economic and trade cooperation and initiatives. For example, providing expertise, research and support for developing organisations such as the Indian Ocean Regional Association (IORA) and the African Economic Community would promote supranational and collaborative initiatives within BRI regions.

Thirdly, Britain should limit and downgrade its investment in the BRI over time, instead of actively encouraging it. Whilst private investment will inevitably continue to some extent it should no longer be promoted. Where Britain does have economic interests they need to be fully utilised as leverage for human rights, ethical implementation strategies, and best practice. This is already the case to a large extent. However, this leverage may only minimally influence China’s long term geopolitical and strategic aims. Therefore, investment in BRI specific projects should be minimised where possible.

Finally, Britain should retain, to the best of its ability, a good relationship with China and President Xi, especially given the level of Chinese investment into Britain’s domestic economy. Soft power initiatives, such as city twinning programmes, educational ties and cultural exchanges should be maximised. UK-China initiatives outside of the BRI within China and Britain’s domestic economies should continue to be developed and invested in. This policy could be flexible in the event of worsening America-Chinese relations, however; ultimately, whilst Britain should avoid ‘taking sides,’ this should not be at the expense of America’s support in other areas of foreign policy (MENA and Russia, for instance).

Conclusion

As the UK’s role in the world changes post-Brexit, and the BRI continues to grow, British policymakers need to prioritise a coherent response to China which is both pragmatic and principled. Utilising the nascent EU strategy as a model, promoting small-scale BRI infrastructure and security alternatives, supporting multilateral regional integration and downgrading investment in BRI specific projects whilst still maintaining strong links with China are policies which are politically and economically consistent. This strategy places long term geopolitical and economic challenges above short term expediency, yet recognises the importance of China’s place in Britain’s economy and the wider world.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the views of the BFPG. The BFPG is an independent not for profit organisation that encourages constructive, informed and considered opinions without taking an institutional position on any issue.

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How the UK is tackling illegal wildlife trade

BFPG Admin — Mon, 05 Nov 2018 14:36:22 +0000

The illegal wildlife trade (IWT) is a global crisis involving organised criminal networks and is estimated to be worth up to £17 billion a year. It is a foreign policy issue because not only does it threaten species with extinction, but it damages economic growth and sustainable development, is fuelled by corruption, and undermines good governance and the rule of law. Urgent, united action by the international community is vital.

The UK is committed to global leadership in tackling IWT. We hosted the ground-breaking London Conference in 2014 that secured ambitious agreements from more than forty governments to take urgent, coordinated action. It was hailed as a turning point in global efforts to tackle these damaging activities. We played a leading role in conferences in Botswana (2015) and Vietnam (2016). And hosted a second and still bigger and more inclusive Conference on 11 and 12 October this year. The 2018 Conference was a great example of Global Britain in action: of the UK using its convening power to provide a platform for, and a new impetus to, international efforts on a crucial and urgent set of challenges.

This year’s event was the largest yet, attracting participants from civil society, academia and conservation professionals to Evolution in Battersea, and strong private sector support. Over 50 countries reaffirmed their commitment to countering IWT, and set out further steps. The UK’s high-level participation and new commitments were key to this, while our creative media campaigns ensured a high media profile. The conference covered demand, supply and transit issues, focusing on tackling IWT as a Serious and Organised Crime, building broader coalitions and closing markets.

Over 1,300 took part, from over 70 countries. Three Presidents (Uganda, Gabon, and Botswana), two First Ladies (Kenya, Sierra Leone), two Deputy Prime Ministers (Cambodia, DRC), US Attorney General Jeff Sessions, and public figures including Ellie Goulding, Helen Clark and William Hague were among the speakers. Panel members ranged from scientists and social media commentators to park rangers and activists.

UK engagement was powerful. The Foreign, International Development and Environment Secretaries and HRH The Duke of Cambridge spoke at the conference and/or the preceding reception at St James’ Palace, while the Prime Minister and The Prince of Wales sent video messages. The Environment Secretary, Ministers Thérèse Coffey, Harriett Baldwin, Mark Field and Conference Champion Zac Goldsmith MP were active on panels and in the margins. Ministers and HRH The Duke of Cambridge held over 25 bilaterals with foreign leaders.

Specific HMG announcements around the Conference included:

A new Ivory Alliance 2024, chaired by the Environment Secretary, which will focus on tackling demand and lobbying for further domestic market closures, particularly in Asia. Five senior political influencers from around the world, including a senior congresswoman from the Philippines and the former New Zealand Prime Minister Helen Clark, and as many cultural influencers, like the Laotian popstar Alexandra Bounxouei, have already joined the efforts. China co-chaired the ivory session at the Conference and shared initial results of their domestic ban.
£6mn of new funding to the IWT Challenge Fund. Inter alia, the latest round will be used to encourage projects supporting transboundary initiatives. It will also allow bids to protect certain endangered plant species;
£3.5mn for technical assistance to Financial Intelligence Units in developing countries, implemented by the UNODC and the Centre of Excellence for Financial Investigation, to tackle money-laundering and corruption associated with the illegal wildlife trade;
£20mn for the UK Aid Match fund which doubles public donations made to charities. IWT and conservation work bids will be among the policy areas welcomed;
£33.5mn to protect critical forest habitat for wildlife including through public-private partnerships to develop environmentally friendly business practices;
£900,000 to develop a British military counter-poaching taskforce to train African rangers in more effective and safer counter-poaching techniques. Complementary support for community initiatives around Malawi parks.

Yet crucially the Conference was a collective undertaking. Over fifty countries signed up to the Conference Declaration, and made a raft of important commitments. Singling out specifics is unfair to those not mentioned. But Cambodia and Laos announced they will follow China in instituting domestic ivory bans; Peru that it will hold a high-level regional conference in 2019 and the US that it will focus on enforcement and closing markets: making its domestic priority was “no market, no safe haven”.

A further highlight of the Conference was private sector engagement. Attendees heard from transport, tourism, e-commerce and financial services coalitions that are cutting IWT out of supply chains, taking down adverts from online marketplaces, clamping down on illicit financial flows, and sharing intelligence between ports, shipping and airlines. In addition to a Finance Taskforce launched by HRH The Duke of Cambridge which enables big banks to track illicit financial flows, the World Travel & Tourism Council announced a major behavioural campaign to ‘make every journey count’. This will reach over a billion travellers. And the e-commerce coalition launched an action plan with Interpol/UNODC to help reduce IWT online by 80% by 2020.

The 2018 Conference succeeded in its specific aims. And yet the challenges remain. And they remain huge. So the focus and determination the Conference established will be its most important legacy.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the views of the BFPG. The BFPG is an independent not for profit organisation that encourages constructive, informed and considered opinions without taking an institutional position on any issue.

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After The Dance: Making the most of business opportunities from the PM’s Africa visit

BFPG Admin — Fri, 14 Sep 2018 09:18:31 +0000

Although the PM’s recent Africa visit was largely misunderstood or patronized by the UK media, it represented an important and welcome indication of fresh ambitious thinking in delivering HMG support to securing post-Brexit trade growth. But it also raised serious questions as to whether the UK is fully prepared to compete for the opportunities Africa represents to UK business.

Government support for trade in these markets is important. While not all African states are command economies, the state is a major actor, and government to government engagement is critical for UK export success. Yet smart coordination with the private sector is key, and the Prime Minister’s Africa trip offered a compelling example of the limitations of current arrangements, and the urgent need to improve them if the UK is to compete at the level it deserves in these markets post-Brexit.

Before the critique the positives: a ‘feel -good’ change of atmosphere; a get-away from the endless grind of Brexit; a visit to a vibrant and growing part of the world about which Brits feel very warm, where there are strong connections and to which they give generously; and African countries lining up to sign deals with the UK (even though the ‘trade agreements’ signed were actually contingent continuity agreements). Plus, the doughty part of ‘brand May’ did well. Whilst the PM’s dance moves were never going to get a ‘ten from Len’, most TV viewers will have given her credit for giving it a go.

Away from the cameras, though, in the nitty-gritty detail of the preparation and delivery of the UK trade ‘offer’, there were gaps of the sort that need to be remedied if trade missions are to go beyond the photo-op and new trade agreements to be more than scraps of paper for political show.

Whilst the list of the business delegation accompanying the PM included some exceptional companies and very impressive people, it did not represent the scale or breadth of UK PLC many African counterparts expected. The UK is seen by its current and future trading partners as excelling at fashion, the creative industries, the professions, education, expertise in infrastructure, healthcare and medtech, finance and fintech. Many of these represent major opportunities with Africa. So where were the likes of the British Fashion Council, the leading established UK law firms, our leading healthcare sector, the representatives of our world-respected water, transport and infrastructure consultants? Sure, The City was represented by the Lord Mayor, banking has the impressive Bill Winters and names like Mott Macdonald and JCB flew a flag for infrastructure, but this was hardly a knock- out delegation of the full range of impressive British expertise, a fact commented on by the South African business people asked to travel down from, mainly, Johannesburg, to Cape Town.

Doubtless there will be reasons as to why British business was thinly represented; and they will sound fair. The problem is that last-minute, cobbled together trade delegations have become too regular a feature of UK trade promotion and excuses are not what the host country are interested in. Foreign officials tell us they want a focused and compelling trade ‘offer’ based on their needs as a nation. That offer needs to be imaginatively and enthusiastically presented by their visitors based on self- evident, relevant competence. When the African countries visited by the PM compared the UK offer they saw on the PM’s trip with what they have been presented in Beijing the difference may be stark.

In common with so many parts of the world, the undoubted ability of our embassies to position the UK well with the host country needs an equally persuasive, very focused UK trade offer. The credibility of that offer is based on close prior HMG consultation with the private sector to identify key target areas for the host nation. This then needs to be translated into a well thought through plan of engagement, with emphatic HMG financing support where the private sector can’t provide it. There are promising signs that this sort of focus is beginning to be included, not least with the DIT appointment of an impressive private sector trade minister, as well as trade commissioners for key export regions around the world and an export credit agency, (UK Export Finance) with £50bn of financing clout and a good team. Yet the challenge remains of generating effective, consistent, and early, strategic HMG engagement with the UK private sector.

There are two main steps that need to be taken to ensure future high level trade missions lead to greater trade wins for the UK.

First, more power to and investment in HMG missions in-country. FCO and DIT people on the ground are best placed to spot opportunities. Yet due to FCO cuts many missions are visibly starved of investment and staff compared to our competitors. This is a highly visible statement of our trajectory and long-term commitment to these countries.

Second, an active re-engagement by DIT with the many trade associations and other sector – expert bodies in the UK is way overdue. There appears to have been a writ running through Whitehall since the days of the unexpected Cameron majority that trade associations were fusty, old hat and what government needed to do was break bread directly with CEOs of ‘real businesses’. This may sound fine, but the reality is that neither CEOs nor government have the capacity or time to engage, company by company, in depth. It’s deeply inefficient. Trade bodies, used highly effectively by governments in Germany, Japan and elsewhere in the major trading nations, are there precisely to collect their members views and expertise and deliver them effectively to government. What has been happening in the UK in contrast has been their disintermediation in the critical business needs – to- export role by substantial hiring of Whitehall trade staff and advisors who, whilst hard working and well meaning can’t hope to have even a modicum of the associations’ knowledge. This is more than just special pleading. It’s timely to ask whether, whilst keeping HMG’s expertise in funding export opportunity, the hundreds of millions spent on employing trade civil servants would not be better deployed in outsourcing to private sector expertise the key role of working with the UK’s embassies and high commissions to translate opportunities they identify into rapid, knowledgeable and successful UK business offers.

Finally, the blame lies on both sides. It can’t be accurately said that the UK private sector has covered itself in glory when it comes to cooperation with HMG. Many industry bodies have adopted a tone around Brexit that has meant a number 10, not known for its willingness to listen to other views, has seen ‘Business’ as a remoaner menace. Business groups could still have made their deep fears about Brexit known whilst engaging early on, sector by sector, to work positively with HMG to methodically identify challenges and suggest solutions. If business does not have its accustomed ear in Cabinet it has, to a large degree, itself to blame.

The week following Prime Minister May’s visit, China greeted Africa’s leaders with full pomp and a persuasive message based on ready finance for major projects and a repeat of a (somewhat unconvincing) ‘no- strings attached’ message. The UK’s ability to compete with this sort of clout may seem limited. It’s not. We have huge and relevant sector expertise needed by Africa, and deep ties through large African diasporas in the UK, through the generosity of its citizens, and not least through the powerful glue of The Commonwealth. The announcement of a UK Africa Summit to take place next year is to be very much welcomed. But without the effective, welcomed and coordinated involvement of the private sector, the risk remains of great sound-bites and photo -opps- and possibly a raft of new trade agreements- but no real export progress as defined by the only statistic that matters; material growth exports to the new non-EU markets that lies at the heart of the Brexit opportunity.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the views of the BFPG. The BFPG is an independent not for profit organisation that encourages constructive, informed and considered opinions without taking an institutional position on any issue.

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Britain and Latin America: New Opportunities in the Post-Brexit Era?

BFPG Admin — Tue, 19 Jun 2018 15:19:10 +0000

Boris Johnson’s recent tour of South America elicited rare media interest in Britain’s relations with Latin America. Speaking ahead of his trip, the Foreign Secretary announced his goal of ‘strengthening the UK’s relationship with countries in the region’. If this ambition could be realised, Johnson stated on his return, ‘realms of gold’ await Britain and Latin America in the post-Brexit era.

Certainly, there is much ground to recover. From a situation in the nineteenth century where Britain was the leading external political and economic power in Latin America, the decades from the First World War onwards saw a rapid decline in Britain’s standing in the region. In 2016 Britain supplied a meagre 0.9 per cent of Latin America’s imports, and received just 1.2 per cent of its exports.[1] Dwarfed by the leading economic powers in the region (the United States and China), Britain also lags behind other European countries, such as Germany and Spain. Aside from the ongoing dispute with Argentina over the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands, Britain’s political and strategic interests in Latin America have dwindled to negligible proportions too.

Can this situation be reversed in the post-Brexit era? As part of a research project on Britain’s contemporary relations with Latin America, I recently interviewed British policy-makers concerned with Latin America, as well as a number of diplomats from the region. What follows is a brief analysis, based on interviews with some of the key policy-makers in this area, of the prospects for Britain’s relations with Latin America in the post-Brexit era.

In general, British officials are fairly sanguine about the effects of Brexit on Britain’s relations with Latin America – certainly relative to the generally pessimistic outlook of the majority of the British foreign policy establishment. Recent attempts by Britain to rejuvenate its status in Latin America stem from a policy initiated by William Hague when he became Foreign Secretary in 2010. In the speech announcing this policy, Hague promised to ‘halt the decline in Britain’s diplomatic presence in Latin America’, seeking instead, ‘intensified and equal partnerships with countries’ of the region.

Speaking in the aftermath of the referendum vote, Hague argues that ‘Brexit certainly doesn’t invalidate’ these ambitions. ‘If anything’, he goes on, ‘it adds to the importance of relations with the rest of the world’. Expanding on this theme, Jeremy Browne, who served as Foreign Office Minister from 2010 to 2012, believes that Brexit could allow Britain to think in ‘optimistic and positive terms about what new opportunities might arise in Latin America’.

Latin American officials speak in similarly positive terms. The Brazilian ambassador to the UK, Eduardo dos Santos, believes that ‘Brexit is an opportunity to increase our trade relations [and] cooperation with Britain’. Likewise, Mexico’s representative in London, Julian Ventura, is clear that ‘the UK is a strategic priority for Mexico, with or without Brexit’.

The more specific focus of Britain’s relations with Latin America in the post-Brexit era has been on the prospects of achieving free trade agreements. Here again, Latin American officials have been outspoken in their desire to achieve such deals. As the Brazilian Finance Minister Henrique Meirelles put it in September 2017, ‘we are ready to open discussions with the British Government’ on reaching a free trade agreement. Likewise, the Mexican Finance Minister, Luis Videgaray, stated in the immediate aftermath of the Brexit vote that a draft free trade agreement with the UK for the post-Brexit era was already in place.

Mercosur, the leading trade bloc in Latin America, has of course long been in negotiations with the EU to secure a free trade agreement. This task should be much easier for Britain without the necessity required of the EU to achieve consensus between all members of the union. Moreover, while a Mercosur-EU trade deal has been impeded by the protections for agriculture demanded by certain EU states – particularly France – this form of protectionism is much less pronounced in Britain. As the Brazilian ambassador in London puts it, whereas ‘the European market is very closed’ to agricultural exports from Brazil, ‘Britain is a free trade country’. At the same time, the desire to increase agricultural exports would be one of the major prizes for any trade deal by Latin American states.

While Mercosur may be the most prominent trade bloc in Latin America, there is possibly greater alignment between Britain and the countries of the Pacific Alliance – Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. Whereas Mercosur countries like Brazil and Argentina maintain restrictions on foreign trade and investment, the Pacific Alliance countries are among those in Latin America to have most wholeheartedly embraced economic liberalisation. As the Colombian ambassador to Britain, Nestor Osorio puts it, ‘it is this group that is working for free trade, movement of persons, movement of services, movement of capital’.

Notwithstanding these opportunities, it remains unclear how great a priority Latin America will be granted in Britain’s post-Brexit worldview. The Brexit vote certainly does seem to have increased Britain’s focus on the extra-European world, as expressed in the Global Britain strategy announced by the Prime Minister in her Lancaster House speech of January 2017. However, when moving from generalities to specifics, proponents of a Global Britain tend more commonly to highlight Asian countries – particularly China and India – as the country’s future partners, rather than those in Latin America. Thus when the Foreign Secretary advocates looking beyond Britain’s ‘immediate European hinterland’ to embrace ‘the rise of new powers’, it is to ‘China and East Asia’ that he refers in particular.

Regardless of the priority accorded to Latin America by Britain in the post-Brexit era, a broader criticism of the Global Britain strategy concerns the resources available to government to facilitate its implementation. As Britain negotiates its withdrawal from the EU – and seeks to strengthen old relationships with European countries on a bilateral basis – doubts have been raised as to whether it is possible to simultaneously establish new relationships with emerging powers in the wider world.

In the immediate aftermath of the Brexit vote, the government’s ability – or willingness – to do this seemed to be in doubt. In a hearing of the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee in December 2017, evidence from Foreign Office officials revealed plans to reallocate resources from Asia, Africa and the Americas to create 50 extra staff for European embassies. This comes against a backdrop of cuts of approximately 40 per cent in overall funding for British diplomacy. Trends such as this are a cause of alarm for those who would wish to see Britain enhance its links with Latin America in the post-Brexit era. Hugo Swire, who took over from Jeremey Brown in the Foreign Office in 2012, sees a danger in this context of ‘second and third tier countries [such as those in Latin America] slipping right down the agenda’ due to a lack of resources.

More recently, however, the Foreign Office has announced the creation of 250 new diplomatic posts, along with ten new sovereign missions, precisely to aid in fulfilling the Global Britain strategy in the post-Brexit era. Moreover, the Foreign Secretary’s recent trip, as well as the forthcoming visit of the Prime Minister to Argentina for the G20 Summit in November, suggests Latin America is at least registering on the government’s radar.

While there is clearly potential to strengthen Britain’s relations with Latin America – as is so often the case with Brexit – there is no guarantee that leaving the EU will result in this outcome. Much will depend on the decisions Britain takes as it negotiates its withdrawal from the EU, as well as the policies it adopts towards the rest of the world. What Brexit has done is cause us to reconsider Britain’s relations with the wider world, including long-neglected regions like Latin America. This can only be a good thing.

[1] Trade statistics sourced from the World Bank’s World Integrated Trade Solution, https://wits.worldbank.org/Default.aspx?lang=en.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the views of the BFPG. The BFPG is an independent not for profit organisation that encourages constructive, informed and considered opinions without taking an institutional position on any issue.

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Tom Tugendhat’s Speech at RUSI: Just a Boris Bromance or a Real Call for Change?

Tom Cargill – BFPG — Tue, 29 May 2018 16:30:16 +0000

Headlines ahead of Foreign Affairs Committee Chair Tom Tugendhat’s RUSI speech today trailed it as a controversial endorsement for Boris Johnson after months of talk of rivalry between two very different foreign policy styles. Yet although there was a nod to that gossip when he quipped ‘’We need to do something you might not expect me to say. We need to give Boris Johnson more power”, there was a far more substantive concern underlying that call. Tom Tugendhat was adding to growing warnings that the UK is entering uncharted and increasingly dangerous international waters without sufficient strategic investment, coordination or direction in our foreign policy. Not only that; but the frustration was palpable in his reminder that the UK has the tools to be a significant and positive global actor in its own and global interests. Tom referred to the UK’s globally recognised world class national assets when it comes to our insight, influence, trade, alliances and force – the ‘five fingers of a foreign policy – a hand of friendship which can if necessary be clenched into a fist’. Yet to truly draw on those assets there needs to be nothing short of a ‘revolution’ at the heart of government, with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) made the ‘strategic engine of our foreign policy’. This in turn requires a bringing together of all the international functions of government under the Foreign Secretary and coordinated by the FCO (though on defence he was tellingly ambiguous).

Tom Tugendhat is undeniably one of the most innovative thinkers in Parliament on foreign policy issues. But critics who say this is part of Tom Tugendhat’s campaign to be Foreign Secretary will inevitably accuse him of Empire building even before he has become Emperor. The call in particular to bring foreign aid under the purview of the FCO will be red rag to the highly influential international development advocacy lobby. They claim to be backed by public opinion in asserting aid is at its most effective when aimed purely at poverty alleviation, and it is undermined when used for wider UK advantage. His ideas for using Common Law as a ‘soft power’ tool of foreign policy may provoke similar concerns in the legal world.

Yet the need for a fundamental rethink of how and who delivers our foreign policy is a theme that is at the core of the work of the British Foreign Policy Group. Tom’s calls for a more strategic approach echoes previous BFPG reports, including a report he helped launch in Parliament last week arguing for greater investment in all the government departments delivering the ‘five fingers of foreign policy’ he refers to, as well as the “Rising Power” report published in November 2017, which makes the case for a foreign policy strategy that integrates trade, defence, and diplomacy.

One aspect that he only touched on is captured in his statement that foreign policy must start ‘…at home. Because a foreign policy that works for the British people is one that builds on their values and promotes their interests’. Here he is absolutely right. The BFPG has hosted events around the UK asking people from local and regional business, government, educational and other professional backgrounds what they want from our foreign policy. Tom would be heartened by the themes, which largely echo his own around values, practical delivery and ambition. But what he doesn’t mention is the frustration that these concerns seem largely ignored by a metropolitan London elite looking out for its own concerns at the expense of Britain beyond the M25. Whether this perception is true misses the point of the real visceral resentment it kicks up, resentment that undermines not only our foreign policy, but our national solidarity at a time, as Tom points out, that we need it more than we have done for many years. To his credit he has offered to engage with audiences around the UK, and the Foreign Affairs Committee which he Chairs has begun to host sessions outside London. So perhaps for his next speech we can encourage him, and other influential foreign policy voices, to swap the policy world of the London thinktank scene for an audience in Cardiff, Glasgow or Manchester. Watch this space, for we may be seeing the birth of a quiet revolution in how the UK engages with itself, and with the world.

*Parliamentary copyright images are reproduced with the permission of Parliament.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the views of the BFPG. The BFPG is an independent not for profit organisation that encourages constructive, informed and considered opinions without taking an institutional position on any issue.

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