Biden’s administration has made clear that restoring the US-EU relationship, and relations between Washington and key EU nations, such as France and Germany, will be one of its most significant priorities. They recognise that the destabilisation in the Western alliance exacerbated under Donald Trump has rendered the alliance less capable of addressing global challenges, and countering the rise of authoritarian China. While Westminster focuses specifically on the ‘special relationship’ between the UK and the US, Washington will be regarding the UK as an important, but not singular, member of the European neighbourhood and a crucial partner, alongside France and Germany, in advancing common interests.

2. It is no secret that Biden’s administration believes Brexit is a mistake, but that doesn’t mean they will marginalise the United Kingdom.

Like many of the UK’s allies, the Washington establishment was concerned about the possibility that Brexit could weaken the strategic cohesion in Europe, and precipitate a period of domestic dysfunction that sapped energy away from Britain’s capacity to lead on the world stage. Washington long saw Britain as the ‘gateway’ to Europe – a role that afforded a special degree of influence. However, they accept the decision has been made, they recognise that the UK continues to hold substantial ambitions for its Global Britain project, and hence their principal interest moving forward is to ensure that the UK and the EU work productively together.

The challenge here, of course, is that the UK Government has made clear that at least this first period of the Global Britain project is driven by a desire to ‘rebalance’ our foreign policy, pivoting away from our European neighbourhood. The US and other allies, such as Australia, will welcome the UK playing a stronger role in the Asia Pacific, but they will not want this to come at the expense of our strategic and security leadership in Europe.

3. Biden’s victory is not a game-changer for the Brexit negotiations, but it will present some challenges for the UK Government in their aftermath.

The direct impact of the outcome of the US elections on the UK-EU trade negotiations is relatively minimal. Washington, Brussels and Westminster all recognise the individual and collective benefit of a UK-EU trade deal – particularly one that facilitates a close relationship on security matters. Although much has been made of Biden’s comments in the past regarding his Irish heritage, it is important to recognise the distinction between his position as an opposition candidate and his diplomatic choices as President. His administration does not regard respect for Ireland, as an EU Member State, and the United Kingdom, as mutually exclusive – however, it is clear that, should a deal not be forthcoming, the perception of belligerence will be regarded as having been led from the UK side.

The most significant consequences of the change of power for the UK on Brexit, is the fact that Donald Trump spoke as an enthusiastic advocate for Brexit, and strengthened the UK Government narrative of sunlit uplands waiting ahead. Biden will be pragmatic, but considerably less evangelical or convinced about the Brexit dividend – precipitating moments of tension. That said, it is important to remember that the astonishing collapse in favourable UK public opinion towards the United States under Trump’s leadership has forced the UK Government to downplay the reach and impact of Donald Trump’s personal advocacy for the Brexit project, lest it became tainted by the nationalist and isolationist framing he embraces, and which this Government is at pains to avoid.

4. Biden’s victory neither imperils nor smoothly facilitates a UK-US trade deal.

There was a clear intention from the UK Government to position a United States trade deal as a key prize of the Brexit vote, and as a means of rebalancing the consequences of the friction that the UK would necessarily be imposing on its trading relationship with its largest partner, the European Union. A combination of the growing toxicity of Donald Trump’s brand with the British people, and the unexpected groundswell of concern around issues of food standards, animal welfare and environmental protections, diminished the persuasive power of a UK-US trade deal as a totem of the UK’s new independence – especially as it became clear that it could not be secured within Donald Trump’s term.

With Biden at the helm, some of the symbolic value underpinning these public anxieties are likely to diminish, as support for a US trade deal becomes decoupled from an endorsement of Donald Trump’s presidency. Biden’s commitment to action on climate change, will also help to alleviate environmental concerns. However, many of the other issues that have become obstacles to public support will continue to remain sticking points, and, having resisted calls to enshrine such protections in law, the UK Government will need to carefully manage public and industry perceptions.

5. Despite these caveats, there is no doubt that a Biden victory is the best outcome for the Global Britain project.

Although areas of tension lie ahead, principally around the UK’s choices in its relations with the European Union, there is no question at all that Joe Biden’s victory in the US elections represents an important step forward for the Global Britain project. Should Donald Trump have won a second term, the United Kingdom faced significant pressures to have to step up and assume a much more significant role in the guardianship of the liberal alliance, and the stewardship of international institutions. Although the realities of America’s domestic position and the limitations of its foreign policy mandate will necessitate the United Kingdom playing a robust and active role in global leadership, the scale of the responsibility will be tempered, as it will be shared.

In many ways, the enduring strength of the ‘special relationship’ has been exemplified under Donald Trump’s unconventional leadership, with the two nations still managing to find areas of cooperation – such as the expansion of the Magnitksy sanctions. With Biden in the White House, a host of new areas of collaboration are opened up. Climate change policy is an obvious starting point, with Biden’s team eager to re-join the Paris Climate Agreement, and Johnson committed to ensuring the UK’s hosting of the COP26 environmental summit charts an ambitious course. With America’s moral mission restored, partnerships on advancing human rights, the spread of democracy, media freedoms, and the rule of law, suddenly all become possible once more. With the UK at the helm of the G7 next year, the emphasis on our common interests, the strengthening of old alliances, and the opening up of new ones such as the D10, will conjure a tone of mutual respect and sober ambition, which has been missing in recent years.

Conclusion

Both nations are emerging from a period of significant domestic upheaval, and there will be significant constraints on their domestic mandates to pursue agendas of openness without also balancing these with investments in security and resilience. There will be some moments of friction in the coming years as new power dynamics evolve and the United Kingdom crystallises its new mission. Ultimately, however, both the United Kingdom and the United States understand that their individual successes and combined strength are integral to the advancement of global peace and security. With both eyes on the prize, the special relationship will earn the rights to its name.

Sophia Gaston’s recent paper on the consequences of the US elections for US foreign policy is available to download here.

The post What Joe Biden’s victory means for the UK & Global Britain appeared first on British Foreign Policy Group.

Here are five things we learned from the speech about how the Trade Secretary seeks to take her brief forward:

1. The UK will not pursue a “Britain First” approach to free trade. In a rebuke to the slogan pursued by US President Donald Trump in his rather aggressive reframing of American trade policy, Liz Truss ruled out “an autarkic Britain First approach” to trade – suggesting that the UK will approach its trading policy as a mutually beneficial collaboration between partners. She argued that the UK is learning “from the twin errors of values-free globalisation and protectionism” but must balance this against the inherent importance of trade, in and of itself, as “a lean, green, value-creating machine”. Truss gave scant detail of how the UK’s trading policy will address concerns citizens hold about globalisation, or how it will be balanced with other domestic economic policies.

2. Values will be at the heart of the UK’s trading policy. The overwhelming message that Truss sought to convey was that the UK’s trading policy will be “values-generating” and “values-driven”. By this, she means that not only will the UK Government only pursue agreements in line with its own values, but that the UK will also seek to spread its fundamental values – defined as  “sovereignty, democracy, the rule of law and a fierce commitment to high standards” – through its trading policy. However, in practice, a values-based trade policy may prove difficult to achieve, especially in light of the combined economic and political pressures created by Brexit and the coronavirus pandemic. For example, the UK is said to be “very close” to securing a free trade agreement with Turkey, whose recent aggressions in Syria, Libya and the East Mediterranean, and its belligerence towards France following a spate of recent terror attacks, challenge the legitimacy of the values-first argument.

3. The UK will seek to challenge China on trade. Although Truss made no direct reference to China, in a number of thinly-veiled comments she repeated criticisms often levied at China, criticising states who “artificially promote state-subsidised products” and engage in forced technology transfer. She argued that “mistakes when the World Trade Organisation allowed new and large economies to join in the early 2000s without being subject to the same disciplines as existing members.”. As such, she committed to using the UK’s G7 presidency next year “to lead the global fightback for free and fair trade, challenging those who won’t play by the rules”. However, as ever, the UK’s willingness and capacity to challenge China as a global trading actor will be tempered by the careful balance to be struck in maintaining positive economic relations with the authoritarian state and keeping China ‘at the table’ on climate change – a key UK foreign policy priority.

4. The UK Government recognises the need to build public support for Free Trade Agreements. Pointing towards the three million signatures that were gathered in Europe opposing the EU’s ascension to TTIP, Truss highlighted the importance of building trust and public support for free trade. She also criticised politicians for not “fully engaging in the concerns the public have”. BFPG research shows that whilst Britons are broadly supportive of free trade and globalisation, they have an extensive range of concerns including over the impact on the NHS, food standards, workers’ rights and animal and environmental protections. The Trade Secretary was seeking to signal that HMG will be looking to build some form of engagement into its trade policy machine.

5. The UK Government continues to resist legislative guarantees for the standards it promises to protect. Truss spelt out explicitly where the UK Government believes the red lines for securing free trade agreements will fall. She pledged that the “NHS remains off the table”, that “food standards must not be undermined and British farming must benefit” and that “any trade deal must help ‘level up’ our country”. However, she refused to impose “blanket bans on any food produced differently from the UK” arguing that to do so would have a “devastating effect on economies which we want to see benefit from free trade”. Activists and many citizens remain suspicious as to why the Government is resisting efforts to enshrine standards in legislation, and this area is clearly going to remain one of the most contentious and difficult communications aspects of the UK’s trade policy moving forward.

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1. The Government wants the UK to be seen as a cooperative global partner in the pandemic, and will be hoping to project this during the vaccine roll-out.

2. The Foreign Secretary noted the UK and its allies must coordinate effectively to ensure that there isn’t a ‘vacuum’ in key positions in multilateral organisations that can be filled by authoritarian states.

(While it was not explicitly stated, it was implicit in his response that the ‘vacuum’ is being accelerated by the United States’ unpredictable behaviour towards global institutions. This reflects concerns being shared privately amongst the UK’s allies.)

3. The Foreign Secretary’s response to questions about the Intelligence and Security Committee’s report published in the summer mainly emphasised a defensive position of the existing systems the Government has in place. Expanding Magnitsky sanctions was the only specific future-oriented policy mentioned by the Foreign Secretary, alongside ‘a commitment to learn’.

4. While coming out strongly against its human rights violations, the Foreign Secretary defended the need to have a constructive relationship with China and expressed frustration at the pressure for an absolutist approach. He said there are both ‘risks and opportunities’ in engaging China, and the central opportunity for cooperation is around tackling climate change. He made clear that China should be part of the conversation at Cop26 and that he wants “China in the room” on UN climate talks.

5. The Foreign Secretary promoted a “three-pillar freedom agenda” for the UK’s foreign policy: defending media freedoms, the freedom of religion & belief, and imposing Magnitsky sanctions on those who constrain freedoms. The UK’s G7 presidency priorities will include promoting an “open societies” mission – based around both free trade, and democracy and human rights. It appears increasingly clear that the presidency is seen as the stage on which to express the ambitions of the Integrated Review.

6. In line with the government’s commitment towards investment in technology, and its ambitions for this to be a competitive point of difference, the Foreign Secretary mentioned that he would like to see investment in technology start-ups coordinated with institutional expertise – such as GCHQ – to offer a competitive advantage for the UK on the world stage.

(It was not mentioned by the Foreign Secretary, but this approach has also been discussed in the context of the UK’s liberal allies providing state-market combined solutions to challenge China’s dominance in competitive infrastructure tenders, as we note in our recent report)

7. The Foreign Secretary believes the integration of the FCO and DFID into one department has already been vindicated, and the increased impact of their work facilitated by the merger is now giving “more value for taxpayers’ buck”. When pushed on whether the Department of International Trade should also be integrated into the FCDO, Raab cautiously sidestepped the question of a formal merger; however, he said that a greater degree of integration was already taking place in a practical sense.

8. The breach of international law in the Internal Market Bill was described as a “cautionary defensive action” towards the European Union. He said there was absolutely no doubt that the UK is seen as a responsible global actor and that no other nation has raised issues with him to this effect. He robustly avoided comparisons of equivalence being drawn between the UK’s actions on this matter and authoritarian states.

9. When pressed on whether the UK should boycott the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics due to the atrocities committed by the Chinese state towards its Uighur population, the Foreign Secretary left the question open and said that the “evidence needs to be evaluated” before decisions can be taken. He made clear that while they believe the human rights abuses are “egregious and appalling”, and “at odds with the responsibility” of members of the global community, the FCDO has not yet reached a point at which they can confidently declare that the situation has reached the legal threshold for the use of the term “genocide”.

10. The Foreign Secretary made clear that the “Indo-Pacific tilt” is going to be a – if not, the – core priority of the Integrated Review, and that the UK will be seeking to bring more “mid-sized powers” into its orbit as part of that agenda. He also named climate change, girls’ education, technology and cyber, and strengthening national resilience, as important focus areas in the Review.

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The Integrated Review is expected to be published in November, following the United States’ Presidential elections. The BFPG will be hosting a series of events and conversations in the aftermath of the Review’s publication. Please sign up to our newsletter to keep informed about these.

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The fact that the UK’s foreign policy is being defined in the aftermath of the seismic referendum – and the unusual period of politics that has followed in its wake – dramatically alters the framework in which it is examined, and the scope and nature of our ambitions. As I have previously discussed, the identity component at the heart of the Global Britain project requires the interrogation of not only our present state and intentions for the future, but also to come to an understanding about our past. Here too, the fact that this exercise is taking place at this particular moment, where an essential component of the social polarisation shaping domestic politics centres on the absence of a collective view about the value and morality of our history, complicates the task at hand.

The depth and breadth of the challenge to governance in Western liberal nations in the 21^st Century is clear, as we move through the growing pains of a great democratic experiment – seeking to build prosperous economies and robust leadership on the collective consent of increasingly empowered, increasingly diverse societies. Within this new landscape, foreign policy has become progressively embedded in, and contingent on, domestic political constraints – and linked to the expression of domestic political identities.

The central challenge at the heart of the Global Britain project centres on how to build public consent for the openness and connectivity required to underpin our economic prosperity, to enable us to fulfil our obligations as responsible members of the international community, and to advance and champion causes important to our values, and global peace and security. While Britons have traditionally been instinctively more inclined towards openness than many of their counterparts in other advanced democracies, their concerns about the asymmetrical benefits of globalisation and its consequences for communities and the agency of the nation state necessitate a shift in gear in both the substance and communications of policy-making.

The mission is therefore to ‘securitise openness’ – to authentically persuade citizens that the things they value and which provide anchors of belonging and community to them, will be tended to and upheld. And therefore, to enable Britons to feel confident that the various forms of global engagement we pursue, and the ways in which we make ourselves open to the world, will not become mutually exclusive to their own safety. It is, in effect, a careful balancing act – reinforcing each act of openness with an act of security. Ideally, reaching a point where we can be ambitious with our global role, because the role itself contributes to citizens’ sense of pride, sense of self, and shared purpose.

While, during the Corbyn era, the Labour Party’s international platform increasingly appeared to weaken its commitment to some of the issues most salient to Britons as part of a shared national identity – such as patriotism, community, the monarchy and the armed forces – while also appearing ambivalent towards some of the aspects of international engagement most valued by Britons – such as our membership of NATO – the Party’s new leadership have made clear that they recognise the practical and symbolic importance of these domestic and foreign policy pillars.

In his speech at the Labour Party’s digital party conference this past week, Leader of the Opposition Kier Starmer spoke frequently about Labour’s renewed commitment to delivering ‘security’ on a range of levels. Starmer explicitly argued that, “Never again will Labour go into an election not being trusted on national security”, but also mentioned other types of domestic security as part of one singular security framework – jobs, communities and finances – demonstrating the extent to which the Party now considers these to be a connected suite of issues. The appointment of Lisa Nandy – who has championed both a ‘progressive internationalism’ and the plight of ‘left-behind’ towns – as Labour’s Shadow Foreign Secretary, has clearly been instrumental in cementing the Party’s thinking around the fusion of the domestic and international spheres.

The Government has also been examining how to embed public engagement into the bricks and mortar of the Global Britain project via the Integrated Review, considering what a more ‘inclusive’ approach to foreign policy-making could look like in practice. There are also serious questions being asked about a meaningful integration of the Levelling Up and Global Britain projects – a relief for those of us who had been concerned that they might fall into competition. Bringing these two together in a more cohesive manner, perhaps even through a dedicated team focused on policy collaboration within the Cabinet Office, would provide a solid underpinning to the strategic endeavour to ‘open with one hand, secure with the other’ – allowing for a greater coordination of policy announcements, and embedding both a stronger spirit of security in our foreign policy, and a stronger spirit of openness in the domestic renewal project.

In some significant ways, the pandemic has hastened thinking around this intersection – compelling focus, as it has, on our national resilience and the areas where international cooperation can prove most valuable. The tensions we and many other liberal nations are experiencing in our relationship with China, and the increasing awareness of our reliance on its supply chains and manufacturing capabilities, provide grist to the mill to efforts seeking to invest in these functions at home. The ‘D-10’ alliance could begin to consider how best to balance market and state investments to challenge China’s dominance in large-scale competitive tenders, unleashing a new era of innovation and strengthening our collective security around critical national infrastructure. Over time, these sorts of endeavours should be able to provide employment opportunities, help to revitalise communities, and allow us to become less reactive in some areas of our foreign policy-making.

Despite the anxieties that have grown over recent years around the Brexit project as a potential moment of ‘turning inward’, the Government has been keen to emphasise that they are prepared to strike a balance with their generous economic regeneration policies and tougher immigration framework, permitting them in turn to pursue an open and connected foreign policy. The Integrated Review, due sometime in November, will help to reveal the extent to which this stated ambition may be achieved. Just as pertinent, however, will be the progress of its domestic renewal project, particularly in the wake of the pandemic and its strain on government finances. It would be useful for foreign policy watchers to regard these missions as symbiotic, to some degree, as it is in the complete picture that they collectively provide, that we will best be able to discern the true scope and nature of the Global Britain project.

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By Sophia Gaston

As populism has become part of the furniture in Europe, focus has shifted away from examining the origins of these anti-establishment movements, and back towards fascination with the fortunes of the leaders themselves. Meanwhile, muted victories for traditional parties in a handful of elections, and the energy of a new parliament, are held up as proof that we have passed ‘peak populism’, and the system-level correction the old guard had been waiting for could yet still emerge.

Beneath the surface of Europe’s nascent political stabilisation, however, its social challenges remain profound. The Divided Continent, a new analysis of public opinion I have conducted for the European Policy Centre, across 13 major EU member states, shines light on the tensions and conflicts simmering beneath the surface, as Europe enters a crucial decade.

As ever, we must note that, despite their shared membership of the European Union, these nations each hold distinct historical, cultural and political stories and identities. Indeed, the diversity of findings simply emphasises the challenge of centralised policy-making for a continent grappling with a number of divergent, often contradictory, trends.

We can see that countries such as France, Germany and the Netherlands are struggling with their poorly managed transitions to post-industrial economies, and diverse, empowered societies. In Southern states such as Italy, Spain and Greece, the spectre of the financial crisis continues to loom large. And in the post-communist states in Eastern and Central Europe, fragile democracies are faltering and pulling away from the liberal European ambition.

One consistent and troubling theme amongst the vast majority of the member states is the disappointment citizens feel towards their nation’s trajectory – in economic opportunities, national standing, and community cohesion. Indeed, Estonia is the only member state we surveyed where a majority of citizens believe that quality of life has improved in their lifetime, with as many as 70% of the French and three-quarters of Greeks believing it has fallen. While those who suffered acutely in the financial crisis could be expected to long for a more prosperous period, nostalgia is deep-seated even amongst the more economically resilient member states – once again confirming the important social and cultural dimensions of this powerful political force.

We can also deduce that two of the most fiercely contested battlegrounds of the coming decade will be over the inter-generational contract, and the next phase of the feminist movement. While they manifest in strikingly different ways between member states, it is clear that many of the most contested issues – such as economic reform, immigration and identity – are fusing onto age and gender to a degree that renders them central to understanding today’s social and political polarisation. Women are, for example, considerably more likely to feel vulnerable to economic inequality, and to be concerned about the preservation of national traditions. In turn, those who hold sexist attitudes towards women are less likely to support democratic principles, and to harbour nostalgic sentiments.

Between the generations, we can also see profoundly different attitudes towards democracy, immigration, patriotism and cultural traditions. In Western Europe, the young are distinctly more liberal in their opinions on cultural diversity. In Central and Eastern Europe, however, it is the older generations who defend democracy and cosmopolitan values. The tensions between the generations are reaching a fever pitch not seen since the 1960s, and diffusing them will compel governments to entirely rethink the social and economic settlement.

There has been much discussion about the future of liberal democracy, and the new cadre of EU leaders consider themselves to be on the frontline of its defence. After a rocky decade for Europe’s traditional political parties, just 37% of Europeans we surveyed consistently supported democratic principles, and half of the electorate is disengaged from political participation. Nonetheless, majorities in most member states declare they would be more likely to support political candidates who stand up for human rights, who seek alternative points of view and seek compromises. The inconsistency with their actual voting behaviour, however, suggests that the wider environment in which many elections are taking place is presenting voters with threats and insecurities that exceed their instincts towards liberal, consensus-building politicians.

The EU’s fresh leadership is keen to drive forward an ambitious agenda; however they will be unlikely to succeed without a deep understanding of the delicate social ecosystem. Whether along the lines of age and gender, or the schisms between those who hope for a more cosmopolitan or communitarian future, the divisions that have formed within and between member states are difficult to ignore. Let us not also forget the glaring absence of the United Kingdom from this survey, as it begins its new life outside the European Union. Small movements towards stabilisation may afford the air of recovery, but they should not obscure the challenging road to reform still to be taken, if the continent is to thrive in the years to come.

The full working paper can be downloaded free via the European Policy Centre’s website.

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Earlier this year, we surveyed Britons about their views on the UK’s foreign policy activities and objectives. At this time, the Brexit Party – which burst to life in the European elections in May – did not yet exist. As such, we captured the spread of parties as they stood at that time in the pre-Brexit Party landscape, including the Conservatives, Labour, the Lib Dems, the SNP, Plaid Cymru, the Greens, and UKIP.

In the European elections, nearly 70 per cent of UKIP voters switched their vote to the Brexit Party, with a quarter remaining as UKIP voters and another sliver voting directly for the Conservatives[i]. The Brexit Party’s largest vote share overall came from former Conservative voters. As Britain’s 2019 General Election approaches, it is unclear as to whether the Brexit Party will once again secure a large representation of Conservative voters, and whether UKIP voters will remain loyal to this new party, or will return to the distant homelands of the Conservative Party – as 45 per cent of them did in the 2017 election[ii]. Recent analysis of voting intention surveys had suggested that UKIP voters would largely gravitate towards the Brexit Party, with a substantial chunk repatriating to the Conservatives[iii]; however, the ‘squeeze’ of the UK’s First Past the Post system also indicates that voters may respond to the existential nature of the vote, and consolidate around the two major parties.

Much has been made of the potential for the Brexit Party and the Conservative Party to join forces in some form of an electoral pact, to prevent both parties cannibalising the others’ vote share. Beyond the election, or the formation of any governing coalitions, however, there are important questions about how the tremendous degree of voter volatility is reshaping the voting bases of the largest parties. In this analysis, I consider what the expressed preferences of UKIP voters towards foreign policy could signal about the challenges facing the Conservative Party, should these voters (and their counterparts in the Brexit Party) find themselves ‘coming home’.

We find that UKIP voters (now largely Brexit Party voters, and referred hereon in as ‘UKIP-BP voters’) are utterly distinct in their views about foreign policy, compared to Conservative voters. This suggests that any homecoming of these voters to the Conservative Party would create a more substantial faction within the Tories instinctively hostile to many of the grounding principles of its ambitions for ‘Global Britain’.

1. UKIP/Brexit Party voters are less likely to be interested or knowledgeable about foreign affairs than Conservative voters.

When asked about their degree of interest in the UK’s international affairs, Conservative and UKIP-BP voters are 20 points apart in their level of engagement. Just 57 per cent of UKIP-BP voters report being interested in our role in the world, compared to 77 per cent of Conservative voters.

The gap increases further when asked about their level of knowledge of the UK’s foreign affairs, with just 37 per cent of UKIP-BP voters describing themselves as ‘informed’, compared to 59 per cent of Conservatives. A full quarter of UKIP-BP voters describe themselves as ‘uninformed’, compared to 13 per cent of Conservatives.

2. UKIP/Brexit Party voters are distinguished from Conservative voters by their relatively narrow focus towards international affairs, and distinct amongst all voters in their preoccupation with immigration.

Significant disparities of opinion can also be observed between their global issues of interest, with Conservative voters much more likely to share common concerns with Labour and Lib Dem voters than UKIP-BP voters. For example, Conservative voters are around 10 percentage points more likely to be interested in climate change and international trade than UKIP-BP voters, and somewhat more concerned about international terrorism and global wars.

UKIP-BP voters, however, are distinct in their outsized preoccupation with immigration: at 81 per cent, they are almost 30 percentage points more concerned about this issue than Conservative voters, and more than 50 percentage points more concerned than Labour voters.

3. UKIP/Brexit Party voters are uniquely hostile to multilateral organisations and institutions, and diverge particularly from Conservative voters on these issues.

UKIP-BP voters are distinctive in their opposition to Britain’s membership of international organisations and institutions – an especially stark contrast with their Conservative counterparts. Compared to Conservative voters, they are nearly 20 percentage points less likely to support the UK’s membership of the WTO, and more than 20 percentage points less inclined to back the UK’s membership of NATO. They are also utterly unique amongst all British voters in their antipathy towards the UN, and their special hostility towards the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. The only organisation for which their support falls within the scope of the median voter is in their general favourability towards the Commonwealth, which in fact exceeds (75 per cent to 70 per cent) that of Labour voters.

Multilateral organisations are clearly regarded with deep suspicion by UKIP-BP voters, who consider them to be instruments of globalisation of little constructive purpose for the UK. These attitudes put them at distinct odds with Conservative voters, who, as we discussed in the previous article, lead the country in their emphatic level of support for international governance.

4. UKIP/Brexit Party voters preference defence spending over trade, and actively de-prioritise international aid.

UKIP-BP voters are the most likely of any Britons to favour a reduction to UK Government spending on foreign affairs, with only 16 per cent of them supportive of increases to the international budget, compared to a quarter of Conservatives, and a majority (53 per cent) in active favour of reductions, compared to 31 per cent of Conservatives.

There are three areas of the UK Government’s international expenditure in which UKIP-BP voters are clearly distinct in their spending preferences to Conservative voters. The first is in the preference they afford to defence spending – with 57 per cent of UKIP-BP voters prioritising this as their principal funding priority, compared to 44 per cent of Conservative voters. In turn, Conservatives are 10 percentage points more inclined (47 per cent to 37 per cent) to prioritise trade as a spending priority. Thirdly, UKIP-BP voters are more likely to actively deprioritise aid spending, with 83 per cent ranking this as their lowest funding priority, compared to 68 per cent of Conservatives.

5. UKIP/Brexit Party voters want Britain to ‘put its interests first’, condemn military interventionism and are disinterested in the UK leading on democracy and values.

UKIP-BP voters are aligned with Conservative voters on their preference for the UK’s foreign policy to preference ‘economic and strategic interests’ over values such as human rights and democracy, and indeed are somewhat more likely (58 per cent to 55 per cent) to emphasise this prioritisation.

When asked as to how they would like the UK to be seen in the world, UKIP-BP voters overwhelmingly favour (76 per cent) being regarded as ‘a country that puts the interests and welfare of its citizens first’ – more than 10 percentage points more strongly than Conservative voters. UKIP-BP are also significantly less likely to choose being a leading nation in the Commonwealth (32 per cent, to 46 per cent of Conservative voters), and being a leader on global political issues such as human rights, climate change and world poverty (17 per cent, to 34 per cent of Conservative voters).

Significantly, UKIP-BP voters are also twice as likely (35 per cent, to 17 per cent of Conservative voters) to want the UK to be known as a country that does not intervene in foreign conflicts.

Conclusion

Even a cursory glance at this data underscores the fundamental distinctions between UKIP/Brexit Party voters and Conservative voters, across a range of crucial foreign policy dimensions. They are less supportive of multilateralism and interventionism, less interested in Britain investing funding and resources towards promoting democracy, values and human rights abroad, and regard immigration as almost the singular international issue of any importance to their lives.

We can therefore conclude, that should these voters – who have wavered between smaller parties over recent election cycles – choose to realign themselves with the Conservative Party, which largely shares their views on Brexit, they will bring with them a unique antipathy towards many of the foundational principles of the ‘Global Britain’ ambitions that have been so important to the Party since the 2016 Referendum.

The challenges the Conservative Party may subsequently face in bringing their voter base along with them on their foreign affairs platform and spending priorities could be made even more acute if the homecoming of UKIP/Brexit Party voters coincides with the exodus of the more liberal, internationalist wing of the Conservative Party towards the Lib Dems and Labour.

As we can see from this data, and in light of the previous analysis of the distinctions between Labour and Conservative voters, the Conservative Party is currently a relatively broad church in terms of its foreign policy priorities and preferences. There is a risk that this election may produce voting dynamics that could see the Conservative voting base become increasingly narrow, more homogenous and – ultimately – less instinctively internationalist in its views.

Foreign policy does appear to be an area in which the general public turns to politicians more receptively for leadership; however, it is always simpler and more effective to govern when your own voting base, at least, trusts your instincts. With enormous political debates looming on the nature and scope of our international footprint after Brexit, a governing Conservative Party will naturally wish to ensure that their most pernicious battles are with the opposition, not their own voters. Should former UKIP voters help them across the line in December 2019, and especially if this comes at the expense of their internationalist former heartlands, the challenges the Conservative leadership will face to persuade the country to fall behind their vision for a more open, global future will exponentially escalate.

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Notes

Survey Sample: 1,514 British adults aged 18+. Fieldwork conducted online by BMG Research, between 8 – 11 January 2019.

The data used in this analysis is based on self-declared voting intention, as of the time of the survey. Evidently, the political landscape has shifted dramatically since the time of this survey – most notably, with the emergence of the Brexit Party, the resurgence of the Liberal Democrats, and a wide series of defections and expulsions from the major parties.

The forthcoming annual survey of British public opinion on foreign policy will be published by the British Foreign Policy Group in 2020.

[1] Lord Ashcroft, May 2019: https://lordashcroftpolls.com/2019/05/my-euro-election-post-vote-poll-most-tory-switchers-say-they-will-stay-with-their-new-party/

[1] YouGov, June 2017: https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-reports/2017/06/22/how-did-2015-voters-cast-their-ballot-2017-general

[1] YouGov, November 2019: https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-reports/2019/11/01/how-will-eu-referendum-and-2017-voters-cast-their-

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A comparison of the countries visited by Boris Johnson and Jeremy Hunt as Foreign Secretary (Blue = countries visited by Hunt only, Green = countries visited by Johnson only, Yellow = countries visited by Both)

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