Fast forward a year, and the majority of adults in Europe, the UK and the United States have received at least one dose of the vaccine, and restrictions are beginning to ease. In contrast, just 1% of citizens in low-income nations have received the first dose of their vaccine, and nations such as Tunisia and Indonesia, which had fared well in the first phase of the pandemic, have now been plunged into emergencies. With the immediate health crisis appearing to become more manageable in many advanced nations, at least for now, there are increasing calls for them to turn their attention to helping to vaccinate the rest of the world.

The Value of Vaccine Diplomacy

As the world grapples with the ongoing effects of the pandemic, Covid-19 vaccinations have revealed themselves to be the only pathway to recovery. Manufacturing and distributing these vaccines provides an opportunity for nations to generate soft power, asserting both their scientific prowess and their values on the international stage. It is an opportunity for nations to reward old friends and build new ones, highlighting the relative benefits of their political systems, markets and ideologies.

Serbia, for example, which is currently setting up Europe’s largest Confucius Institute to study Chinese culture and history, was among the first to receive Covid-19 vaccines from China, and bilateral donations by the EU have overwhelmingly been sent to its Balkan neighbours, in an effort to anticipate and rebuff Russia’s growing influence in the region.

In some cases, the coercive intentions behind Covid-19 vaccine donations and purchasing opportunities have been more overt, with China allegedly asking Honduras to end its recognition of Taiwan’s autonomy in return for vaccines and pressuring Ukraine to stop criticising its treatment of the Uighur people in Xinjiang. As a scarce resource, vaccine diplomacy has therefore cleaved on to existing geopolitical tensions, with China accusing Japan of ‘political manipulation’ and the United States of ‘interference in China’s internal affairs’, for donating vaccines to Taiwan.

China and Russia’s Early Dominance

While Western nations were criticised for hoarding vaccines in the early stages of vaccine development, China and Russia opted instead to delay vaccinating their own citizens, and instead gain an early lead in the global vaccine diplomacy race. While China has only donated 27 million Covid-19 vaccines so far, paling in comparison to the 500 million doses the United States pledged to donate last month, it has widely been regarded as the leader in vaccine diplomacy. In part this is due to the speed at which it began its vaccine diplomacy efforts, the wide geographic dispersion of its donations, covering 70 countries worldwide, and its ability to offer supplies quickly.

China’s leadership in this area has been cemented by its willingness to sell domestically produced vaccines to other nations, selling over 400 million Chinese-produced vaccines internationally, compared to the 44.6 million exported by the United States. By providing vaccine purchasing opportunities to nations unable to access Western vaccines due to the early orders made by advanced nations, China has been able to curry favour with lower-income nations without the economic cost of donating vaccines. Russia has followed closely behind, particularly in Africa, offering the African Union the opportunity to buy 300 million doses of the Sputnik V vaccine in February, alongside financing packages to enable countries to distribute these vaccines.

The two nations’ vaccine diplomacy hasn’t just been confined to developing nations. In the Spring, they identified opportunities presented by the slow rollout of the EU’s vaccine purchase and delivery scheme as a chance to make inroads amongst its member states, and to sow divide within the European Union. Hungary has publicly criticised the EU’s vaccine rollout, opting to inoculate its citizens with Russian and Chinese vaccines and taking an early lead in vaccinations as a result. Meanwhile, the Sputnik V vaccine has been at the centre of political disputes in Slovakia, with former Slovakian Prime Minister, Igor Matovic, forced to resign his post after secretly arranging to import 200,000 doses of Russia’s Sputnik V vaccine, a move he failed to gain approval from his coalition partners for.

Unfulfilled Promises and Changing Tides

However, as with the disillusionment with the PPE delivered by these nations in the first wave of the pandemic, Russia and China’s vaccines have also not been able to fulfil expectations.

A primary issue has been the efficacy of Chinese-manufactured vaccines, with hundreds of healthcare workers in Asian countries contracting Covid-19, despite being double vaccinated with the Sinovac vaccine. As a result, Thailand and Indonesia have both opted to give citizens a mix of vaccines, rather than two Sinovac vaccines, in a bid to increase efficacy and curb spiraling new outbreaks, while the UAE is offering third doses of the Sinopharm vaccine in an effort to boost immunity levels.

Similarly, while Russia has made much of its international Covid-19 vaccine sales and deliveries, just 24 per cent of the 1.14 million doses of the Sputnik V vaccine donated by Russia have been delivered. In Africa, Russia significantly overestimated African nations’ capacity to locally produce Sputnik V, and has been too slow to transfer the production knowledge to public health professionals in Africa, resulting in nations such as Egypt needing to delay the rollout of the Sputnik V vaccine to the second half of 2021. Further, the Sputnik V vaccine costs triple the price of the AstraZeneca vaccine, which is being provided to developing nations at a not-for-profit price, pricing out many nations, which are looking towards more affordable and effective Western alternatives and the COVAX scheme.

However, despite current setbacks, no doubt Russian and China’s vaccine diplomacy campaigns will continue at pace – just last week COVAX signed a deal to purchase 550 million Chinese Covid-19 vaccines, to mitigate delays in Western deliveries. Unless Western nations significantly increase their pledges of support and international access to their domestically produced vaccines, lower-income nations will have no choice but to rely on Russia and China – despite their many issues.

COVAX and Western Vaccine Diplomacy

It is true that Western nations have slowly increased their vaccine diplomacy efforts. As well as investing heavily and leading the creation of some of the most effective Covid-19 vaccines including the Pfizer-BioNTech, Moderna, AstraZeneca and Johnson & Johnson vaccines, and supporting local vaccine production, Western nations have been some of the biggest supporters of COVAX, both financially and in terms of vaccine contributions. Ahead of the G7 summit in June, G7 nations alone had contributed over 1 billion doses to COVAX through direct financing and doses. At the summit itself, G7 nations committed to providing a further one billion doses from summer 2021, with the United States alone committing to purchasing and contributing 500 million Pfizer vaccines to COVAX, while the UK committed to donating at least 100 million surplus vaccines.

Nonetheless, of the 870 million Covid-19 vaccines pledged at the G7 Summit in June, very few have been distributed, and the Western-led COVAX scheme has been plagued by supply challenges. After the pandemic situation in India reached a crisis point, the Serum Institute of India, which produces the Oxford-AstraZeneca vaccine, on which much of the COVAX scheme relies, ceased vaccine exports until the end of 2021. The COVAX distribution scheme has also received less than one per cent of the over 500 million doses pledged by wealthy countries, with the EU and the UK both yet to donate any of their pledged surplus vaccines to COVAX, while donations from the United States have only recently begun to trickle through.

In part, this reflects the ongoing precarity of Western nations’ domestic situations, with concerns over new variants, vaccine efficacy and the possible need for booster vaccines in the Autumn. This has led the UK to begin preparations to provide booster vaccinations to its most vulnerable in September, pending final advice from the Joint Committee on Vaccination and Immunisation, while the United States is currently in talks with Pfizer about the provision of booster vaccines. With Western leaders fearful of having to reimpose restrictions on their citizens in the future, the uncertainty around the next phases of the pandemic mean the issues with COVAX’s supply chain currently remain unresolved.

Where to Next?

With the United States sitting on millions of excess vaccines set to expire next month, and yet the COVAX scheme struggling with lack of donations, patience among developing nations and in international organisations is wearing thin. The World Health Organisation has called for a further 10 billion vaccines to reach global herd immunity, far and above the amounts currently being offered, with World Health Organisation Chief Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus criticising wealthier nations “greed” for driving vaccine inequity.

While Western nations have consistently resisted pressure from international organisations and developing countries to increase Covid-19 aid and support, with the disappointment of Chinese and Russian vaccine efforts, there is a clear opportunity for Western nations to step into the vacuum presented by the global scramble for Covid-19 vaccines. However, their ability and willingness to do so will no doubt be contingent on their confidence in the extent to which they have been able to get the virus under control domestically – a prospect for which there remains many unknowns.

If Western nations do decide to focus on accelerating the vaccination of the developing world, they will face a changing set of competitors in the field of vaccine diplomacy, as the challenges to vaccine equity shifts from vaccine production to vaccine purchasing. Where development of their own vaccines previously gave the United States, India and China the upper hand in vaccine diplomacy, financial and purchasing power now holds greater weight, enabling nations such as Saudi Arabia to get in on the action.

As demonstrated at the G7 Summit, the purchasing power and logistical heft of Western nations remains extremely strong when a spirit of collaboration prevails. Leaders clearly recognise the moral and a strategic imperative to tackle the two-tier system emerging between the global North and South, but continue to be cautious about the evolving needs of their domestic populations. It is only through working together to share the collective risk and responsibility to adequately service the COVAX scheme that the West will be able to counter the challenge posed by Russia and China, and stimulate the global economy.

For the UK, the need for balance is clear. While hospitalisations and deaths remain low, cases continue to rise and the so-called ‘pingdemic’ is challenging our ability to return to day-to-day life, necessitating caution and pragmatism from the UK government to ensure its own citizens are protected. Nonetheless, properly supporting lower income nations in a truly global health crisis is both a moral and strategic necessity, and must be taken seriously as a central focus of the Global Britain agenda.

The post The Rise of Vaccine Diplomacy appeared first on British Foreign Policy Group.

The growing visibility of Australian strategists at the heart of the Conservative Party’s operations has drawn much interest, but their presence is nothing new. Canberra has long served as a training ground or victory lap for political recruits, with the shared Westminster system facilitating a kind of two-way exchange programme for strategists trading off election success. Sir Lynton Crosby cut his teeth on John Howard’s campaigns during the 1990s, before decamping to London to support Boris Johnson’s mayoral campaigns and David Cameron’s 2015 election victory. After serving as Tony Blair’s director of political operations, John McTernan moved to Canberra to support Kevin Rudd’s 2007 campaign, and then went on to serve as the communications director for Julia Gillard.

Last year, Lynton Crosby’s protégé Isaac Levido, who worked on current Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison’s surprise 2019 win, was brought in to lead Boris Johnson’s general election campaign, and returned in March to sharpen the government’s coronavirus communications. Like Crosby, Levido has now established his own political consultancy, helping businesses and other stakeholders get their heads around the new centrifugal force of political power.

Still, something feels unique about the Australian influence in British politics in 2020, which extends far beyond personnel. Today’s antipodean dalliance coincides with one of the most significant moments in modern British history, as the chapter of our European Union membership comes to a close. The irony, of course, is that Australia was forced to undertake this same exercise after Britain joined the EEC some forty years ago, compelling the young Anglosphere nation to reconsider its identity and build a new future for itself within its region.

With its sense of boundless energy and good humour, Australia provides an attractive model for a nation reinventing its identity, and a government urgently needing a tangible blueprint for an independent future. Australia’s unique combination of a European-style welfare state and an American streak of libertarianism offer an intriguing template, and its high-functioning civil service is a font of policy ideas.

The importation of Australia’s ‘points-based immigration system’ proved so popular with the British public, that the nation’s hard-line border approach to irregular arrivals by sea is now being considered to address the growing spate of Channel crossings. The merger between Australia’s own development and foreign affairs departments was studied in great detail as the prototype for the UK’ s consolidation of its international engagement. The decision by the Australian government to draw a hard line on Huawei, banning the China-owned technology firm from its 5G network, accelerated pressure on the UK government to reverse its position.

Recent reports that Tony Abbott, the divisive former Prime Minister of Australia, will be appointed to an advisory role on the UK’s new trade commission body, has solidified the influence of an Australian tone in post-Brexit Britain, if not its substance. Deadpan, the UK Government has even taken to brazenly describing a ‘No Deal Brexit’ as an ‘Australian-style deal’ – a source of great bemusement and weariness for Canberra’s political commentators.

Opinion polling and focus groups make clear that Australia holds special appeal for ordinary Britons, regarded as a prosperous and buoyant model to emulate. Certainly, one only has to step off the plane in any of Australia’s major cities to feel an immediate sense of good health and good living. Yet, it is also true, that many Britons misconceive Australia’s modern identity, as a profoundly multicultural, cosmopolitan nation necessarily preoccupied more with economic and geopolitical implications of the ‘Asian Century’ than the endless summer the white-washed tourism advertisements convey.

There are other areas of Australian policy innovation that may appeal to this government in its revolutionary zeal – not least of all, the nation’s public-private healthcare system, which compels mandatory private insurance for higher-income earners, and its hugely successful superannuation system, which has mandated a 9% flat contribution from employers for decades, and built substantial provisions for an ageing population along the way. If the UK Government continues to seek inspiration in Australia’s immigration system, its controversial off-shore approach to asylum processing and ‘towing back the boats’ may too fall into the purview of British policy-makers.

It’s easy to admire something from afar; the months and years ahead will prove a test for the resilience of the love affair with ‘the Australian way’.

At some point, Britain and Australia’s pathways will diverge once more. The structural differences around their economies, their social and demographic profiles, and their geopolitical realities remain profound. While Britain feels at a crossroads, its deep connection to its history and the powerful tropes of its cultural and traditions, continue to form a coherent – if fragile – national identity around which to build a modern state.

Indeed, if Britain assumes the confidence it hopes will rub off from its recent fascination with its antipodean ally, it should also come to fully appreciate the privileged status it holds in world affairs, as – a few bumpy years notwithstanding – a nation uniquely admired for its diplomatic prowess, the strength of its institutions, and the openness and generosity of its people. Britain’s interest in Australia comes at a moment of uncertainty and faltering confidence, and when it fades, we will know that Britain has once again found its sense of self.

The post An Enduring Affair? How Britain Fell in Love with Australia appeared first on British Foreign Policy Group.

The UK is not the only country ‘going it alone’ and pre-ordering vaccines for its citizens. The United States has, or is in the process of agreeing, deals totalling over $6billion across a range of vaccines. The EU has also entered several pre-purchase agreements with vaccine manufacturers including 300 million doses of the vaccine developed by Oxford University and 300 million doses of the vaccine from French pharmaceutical company Sanofi.

The World Health Organisation (WHO) has, however, urged countries to stop stockpiling, warning against ‘vaccine nationalism’. Instead, WHO chief Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus argues, “sharing finite supplies strategically and globally is actually in each country’s national interest”. The interconnected nature of global supply chains means that while some countries are left vaccine-less and therefore continue to struggle to get the pandemic under control, global supply chains will continue to be disrupted, slowing economic recoveries across the world.

The problem with vaccine nationalism is that it means vaccine distribution will depend on countries’ relative purchasing power rather than their need. This prices out developing countries who do not have the resources to compete with the offers made by wealthier countries, nor do they have the resources to waste pre-ordering vaccines that may be unsuccessful. This pushes developing countries to the back of the line, prolonging the pandemic in these countries compared to the rest of the world. Not only will this result in additional deaths in these countries due to infection, but as the rest of the world recovers, these countries will be left behind, risking years of progress designed to reduce poverty and global inequality.

In a bid to counter such actions, the World Health Organisation launched the Access to Tools (ACT) Accelerator which is designed to aid development, production and access to COVID-19 tests and treatments. This includes equal access to vaccines through its COVAX facility which aims to procure two billion doses of COVID-19 vaccines by the end of next year, mainly for developing and middle-income countries. The ACT project has so far received $8 billion funding from the Gates Foundation, Wellcome Trust and EU nations. However, significant funding gaps remain and major powers including the United States, Russia and India have so far declined to participate in the initiative, majorly limiting its effectiveness.

This is, perhaps, unsurprising, as countries across the world are plunged into recession, governments face immense internal pressure to prioritise their own and get their economies, and citizens, moving again. It also matches with the general trends that have been seen so far during the pandemic particularly in the scrabble for PPE and testing kits at the start of the pandemic, as well as the US buying up all the stock of remdesivir in June, one of only two drugs at the time proven to reduce the effects of COVID-19.

Vaccine nationalism is also not new. Very similar actions occurred in the 2009 H1N1 flu pandemic with Australia, the first country to find a vaccine, blocking vaccine exports until its own order was fulfilled. Wealthier countries went on to purchase large quantities of the vaccine and it was only after the worst of the pandemic was over that many developing countries were able to access the vaccine.

The rise of vaccine nationalism is therefore to be expected, in times of trouble countries are forced to prioritise, and unsurprisingly they often choose to prioritise their own. However, this does not negate the fact that such actions often do more harm than good, exasperating global equalities and disrupting global supply chains which in the long run may cause significant problems. As such, whilst the WHO’s message that “no-one is safe until everyone is safe” may ring true, it seems unlikely that their advice will be headed.

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Over the last week, Belarus has erupted into the largest mass protests in its history as people take to the streets in response to alleged election rigging and a growing discontent with the broader Belarusian regime. But what exactly is happening and why are Belarusians protesting?

Background to the protests

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Belarus became a sovereign nation and Aleksandr G. Lukashenko won the first Presidential election in 1994, elected on a populist manifesto and a promise to fight corruption. He has held power ever since, ruling for 26 years and winning five elections, though the results of every election since his first victory have been disputed.

He is often referred to as Europe’s ‘last dictator’ and Belarus was listed by the US as Europe’s last remaining “outpost of tyranny”. His rule has been characterised by a suppression of free speech, with only registered journalists allowed to operate online, extensive persecution of journalists and human rights activists, and punishment for participation in unregistered civil society organisations. The rule of law is also harshly enforced by state security forces including through the use of the death penality, torture, enforced disappearances and arbitrary detention. Throughout his rule, Lukashenko has maintained close relations with Russia, who it relies on heavily for energy supplies.

In recent months, the regime has come under increasing pressure due to criticism of its handling of the coronavirus pandemic. Lukashenko has widely dismissed fears about the pandemic, refusing to implement a lockdown and instead urging people to drink vodka and go to the sauna twice a week to stay healthy.

During the 2020 election, all of Lukashenko’s main political rivals were either exiled or jailed. This included Sergei Tikhanovsky, a prominent blogger who was arrested in May, after which his wife – Svetlana Tikhanovskaya – stepped in, becoming the main opposition candidate. On the 9th August, the Central Election Commission announced that Lukashenko had won 80.1% of the vote, and his rival Ms Tikanovskaya had won just 10.12%.

The protests

Protests began on the 9th August after the election result was announced, with protestors claiming the vote was rigged. Opposition candidate Ms Tikhanovskaya, who fled to Lithuania after the results due to concerns over her family’s safety, claims that vote counts from precincts that were conducted fairly suggests she won 60-70% of the vote.

The protests that broke out on the evening of the 9th August began peacefully but later turned violent when they were met with police brutality. The protests have attracted a range of supporters including large numbers of women and factory workers – the latter of whom traditionally made up a significant proportion of Lukashenko’s support base – making their involvement even more significant. Many factories have gone on strike in solidarity and staff at state media service Belteradio have walked out, forcing the national TV channels (all of which are state controlled) to broadcast repeats.

Protests have, however, been met with extensive state violence including the use of tear gas, rubber bullets, and stun grenades leaving hundreds of protestors wounded and causing at least two deaths. Nearly 7000 people have been detained, many of whom have since been released, and have spoken of extensive torture by security forces.

On the 16th August, rival rallies were held in Minsk with officials claiming that 65,000 people attended the pro-Lukashenko rally though unofficial estimates suggest that attendance was closer to 10,000 and that many attendees were state sector workers who were threatened with redundancy if they did not attend. Unofficial estimates suggest between 100,000 and 200,000 attended the opposition rally though state controlled STV news states it was merely an ‘alternative walk’.

High-ranking officials, including Lukashenko, have begun to condemn the use of unnecessary force, in a bid to soften the regimes image and on Monday 17 th August Lukashenko went to a tractor plant, to try and smooth relations with his traditional support base. The move backfired as Lukashenko was heckled heavily by workers. He retorted that: “We held the election. Until you kill me, there will be no other election.” Lukashenko maintains that protestors are “puppets” and are agitators from foreign countries such as Poland, Lithuania and Ukraine.

Strikes and protests are expected to continue at the time of writing.

International Response

EU states have been quick to condemn both the election and the subsequent use of violence by the state with UK Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab describing his “horror at the violence used by Belarusian authorities”, stating that the UK does not accept the results of the “fraudulent” election. Belarus’ neighbours, Poland and Lithuania, have been particularly vocal in calling for action from the EU in response to the protests.

EU Foreign Affairs Chief Josep Borrell has condemned the election as “neither free nor fair” and on the 14th August EU leaders approved new sanctions against Belarusian officials responsible “violence, repression and the falsification of election results”. They will also hold an emergency video summit on Wednesday 19 th August to discuss how best to support the people of Belarus. The UN has also condemned the use of violence stating that protest arrests were a “clear violation of international human rights standards”.

Russia has so far struck a rather different tone and has criticised the EU’s response, condemning “clear attempts at outside interference” in Belarus and calling out EU hypocrisy for failing to respond to protests within the EU, particularly the Yellow Vests movement in France. On Saturday 15th August, Lukashenko announced that Putin had promised “comprehensive security assistance” in the event of an external threat.

What happens next?

Lukashenko’s position is clearly weak but the leaderless nature of the protests may make it difficult for the opposition to capitalise on this. If Lukashenko was to resign, many may turn to Presidential opposition candidate, Ms Tikhanovskaya who has announced she is setting up a coordination council to ensure a “peaceful transition of power” and has offered to become a “national leader” freeing political prisoners and setting up new elections. Whether that transition occurs will depend not only on the current regime’s desire and ability to cling to power but also on how the world responds.

 In particular, all eyes will turn to Russia and to whether it will intervene to support the existing regime, as it did with Ukraine. At present this remains unclear, despite Putin’s assurances of security assistance to Lukashenko. Intervening would no doubt come with a number of costs to Russia. Sending in Russian troops to support Lukashenko, despite his clear unpopularity, risks alienating the Belarusian people and pushing the public to a more pro-Europe stance. It would also sour relations with Europe, who have already made their stance clear. Furthermore, relations between Russia and Belarus have become increasingly strained in recent years with Lukashenko expelling the Russian ambassador in 2019 for and Russia has begun scaling back subsidies to the country, which may reduce Russia’s desire to intervene.

That said, Belarus remains of strategic and economic importance to Russia. Belarus hosts pipelines that carry Russian oil and gas to the West and is a territorial buffer from NATO in Poland. Furthermore, Putin may worry that the fall of a dictator so close to Russian borders and the possibility that any new Belarusian government may align more closely to Europe would be a symbolic blow to Russia which could fuel instability within his own regime.

Much will also depend on the outcome of Europe’s discussions on the 19 th and the lengths they are willing to go to support protestors and to punish the existing regime. Until both Russia and Europe begin to take definitive actions the future of Belarus remains unclear but no doubt much will transpire over the coming days and weeks.

The post What’s happening in Belarus? appeared first on British Foreign Policy Group.

A reset in our relations is well overdue, although we begin at a point of great imbalance, due to the relative deficiency of knowledge held about China within British institutions. Recalibrating our engagement with China is not simply a geopolitical task – it is also about up-skilling our policy-makers, our society, and securing our domestic resilience. This is a generational undertaking, which will require the British state, businesses, universities and Britons themselves gaining a more sophisticated understanding of China’s history, its modern psyche and its intentions.

It is patently clear that China’s economic dominance has not come hand in hand with a desire, nor a need, to embrace democratic principles – indeed, many aspects of its success are derived from its autocratic nature. It is also true that many of the carrots and sticks the West thought it had at its disposal have been shown lacking. Yet, to characterise China as entirely focused on achieving a zero-sum game towards world domination misses something fundamental about its domestic and geopolitical ambitions.

China’s unique brand of mercantilist authoritarianism has brought it riches and influence, and afforded its government a seat at the table of our multilateral institutions. There is no precedent of another non-democratic power in our recent history, so utterly entangled within Western nations, and yet with the economic strength, defence and diplomatic capabilities to truly challenge Western hegemony.

As ever when it comes to China, there is something to be gleaned from the experiences of the Australian Government, which has learned the hard way that it is much more difficult to reel back a deepening relationship, than to never allow it to become so close. China’s escalating incursions into national security and its ham-fisted attempts to meddle in the country’s political life broke the goodwill of public opinion, and forced politicians to act. With the drawbridge closing, Australia will pay a significant price for its pivot away from its largest economic partner.

Despite the pandemic, the allure of China’s economic might remains strong, and its centrality to global economic growth undiminished. It is not inconceivable, however, that an economic relationship can be cultivated that does not come at the expense of our security. With the complacency of the past behind us, we should be thinking creatively and expansively about our ‘critical national infrastructure’, and fighting tooth and nail to defend it. The benefits of trade with China, including cheaper prices and consumer choice, should be matched by investments in local manufacturing and supply chain resilience.

With these domestic guardrails in place, we will be able to act as a more confident, equal partner in our economic relations, and in advocating for the liberal values that are so important to Britain and our allies. The government will also have more credibility in asking the British people to consent to relations with an authoritarian state, whose interests may appear diametrically opposed to our own.

It is not feasible nor constructive for us to categorise China in the same manner we do North Korea or Iran, nations with whom we hold economic sanctions. We urgently need a more constructive, informed and realistic approach to our engagement with China – one that recognises the divergence in our values and intentions, and which frankly assesses and secures the potential vulnerabilities in our domestic systems. Equally, we must give more careful thought to the areas where the UK’s strengths, including the respect with which it is held by China, could cultivate productive partnerships around shared interests.

On issues such as climate change, there are clear advantages in having China – both a leading polluter and innovator – at the table, not least of all because of the strength of its own diplomatic power towards developing nations. And although our capacity to influence China’s domestic policy is limited, we would also be selling ourselves short to claim that we have no capacity to influence its priorities as a global actor.

The government’s commitment to a new approach is evident. Less clear is where the pendulum will fall. Cool heads will allow us to better defend our assets and interests, while allowing the door to important areas of economic and diplomatic engagement to remain open.

Sophia Gaston is the co-author, with Prof. Rana Mitter of Oxford University, of a new British Foreign Policy Group report, ‘After the Golden Age: Resetting UK-China Engagement’.

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One in three deaths in Africa every year is from an infectious or parasitic disease (compared with one in 50 in Europe), so to some extent countries are equipped to deal with an outbreak. The recent Ebola outbreak is illustrative of that (insert some Ebola information)

The fact remains, however, that poorer countries in general are less equipped than many in the global community to deal with a large number of COVID-19 cases, first and foremost because they lack the medical equipment to do so.

The number of doctors, hospitals, and intensive care beds, is generally much lower in poorer countries than in rich ones. Sub-Saharan Africa has roughly one doctor for every 5000 people. In Europe, there is one for every 300 people.

Measures taken to prepare for outbreaks have been promising, with many countries introducing lockdown measures much before their numbers of infections reached European levels. South Africa, for example, introduced a lockdown before the UK, despite having a lower level of infections. Pakistan, which introduced a lockdown last week, spends one two-hundredth the amount on health of what the US does. 

The efficacy of these measures, however, is in doubt. In Europe, citizens – for the most part – have been induced to stay at home, isolated from others, safe in the knowledge that generous state safety nets will guarantee their basic needs. In many other countries, this is not the case. More than half of city dwellers in Africa live in crowded slums, making social distancing impossible. In India, hundreds of thousands of migrant workers have returned to their home villages on foot as the state closed air, rail and bus services, risking their lives, as well as further spreading the virus.

Some countries have introduced measures to protect livelihoods, with South Africa announcing a tax holiday for businesses to encourage them to keep paying workers. Other countries do not have the funds. Since the start of the crisis, $83 billion has been withdrawn from emerging markets, meaning that public spending, consumption, and governments’ tax receipts will be lower.

As Western countries scale the peak of their own crises, poorer nations will need assistance. Ehtiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has already asked the G20 for an emergency package worth $150 billion to boost health spending and protect social safety nets.

Rich countries, especially in the West, appear more divided than ever. In Europe, leaders are squabbling over the economic response to the crisis. In the US, President Donald Trump is too focused on the domestic crisis and in scoring political points against China to orchestrate international action.

Other countries – and individuals – are stepping into this void left by the key institutions in the global community. Jack Ma, founder of Alibaba, and one of China’s richest people, has donated 20,000 tested kits,100,000 masks and 1,000 protective suits to each African country. State-led action from China is likely to follow. China has already shipped massive amounts of medical equipment to European nations like Italy and Hungary. Russia has made similar moves. Sophia Gaston, BFPG Director, argued for our blog last week how states’ actions in the coronavirus crisis will shape others’ perceptions of them. It is a challenge that China and Russia appear to be seizing, leaving the West trailing behind.

Levels of international cooperation in dealing with the pandemic thus far have been low. If the West wants to avoid a Chinese domination of the response to the coronavirus crisis, it should act to assist poor countries in navigating their own outbreaks.

The post The Global Community Must Cooperate to Tackle Coronavirus appeared first on British Foreign Policy Group.

A recent British Foreign Policy Group event on the future of foreign policy in space raised the pertinent  question of how the development of space technologies and the space industry fit into the climate change debate.

Harriet Brettle, Head of Business Analysis at Astroscale, pointed out that we take space for granted and don’t appreciate the extent to which it’s already influencing our lives – in terms of the technology that relies on space. She also pointed out that space is ‘like any other environment on earth… and we need to look at how the space industry can move to a more sustainable future.’

Debris in space is a major facet of orbital sustainability, which is one of Astroscale’s core aims. Their homepage states that: ‘just as society is dealing with issues of pollution of our land and oceans, we also have to address the growing amount of debris polluting space. There are now millions of pieces of debris posing a threat to our orbital highway, and these uncontrolled hazards can cause potential damage to the many active satellites that are providing daily benefits to society. 

If we don’t start addressing the issue of space debris now we will endanger active satellites and the benefits they bring us here on Earth.’

As space technology develops, we are bound to see another phase of industrialisation, though to what extent this will exacerbate the issue of climate change remains to be seen. Certainly, the space sector is developing against the backdrop of huge fear over climate inaction – and new technologies will be developed in an atmosphere of increasing regulation focussed on protecting the environment, and a world in which the Socially Responsible Company is becoming increasingly common. 

Beyond that,  there’s real scope for space technologies to benefit the environment and save energy. Already, satellite-based systems are being utilised to reduce the CO2 emissions of vehicles – and weather satellites are making it easier for solar cells to produce more energy. 

For example, the European Space Agency (ESA) recently helped French company Leosphere improve their product (wind measurement equipment) and maximise the amount of electricity that could be harnessed from new wind turbines. According to the ESA website, the instrument can measure wind speed and direction from the ground up to heights of 200 metres – massively increasing the efficiency of turbines.

A recent article in the Independent called for a new Industrial Revolution – in space – to help tackle climate change. Graham Peters writes: “The ever-increasing accuracy of satellite imagery means that emergency services and fire response teams are already capable of deploying at a faster rate than ever before. Within the next decade the various technologies will be developed further and there could be numerous job opportunities in the field of real-time natural disaster hotspot monitoring.” 

Peters is right that the space industry is the unsung hero of attempts to tackle the climate crisis – certainly, space and climate action are not entirely separate. Properly investing in the sector, as the UK government is indicating it intends to (and the private sector is very much doing), could be instrumental – not only in developing improved technologies to deliver a better quality of life, but in allowing economies to grow without inflicting greater damage to the environment. 

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But with space becoming increasingly important  in many ways – both in terms of developing new technology and in providing a new frontier for development and research – a new space race, of sorts, appears inevitable. Dr Alice Bunn, Director of International Programmes at the UK Space Agency, noted this at the BFPG’s  recent event on the future of UK foreign policy in space, arguing that “we’re coming back full circle – (Donald) Trump is laying out his plans for boots on the moon and China is showing huge capabilities. We are coming back to a more competitive space.”

But the ‘new space race’ won’t be as binary as the US-Russia Cold War contest to be the first to put man on the moon of the 60s. For example, both Dr Bunn and Liz Seward, Senior Strategist for Airbus Europe  pointed to the capabilities of India – which recently successfully launched an earth observation spy satellite. The new satellite can take high-resolution images during any time of the day, even under cloudy conditions, which will boost India’s all-weather surveillance capabilities.

Since the original space race of the 1960s, the world has changed in major ways. What back then was a battle for space supremacy between two competing ideologies, now incorporates not only governments around the world, but individuals and organisations. Elon Musk, soon after his company SpaceX launched the most powerful working rocket in the world into space – launching a Musk-owned Tesla into orbit – said: “We want a new space race. Races are exciting.” According to John Logsdon, founder of the Space Policy Institute: “SpaceX has challenged the traditional launch industry in the United States and in Europe and in China and in Russia.”

Space reflects more than the increased ability of billionaires to launch rockets into space – it’s a microcosm of the ever-changing balance of power back down on Earth. Taking Brexit as an examle, the panellists at our recent event noticed that whilst the UK’s withdrawal from the European Union has not magically opened doors for the UK space sector, it has massively increased the political will to ramp up our capabilities in space. As I wrote in a previous BFPG blog on space, the Conservative Party made a pledge to establish the UK’s first ‘Space Command’ in their December 2019 general election manifesto, and several Ministers have since made calls for the UK to embrace space as a ‘new frontier’ in foreign policy. Spaceports have been proposed, and plans for new satellite systems drafted.

But that blog also noted that the comments made by Dr Bunn and Liz Seward – on the idea that the new space race will not be binary – is already proving true. Certainly, the UK’s ambition is being matched across Europe. Sweden, for example, has committed to starting rocket launches from Kiruna by 2022. Norway aims to beat that – and has 2020 in its sights. Portugal matches the UK’s space ambitions – and aims to open a spaceport in the Azores. France, Germany and Italy all spend a substantial amount more than the UK does on space exploration. 

50 years since the first moon landing, space still ignites the imagination of millions around the world. As the global economy grows and becomes more cooperative, the space race is changing – but it’s still there. With individuals, governments, organisations and more involved in the rapidly developing sector, Britain can have a huge role to play in writing the rulebook and convening exciting new coalitions.

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