The UK has been proudly playing a vital role in the defence of Ukraine, with the Prime Minister, Foreign Secretary and Defence Secretary in lockstep about the gravity of the situation and the need for a comprehensive Western response to Russia’s attack. The UK is, thus far, the largest single European donor of military and humanitarian aid to Ukraine, and the Government has been able to act swiftly and ambitiously in the knowledge its citizens support a robust response. While the United States’ financial contribution to the defensive response towers above that of its allies, the complexity of the war response requires a varied range of skills and expertise. The United Kingdom has been playing an important ‘framing’ function in supporting the coordination of military equipment and infrastructure, the provision of humanitarian aid, and the gathering of legal evidence. In these roles, the UK has earned itself praise as a dedicated, agile, and trustworthy partner.

The Ukraine Recovery Conference being held in Lugano in Switzerland this week brings together international partners to begin to outline the full scope of requirements to not only restore Ukraine’s economic, political and social fabric, but also to make longer-term investments in its future success, as Europe’s security borderland. The task of rebuilding Ukraine after such a shocking military bombardment that has sought to inflict as much damage on critical infrastructure, cultural monuments and civilian services as possible, will be monumental in scale and require intellectual, physical and financial input from many partners. The scale of the project is currently estimated to stand at more than $US500 billion. It will involve the full capabilities of both governments and the private sector. It is likely that this project will take place alongside the formal criminal proceedings that will seek some form of justice for the Russian state’s egregious breach of international law in the invasion itself and the atrocities that are continuing to come to light during the conflict. This will therefore be a time of simultaneously looking back and looking forward.

There will be many different aspects to rejuvenating a sovereign nation that has suffered such significant structural and social harm. Just as it was essential for Western allies to work productively and expediently together in the initial provision of military and humanitarian aid and the application of economic sanctions, it will be crucial that partners can collectively agree on the distribution of labour to support successful outcomes. In conceiving of our own individual role in the reconstruction, the UK must take account of the particular interests, assets and skills of our allies. We should also consider the opportunities presented by this project to reinvigorate and redefine our relationships with key partners in the West, including both the European Union and the United States. Moreover, how we might act as a galvanising force to encourage and shepherd the involvement of Indo-Pacific states, which recognise the significance of Ukraine to the stability of the international rules-based order.

The EU has announced that it will be moving Ukraine into the candidacy process for accession, and while there are no clear timeframes for this being realised, there will be many aspects of a new Ukraine-EU relationship that can be actualised in the meantime. There is no doubt that the EU will need to play a specific, substantial role in Ukraine’s economic resurrection and in shoring up its governance in the aftermath of the conflict. And with EU member states currently home to millions of Ukrainian citizens, the institutions will also need to play a major role in the country’s social rehabilitation. The EU has already put forward its plans for a ‘Ukraine reconstruction platform’, identifying both economic development and institutional reforms as priorities for the bloc to lead on. It also notes that other countries and alliances – including the G7 – will need to be involved in the colossal reconstruction project.

It is unclear what specific role the United States will wish to play in supporting Ukraine’s reconstruction over the medium-term. There has been a high degree of bipartisan political support for the robust institutional response, but there has been little effort to publicise these investments towards a population made weary from military interventionism. As the United States moves towards its mid-term elections, which are likely to inject further dynamism and instability into its domestic political culture, there will be forces compelling its attention away from the European security theatre. Thus far, the Biden administration has made clear through its generous financial and military provision to Ukraine that it continues to regard Russia as an existential threat to the liberal world order. It has also recently announced new investments in its European security presence, after decades of incremental withdrawal.

However, it is also less than a year since America withdrew, in chaotic circumstances, from Afghanistan, haunted by a flawed reconstruction process that failed to achieved self-sufficiency. With an increasingly risk-tolerant China continuing to challenge American global power, and a potential rift opening in Washington about the nature of the response to these threats, competing forces will be weighing heavily on the President as he makes his choices about the allocation of increasingly contested resources. The instability in America’s political environment compels all Western allies to reflect on how best to embed continuity and resilience into our relationships with this global superpower, and there could be a British role to play in shoring up a substantial long-term role in the Ukraine reconstruction process as a step towards achieving this.

For the United Kingdom, the Ukraine crisis has presented a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate the nation’s ongoing commitment to the European security theatre, and how effectively and ambitiously we can work when political will combines with sound policy investments. The Ukrainian praise for the UK’s response has been heartfelt and genuine, and there is a sense that an enduring partnership is being forged. It should not come as a surprise that the Ukrainian leadership would like the UK Government to play a significant role in the reconstruction process, extending the nation’s current ‘framing’ function, which plays to our established strengths as a convenor, strategist, educator, and administrator. The UK has announced at the Lugano Conference that it will commit a further $1.5 billion in funding as an opening gambit towards Ukraine’s reconstruction, starting with a particular focus on Kyiv and its surrounds, as requested by President Zelenskyy.

There are many moral, tactical and practical reasons why it makes good sense for the UK to lean into the opportunity to play a substantial role in shaping and delivering the Ukraine reconstruction process, but it will require political and institutional ambition. The nature of the issues in scope for the reconstruction will align well with many British strengths in terms of both process and substance. The UK is globally recognised for its skills in diplomacy, knowledge exchange, regulation and standards-setting, international governance, conflict resolution, humanitarian response, foreign aid and international development. Our domestic expertise and commercial successes in science and medicine, research and innovation, education, financial and legal services, can all be drawn upon to bring valuable insights, linkages and blueprints from both the public and private sectors. Rebuilding Ukraine will be an expensive exercise, and other partners will certainly be best-placed to deliver on many aspects. But this is a project that requires a huge variety of stakeholders and many contributions that are less about putting dollars on the table and more about nuanced and careful planning to nation-build for long-term stability.

The UK’s role in the Ukraine reconstruction project will be a practical test of the Global Britain agenda, requiring coordinated and constructive cross-HMG involvement to bring its highest ambitions to life. This towering task arrives at a time when the Government is facing tremendous constraints on its resources, bandwidth and staffing, and will necessitate the development of a powerful narrative to secure the consent of the British people. It is a mission we cannot afford to rebuff, and despite the immediate challenges, we must be confident that we will approach it from a position of strength. A crucial aspect of the British response will be to harness the full weight of our private sector capabilities. Part of the reason the UK’s international development programmes have been considered the ‘gold standard’ is the effective delivery partnerships that have been forged between the state and private companies. The growing role of academia and business as established Government partners in the UK’s national security and defence sectors has afforded a distinctly British advantage that can be extended to this project.

HMG has already sought to pursue a meaningful integration of the UK’s development activities with its broader geopolitical objectives, and the Integrated Review and its sub-strategies – including the International Development Strategy – provides the intellectual architecture to pursue a project of this scale, which straddles both the projection of our values and the advancement of our strategic interests. The successful reconstruction of Ukraine will provide a proof of concept to other partners around the world, and restore confidence in the West’s capacity to work together to achieve common goals. It will enable the UK and our allies to compete more effectively against the geopolitical interests of authoritarian powers, including those which engage in economic coercion and promote investment without accountability or transparency. It will make the case that liberal democracies are able to offer credible alternatives to transactional economic relationships, which extend across the full suite of foundational building blocks of prosperous, inclusive, sustainable societies. The only question now is whether the UK can rise to the challenge.

The BFPG will be undertaking a programme of work considering the specific British role in the reconstruction of Ukraine, bringing together the full suite of assets and instruments of both the state and the private sector. We will also continue to monitor British public opinion about the UK’s role in Ukraine and consider the domestic pressures and opportunities that will influence decision-making amongst allies – as well as capturing the evolving wishes and ambitions of the Ukrainian people. The BFPG believes this is a generational opportunity for the UK to play a defining role in forging a new European security architecture, as well as supporting the future of the rules-based international order and making a success of the Global Britain project.

The post The Case for an Ambitious British Role in Ukraine’s Reconstruction appeared first on British Foreign Policy Group.

The session provided a platform through which the Foreign Secretary could delve deeper into fleshing out her vision for the UK’s role in the world, reflecting the seismic consequences of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the rising threats posed by China, and an increasingly constrained fiscal environment. It was also an opportunity to take stock of the operational transformation that has taken place within the FCDO since the merger of DFID and the Foreign Office. Here we set out some of the highlights from the session, clustering together the evidence given on the substance of the UK’s foreign policy, and the functional operations of the FCDO.

The UK’s Foreign Policy 

Alliances

Liz Truss explained that the traditional security architecture had been “shattered”, and this necessitated the formation of stronger alliances. She highlighted the successful collaboration within the G7, particularly in the application of sanctions towards Russia, and emphasised the importance of the NATO Alliance and its expansion plans. Truss made clear that she is supportive of Sweden and Finland’s membership of NATO – just hours before a successful agreement was brokered with Turkey at the opening of the NATO Summit, an outcome the UK had played a substantive diplomatic role in supporting. The Foreign Secretary also repeated her ambition for an ‘Economic NATO’, highlighting the combined GDP weight of the G7 as an “incentivising” force of influence.

The UK’s Role in Europe

The idea for a ‘European political community’ – which both President Macron and Prime Minister Johnson are now claiming to have coined – appears to still have some way to go until the UK is convinced of its practical merits and viability. The political turmoil around the bilateral relationship during the past year suggests there will need to be some careful choreography in bringing all sides to the table. There is clearly no desire from the Foreign Secretary to hand Macron an early victory on his proposal, which would need to be forged through respectful collaboration. However, the fact that both leaders are claiming linguistic and conceptual ownership of the idea suggests it may be the right vehicle, just in need of a careful landing. In the meantime, the UK Government continues to harness the language of NATO – alongside the JEF – as the primary vehicle through which the UK’s security role in Europe is expressed, and to emphasise the deepening of bilateral relationships in Europe. The Foreign Secretary said there have been 13 bilateral agreements forged since Brexit, with seven more in the pipeline.

The UK’s Military Response to Ukraine

The Foreign Secretary said that she and her US counterpart Tony Blinken would be discussing further military equipment for Ukraine during their upcoming meeting, and that the UK would provide training support for Ukrainian defence forces in how to use ‘next-generation’ military supplies and weapons. When asked about civilian and political fatigue around the protracted conflict, Liz Truss disagreed that this could undermine unity within the Western alliance, referencing the recent G7 meeting and the statement given by Commonwealth leaders in CHOGM. She also noted the bi-partisan support for a robust Ukrainian response in Washington DC, and said that she felt confident the liberal coalition would “hold over time”.

Engagement with Authoritarian Regimes

Tobias Ellwood questioned the Foreign Secretary on the morality of pursuing trade agreements with authoritarian governments in the Middle East. Liz Truss described the Gulf States as partners of the UK and noted that a trade deal was being pursued with the Gulf Cooperation Council. She explained that not every country the UK negotiated with was aligned with all elements of British foreign policy and values, but that the Gulf States remained “important allies”. When pressed on the specific example of Saudi Arabia, the Foreign Secretary emphasised that the UK was focused on addressing the major threats facing the world, which includes Russia, and that effectively responding to their aggression requires us to ensure alternative energy sources – including from the Gulf region. Liz Truss acknowledged that we are “not living in a perfect world” and that difficult decisions needed to be made.

China and the Indo-Pacific Tilt

The Foreign Secretary is a keen enthusiast of the UK’s Indo-Pacific ‘tilt’, and highlighted the recently signed Pacific Blue Partnership as an example of the UK clarifying its role in the region. She mentioned partnerships with Australia, New Zealand, Japan and the AUKUS alliance with Australia and the United States, and said the UK was pursuing a “network” of partners across the region. She noted that more announcements would be made in due course about UK investments in the Indo-Pacific.

There was some confusion about the existence of a dedicated HMG China Strategy. The Foreign Secretary appeared to refute media reports raised by the committee that the Government had planned to publish such a Strategy, and rather noted that the Government had regular internal discussions about evolving nature of the threats posed by China, and that the Integrated Review (along with the Network of Liberty and the UK’s G7 work) had set out the framework of the UK’s approach to China. Committee members indicated that they were aware from conversations with HMG officials that a sub-strategy on China that sits underneath the Integrated Review was being developed internally, and the Foreign Secretary said that while there was no commitment to producing a dedicated Strategy, she would look into the question of the production of a focused “written document”. Philip Barton said that the work on a China strategy document was “in progress”, that much of the UK’s strategic planning on our strategic rivals was too sensitive to be put into the public domain, but that the Foreign Secretary had been very clear about the substance of the HMG strategy on China.

How to make sense of this? In short, both the Foreign Secretary and the committee are correct. The Government has been advancing its work on its relationship with China, but this is largely being undertaken as an internal planning and research exercise and without the intention to produce a specific new publication beyond the information shared in the Integrated Review. The Foreign Secretary also understandably feels that the nature of the strategy is evident within the actualisation of the UK’s geopolitical activities. There is therefore currently a ‘strategy’ but not a ‘Strategy’. This likely reflects both security concerns about showing our hand on the UK’s emerging thinking on what we have determined to be a “systemic competitor”, but also the realities of the “balanced” approach being pursued by HMG – which has many competing internal voices about how the UK should pursue its public diplomacy towards this economic superpower.

FCDO Operations

First Anniversary of the DFID and FCO Merger

The Foreign Secretary took up her post after the DFID-FCDO merger was first enacted, but has put her own stamp on the evolving department. She said that she had restructured the FCDO along three core principles: to impose geographical accountability, to ensure there is a specific focus on geopolitics, and to establish a dedicated Director-General for development. She explained that this third change was important as when she arrived at the FCDO, she found that there was no dedicated leadership at the board level for development.

When asked if the Department for International Trade should also be merged into the FCDO, the Foreign Secretary said she would not currently support this, but noted that the FCDO works closely and collaboratively with both DIT and the MOD. She added that she believed it was right to have separate Cabinet ministers for those roles, as there is a “significant amount of work and focuses required”, but that the UK needed to ensure that its activities across development, trade, security, defence and diplomacy were all pointing “in the same direction”.

Philip Barton structured his summary of the changes that had taken place within the FCDO since the merger into three policy and activity areas. He first cited the delivery of the UK’s year of international leadership in 2021 (hosting of the G7, Cop26, and the Global Partnership Education Summit) as an example of the successful functioning of the new department, with both diplomacy and development approaches being harnessed effectively. Barton then outlined how the UK’s response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine had been “more agile” as a result of the development integration, which facilitated quick thinking around the provision of humanitarian support. Finally, he emphasised that the UK’s efforts to respond to broader humanitarian crises around the world were better achieved through the cohesion between political and diplomatic efforts, especially in the context of the partnership with the World Food Bank to deliver aid to Tigray and using diplomacy to secure access.

FCDO Staffing

The resourcing and staffing of the FCDO formed a major focus of the session. The FAC Chair asked the Foreign Secretary whether the DFID-FCO merger had created additional pressure on staff, and this was refuted. Rather, Truss highlighted the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic as a primary source of stress and bandwidth challenges. She said that efforts were underway to bring more “talent” into the organisation, to ensure the right expertise in areas such as technology and economics, to better reflect the changing nature of modern diplomacy.

Philip Barton was asked about reports that FCDO had asked for 1,000 additional staff to assist with the UK’s role in both the Afghanistan withdrawal and the Ukraine response. Barton referred to the publicised process of reductions being made to the civil service, which will conclude in the Autumn, and said that this would ultimately provide an understanding of overall capacity. He confirmed that more staff were needed at senior levels, and that there had been reprioritising around Ukraine. The Foreign Secretary noted that staff were moved into ‘Russia’ and ‘Ukraine’ workstreams, and that some staff had been transferred into geopolitical teams to support the UK’s G7 work.

FCDO Funding

While the committee posed several questions about aid targets and the conceptual framing of ODA in the FCDO, the session did not focus substantively on the question of how choices were being made around the allocation of constrained FCDO resources. The Foreign Secretary confirmed that the Government continued to pursue the reinstatement of the 0.7% development commitment “when feasible”, and acknowledged that the UK’s generous Ukraine support meant that the UK was ultimately investing significantly in humanitarian and development activities – albeit in our European neighbourhood. When speaking about the FCDO’s engagement with the Treasury, the Foreign Secretary noted that there were regular discussions about the overall development budget, in particular pertaining to Ukraine and its future reconstruction.

Sharpening the Geopolitical Underpinnings of Development

When asked if she saw “development spending as a tool of diplomacy”, the Foreign Secretary said it has various purposes, but that it must be a coherent part of the UK’s foreign policy. Substantively, this means contributing to the UK’s overall objections of promoting freedom and democracy around the world, and challenging “the geopolitical efforts by malign actors”. She noted that the British International Investment vehicle was launched to specifically address this and serve as a liberal alternative to “strings-attached investment from countries like China”. The G7’s Global Partnership for Infrastructure and Development launched this past week – which brings together several otherwise disparate Western offers to more competitively challenge China’s dominance in several key areas – was cited as complementary to this UK-led initiative.

The post The Foreign Secretary’s Evidence on the Work of the FCDO appeared first on British Foreign Policy Group.

The British Foreign Policy Group’s (BFPG) Annual Survey of UK Public Opinion on Foreign Policy finds the UK in a state of transition, with Brexit and the pandemic receding, but the war in Ukraine, tensions in alliances, and the cost-of-living crisis, forging a new period of uncertainty for Britons.

The BFPG’s Annual Survey is the leading study of British attitudes on international affairs and the 2022 survey is the most extensive ever undertaken. The fieldwork is conducted with the BFPG’s established research partners, the leading insight agency Opinium. Public opinion is becoming an increasingly powerful force in shaping foreign policy decisions in the UK and among our key allies – affecting defence choices, spending, trading relationships and climate commitments.

About the Survey

The ‘BFPG 2022 Survey on UK Public Opinion on Foreign Policy and Global Affairs’ was authored by the BFPG’s Director, Sophia Gaston. The fieldwork was conducted with Opinium Research on 8-21 February 2022 (sample of 2,000 UK adults, weighted to be nationally representative).

FULL REPORT

SUMMARY REPORT

The BFPG’s Director and the report’s author, Sophia Gaston, said:

“This survey reveals both good foundations and challenging ground for the Global Britain project. With Brexit becoming less central to the UK’s political debate, some of the emotional weight and tribal identities associated with this period are beginning to ebb away. There is also support for a collaborative and active international agenda, with a focus on climate leadership. But the British people emerge from the last decade battle-weary, and both Brexit and Trump’s US Presidency have significantly impacted how Britons think about their alliances and role in the world. The scars left by the coronavirus pandemic and the cost-of-living crisis in its wake will also profoundly shape the coming years of public debate about UK foreign policy and our role in the world.”

Key Findings

• Global Britain: More than a quarter (27%) of Brits have never heard of the term ‘Global Britain’, and only 12% of Brits believe they fully understand its meaning.
• Trust: Trust in the Government to make foreign policy decisions on behalf of the British people’s interests has fallen over the course of the past two years. Just 35% of Brits now trust the UK Government on foreign policy, and 51% actively distrust the Government.
• Pride: 43% of Brits are proud of the role the UK plays in the world, and 40% are not proud, with pride highly linked to views of the Government. Hence, 67% of Conservatives are ‘proud’ and 66% ‘patriotic’, while just 24% of Labour voters are ‘proud’ but 37% ‘patriotic’.
• Globalisation: Recognition of the benefits of globalisation to the UK overall (was 66%, now 58%), and to areas outside of London (was 54%, now 46%), have declined since 2021.
• Alliances: Two-thirds of Brits (67%) believe that international relationships and cooperation make the UK more resilient. But many perceive a deterioration in the UK’s relationships.
  • Almost a third of Brits (29%) don’t believe the UK has any particularly close allies.
  • Germany (63%) is judged as the most likely to act responsibly in the world, above France (55%) and America (51%). Only 27% of Brits trust India to act responsibly.
• America: USA remains Britons’ choice as the UK’s closest ally (42%). But half of Brits (50%) believe the instability in American politics has weakened this alliance, and that America’s fragile society and democracy will compel its focus inwards for the near future (55%).
• The EU: Most Brits support a wide range of cooperation areas with the EU, with the most popular being to reduce trading barriers (55%), to facilitate freedom of movement of people (41%), research and academia (40%), and cooperation on global geopolitical issues (39%).
• Reputation: Brits judge the UK’s pandemic response (38%), joining AUKUS (37%), and defending Ukraine against Russia (37%) as giving the biggest boost to our global reputation.
• Foreign Aid: The largest single group of Brits (34%) think the UK’s aid budget should remain reduced into the future, a further 24% think the 0.7% commitment should only be restored when HMG finances reach pre-pandemic levels, and 17% want it restored now.
• Threats: The three most common security threats perceived by Britons are, in order, climate change (42%), international terrorism (36%), and the rise of China as a world power (34%).
• China: 81% of Brits do not trust China to act responsibly in the world. A large plurality of Britons (45%) view both Russia and China as equally dangerous to the UK’s interests, and fewer than one in five (19%) support the UK pursuing economic engagement with China.
• Military: Britons remain sceptical of UK military deployment and only support a limited scope of intervention scenarios. The largest group (37%) only authorise responses to direct attacks on British soil or British assets, or in the case of humanitarian disasters or genocide.
• Afghanistan: The largest group of Britons (40%) think earlier preparations should have been made to ensure a more orderly withdrawal from Afghanistan. But just 19% think the UK should have maintained a presence in Afghanistan beyond the withdrawal date.
• Climate Action: Support for the UK’s international climate action leadership remains robust (66%). But it is assumed that this will mean we need to make the domestic transition on net-zero at a faster pace than our peers (48%), and a majority of Britons believe the costs of the transition will be greater for the disadvantaged than the wealthier in society (51%).

Media Enquiries:
eliza.keogh@bfpg.co.uk | 07884 375018

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This is the first major strategic publication since Liz Truss took the reins as Foreign Secretary in September 2021, and is therefore significant beyond its own vital utility as a substantive expression of her vision for the UK’s wider international positioning – building on the architecture she began to draft in her recent Mansion House speech.

What strikes me about this document is the sharped-edged nature of its focus on making the UK more competitive as an international partner, and the more expansive understanding of what ‘development’ investments can and should seek to target. Indeed, it makes bold reference to the UK’s “offer”, emphasising the UK’s special expertise as much as its funding commitments, and highlighting trade as a priority lever for sustainable growth. It is ambitious – urging ‘patience’ in the pursuit of long-term structural change – but it is also focused and nimble. This is a strategy that places values at its heart, but they are projected from a position of confidence and a quite sober, hard-nosed assessment of the geopolitical landscape. It is constructed with an eye to the UK’s strategic rivals and in the spectre of an existential battle to ensure the future of the liberal world order in the face of a rising global authoritarian influence.

Some in the traditional development community may balk at this framing. It makes no apologies in asserting that our values and interests should be aligned and working in symbiosis. One of the natural consequences of this strategy’s successful implementation would be the opening up of the development sector to a wider range of actors, including a stronger role for the private sector, and other organisations that have typically focused more on the nuts and bolts of international security. This would reshape the composition of the Government’s stakeholder base for international development, and could potentially redistribute the balance of power and influence within this sector.

This is not a strategy without compassion. For all the focus on the temporary reduction in the UK’s 0.7% GNI development commitment, the UK remains one of the leading global donors across a range of essential areas – perhaps most significantly, in the field of women’s rights and security, and girls’ education. These areas are singled out as particular priorities in this strategy, and we know that the Foreign Secretary has successfully secured a funding restoration for these programmes. There is also a clear intent to position the UK as a leading humanitarian crisis response partner, and global health and climate resilience are prominent priorities backed up by tangible initiatives.

What is striking about the themes prioritised within this strategy is their alignment with established areas of British national excellence, including medical and scientific research, renewable energies, innovation, biodiversity protection, and the administrative bread and butter of standards, regulatory frameworks, finance and the rule of law. This is the ‘integration’ agenda in action, which began with the merger of the departments and was advanced with the publication of the Integrated Review in March 2021. Such an approach in fact corresponds with the very strong sentiment being conveyed by the British people in the BFPG’s focus groups and polling, which we will be publishing more research on in the coming months. The idea is to create a more holistic approach to enhancing the UK’s domestic economic resilience while also deploying these same capabilities to support our international partners. It’s an efficient calculation, but also one that recognises that many of these areas of collaboration and knowledge-exchange become important foundations through which more explicit security and geo-strategic agreements can be forged.

It is important that we debate and critique this document and monitor the Government’s practical progress against its objectives. As with many other areas of the UK’s foreign policy apparatus, the primary obstacles to its successful implementation will be internal bandwidth and funding, as well as a fast-moving and increasingly fractious geopolitical environment precipitating a ‘crisis status quo’. Certainly, while this strategy reaffirms the intention set out in the Integrated Review to restore the nation’s 0.7% of GNI development commitment, it is obvious that HMG’s fiscal situation has deteriorated further since this pledge was made. It is also clear that the conception of development is fundamentally evolved by this document and therefore such a restoration would not necessarily see programmes that have been affected by the temporary reduction reinstated.

This International Development Strategy reflects some difficult choices that are being made in a climate of constrained resources. The UK Government will focus on the areas it believes that we are best-placed to succeed in – in large part, because of our established domestic expertise – and in the areas in which we can be most competitive against our strategic rivals. There are many regions and individual programmes that will necessarily be de-prioritised within this process, and which will have to be reframed as areas of burden-sharing with our allies. I have no doubt that this will ruffle some feathers, and that many compelling cases can be made for alternative priorities. In the spectre of the shocking invasion of Ukraine, it is also reasonable to expect that urgent new issues will be thrust into vision and that an appetite for flexibility and adaptation will remain essential.

There will be much renewed focus in the aftermath of the publication of this document on the Indo-Pacific, which clearly compels the Foreign Secretary’s interest and focus as an economic and security theatre. I would also argue that there will be many aspects of this strategic framework that can and should be activated in the planning we undertake to support the gargantuan humanitarian, governance and geopolitical task of the reconstruction and stabilisation of Ukraine in our own neighbourhood. Working closely with our allies, there will be an opportunity and an imperative to demonstrate both the British and wider Western ‘offer’ to support economic growth, open and cohesive societies, and a flourishing democracy, in a case study that we cannot afford to pass with anything less than flying colours.

The post Making Sense of the UK’s New International Development Strategy appeared first on British Foreign Policy Group.

In this article, Rana Mitter and I work briskly through a number of these issues, and highlight the areas where parallels between Ukraine and Taiwan, and Russia and China, are indeed worthy of examination.

China’s Reactions to the Russian Invasion of Ukraine

President Xi and President Putin met in Beijing during the Winter Olympics. The outcome of this meeting was a substantive international relations agreement that is notable for its strategic alignment and an emergent cohesion in narratives between the two authoritarian powers. The meeting also established some of the power dynamics of the relationship, with the Chinese securing a win in shaping a landmark bilateral gas supply deal – which will build a greater degree of resilience in Russia’s energy markets – in their favour.

We may never know the full extent of the discussions between the two leaders about Russia’s plans with regards to Ukraine, but our instincts are that the scale and scope of the military project were a surprise to President Xi, who had likely anticipated a more targeted operation focused on the Eastern parts of Ukraine it has already occupied or contested. China would typically be disinclined to support separatist movements, which would include any attempt by actors in Donetsk and Luhansk to declare ‘independence’ from Kyiv, something that Putin stated that he would authorise shortly before the full-scale invasion. This unease must have compelled the scramble in the immediate days following Russia’s transgression into Ukraine to forge a narrative for the international community around supporting Ukraine’s sovereignty – requiring a series of contortions to ensure consistency in its position on its own sovereign claims to Taiwan – and China’s choice to abstain from, not reject, the Western-led UN Security Council motions. It is also true that the global economy and security instability provoked by the war in Ukraine may well further test China’s leaders as they seek to maintain the country’s economic buoyancy in the face of rising domestic pressures in a number of key structural areas.

At the same time, the notion of China as a ‘broker’ to negotiate the end of Russia’s aggressions in Ukraine does not feel credible. Certainly, many Western nations are reviewing investment agreements and deals with China in a somewhat more cautious light in the wake of China’s strategic ambiguity on Ukraine, and the tough language of the recent EU-China Summit showed a greater willingness to harness the bloc’s combined strength as marketplace to hold China to account for its choices. Yet it is also the case that China’s leaders will identify longer-term direct and indirect opportunities from the crisis.

In the short term, there may be economic gains from access to discounted oil and gas, or to become a priority customer for grain from Russian-controlled areas of Ukraine. There is also the chance for China to position itself as a preferred provider for infrastructure construction in the Ukraine in the aftermath of the conflict, with Beijing able to stump up bold sums and underpin risk in a way that cash-strapped Western powers facing cost-of-living crises may struggle to match. In the longer term, there are possible geostrategic dividends for China, such as greater pressure on Russia to support China taking a role in the Arctic – and area in which Russia has increasingly sought to make sovereign territorial claims – and a boost in China’s role in Central Asia, where its relationship with Russia has sometimes been prone to tension.

More broadly, China recognises the value of selective engagement in the international order and is also comfortable and increasingly confident in forging its own Chinese-led initiatives – whether on climate action or infrastructure investment – to address issues of global concern. The war in Ukraine, and its consequences for inflation and energy provision, will consume vast Western resources, while also rendering their domestic environments more fragile. China will ultimately be less interested in playing a frontline role in the conflict, and more in ensuring it is in the best possible position to capitalise on its outcomes.

Implications for the Indo-Pacific ‘Tilt’

The UK’s Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy announced a ‘tilt’ to the Indo-Pacific, and questions have been raised about the viability of this initiative in light of the event of a ‘hard power’ conflict in the European neighbourhood. There is no question as to whether the UK should take a greater interest and stake in the Indo-Pacific region, which will undoubtedly be a theatre of substantial economic and security change over the coming century. The UK’s interests in the Indo-Pacific are diverse and spread across multiple fields – including trade and investment, development and climate action – of which defensive instruments are simply one prong of a much broader, integrated repertoire. Moreover, the ‘tilt’ was always expressed as such, avoiding the term ‘pivot,’ which would have more explicitly signalled a fundamental move away from other key regions.

It is legitimate to ask whether constrained resources will need to be spread even more thinly, but one can argue that the Ukraine conflict only intensifies the need for the West to take a more active posture in defending the liberal world order. Moreover, the Russian invasion has facilitated a form of liberal cooperation that feels more functional and cohesive than it has in some time, and could open conversations about longer-term structural projects – including the acceleration of burden-sharing initiatives around technology and innovation, the architecture of new frontiers of governance, and investments in infrastructure projects with clear security dimensions.

There are obvious Indo-Pacific angles to these, a fact which has been brought into clear focus by the troubling developments in the Solomon Islands around a new security cooperation agreement with China. The spirit of cooperation and the urgency of ambition we have seen come to fruition in the Ukraine crisis – not least of all, in terms of Germany’s dramatic recalibration of its defence commitments – is precisely the energy we will need to see dedicated to the even more complex landscape of the Indo-Pacific.

The Future of Taiwan

One of the most commonplace analogies drawn during the Ukraine crisis has been to consider a potential Chinese attack on Taiwan. The conceptual comparison is understandable, but a direct comparison is misleading. It is almost universally acknowledged that Ukraine’s sovereignty has been breached by the Russian invasion, whereas China does not recognise Taiwan as sovereign, and only a handful of small countries formally recognise the Republic of China on Taiwan as a nation-state. While an assault on Taiwan would be regarded an unacceptable interference in the island’s independence, such an act would not be seen at the United Nations as a formal breach of recognised borders in the same manner as the attack on Ukraine has been.

There are reasons to believe that an imminent attack on Taiwan is also unlikely. For China, the primary focus of 2022 will be to attempt to move past the pandemic, and ensuring that Xi Jinping gains his unprecedented third term in power. Strategic analysts point out that Taiwan’s beaches are not easy to assault, and that it is not certain that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) yet has the training to manage such a feat – although that could well change by the end of this decade. China has also seen how Russia has lost the international war of narratives and information, and will no doubt be aware that any strikes on the densely housed civilian population in Taiwan would be widely condemned. Like much of the rest of the world, China is also very dependent on Taiwan-manufactured high-end semiconductor chips, and any assault that would in some way jeopardise the short-term supply of these vital resources is improbable.

However, there are many elements of the Ukraine crisis that have given Taiwan’s planners pause for thought. Taiwan is currently under-powered in terms of its capabilities to address cyberattacks, and its armed forces may well be under-trained in many aspects of military warfare. The purchase of expensive defensive equipment is not alone a panacea; this year, for example, Taiwan’s air force pilots have crashed two Mirage jets. On a structural level, over 40 per cent of Taiwan’s exports still go to China, and the level of Western support remains ambiguous. There is currently no formal United States agreement to support Taiwan, which might lead to a situation not dissimilar to the NATO caution in the Ukraine conflict, where other countries fear to step in because they might provoke a wider conflict.

Nonetheless, key actors in the region such as Japan have begun to indicate that they regard Taiwan’s autonomy as key to maintaining regional stability. In the short term, Taiwan is very unlikely to move toward any formal declaration of independence, which would almost certainly lead to a direct Chinese military response. Instead, its leaders will be considering how best to strengthen its defences to make it as difficult as possible for any assault to succeed. In turn, China’s foreign policy and military establishment will be trying to calculate the best means of circumventing any initiatives aimed at deterring them – whether within Taiwan itself and in the wider regional and international community. If there is one lesson that Beijing will certainly bear in mind, it is the way that Russia sought to undertake a lightning strike-style campaign, but through a combination of poor tactics and over-enthusiasm to believe its own propaganda, ending up failing and becoming caught up in a lengthy and expensive war.

For the West, if it is indeed the case that the Russian invasion of Ukraine has either delayed or changed the parameters of a potential Chinese assault on Taiwan, then there is a clear impetus to accelerate and scale-up the proactive initiatives and deterrence mechanisms required to render such an outcome less probable, while making sure to devote careful attention to channels of dialogue with Beijing that keep the diplomatic temperature lowered. Russia’s shocking actions have undoubtedly proven more costly – in all senses – because of the failure of the West over many years to take difficult decisions around its entanglement with this authoritarian power. More broadly, liberal powers including the UK should be attuned to the realities of China’s objectives in the conflict in both the short- and longer-term, and ensure that we are able to anticipate its strategic choices in areas vital to our own interests – particularly in terms of the reconstruction of Ukraine, energy provision, and vital emerging geo-strategic theatres.

Sophia Gaston is the Director of the British Foreign Policy Group

Rana Mitter is Professor of the History and Politics of Modern China at the University of Oxford

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What’s the UK story?

As Westminster is consumed by political scandals and manoeuvring, the UK Government is playing a leading role in an extraordinary regional effort to bolster Ukraine’s defences against an intensive Russian build-up of troops and weaponry along Europe’s borders, on a scale unmatched in modern times. The outcomes of this geopolitical stand-off will bear consequences for the future of European security, and will play a role in shaping the future of the Western alliance.

The UK has a long-standing interest in Ukraine, considering it an essential strategic partner on the flank of Europe’s borders, standing alongside the nation we believe to be the primary regional security threat. We consider ourselves to be the leading European power in NATO, which granted Ukraine ‘Enhanced Opportunity Partner’ status in 2020, affording preferential access to NATO exercises, knowledge exchange, and training. Our most substantial troop presence is based in Estonia, and we have cultivated highly productive and sustained security relationships with many Baltic nations.

The UK Government has chosen to take a robust role in responding to the crisis, through the provision of defensive systems, training and armaments to Ukraine, high-level diplomatic coordination with our allies, intelligence-sharing, direct engagement with and representations to the Russian leadership, and the development of new pacts and partnerships with other key regional actors.

Will Russia Invade?

There’s no room for complacency on this question, because Russia has in fact already invaded Ukraine and is currently occupying sovereign Ukrainian territory. In 2014, when Russia seized Crimea and began to arm and occupy several regions in the East of Ukraine, some Western commentators felt that, while regretful, there was a logic to allowing Putin to ‘get it out of his system’ and that he would be content with reclaiming what he regarded as ‘lost’ territory.

The notion that President Putin can be sated in his appetite for rebuilding Russia’s sphere of influence in former Soviet Union territories has been proven to be extremely naïve, and there is no reason to believe this would be the case now. Putin, after all, described the collapse of the Soviet Union as “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century”, and considered his invasion of Ukraine in 2014 as morally justified on the basis of it being a ‘repatriation’ of Russian citizens and Russian territory to the motherland.

It is important to remember that an ‘invasion’ will likely take a hybrid form – not only involving the traditional armed forces, but also sophisticated and widespread cyber-attacks, intelligence operations, and the disabling of critical national infrastructure. Russia has already begun to flex its muscles in penetrating Ukrainian government communications, and it would likely seek to sow confusion and chaos within the military and other supporting forces, and also amongst the Ukrainian people.

When would Russia invade?

It is difficult to anticipate the timing of any such further invasion, although there has been some discussion as to whether the Beijing Winter Olympics on the 4^th of February may provide a useful guide. As I discussed in a BFPG article about the Olympic boycotts, both Russia and China place a significant degree of importance on the Olympics in domestic and geopolitical terms, and the Chinese leadership was rather unenthusiastic about Russia’s decision to move into Georgia during the staging of the Beijing Summer Olympics in 2008.

Given that Russia subsequently sought to seize Crimea in the aftermath of its own hosting of the 2014 Sochi Winter Games, it is difficult to discount the possibility that there may be some planning being undertaken around this milestone. Recognising this significance, and the broader framework of emerging Russia-China cooperation, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken this week called China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi, to implore Beijing to “use its influence with Moscow”.

There is also some discussion of the scheduled Belarusian-Russian military exercises as a possible inflection point. These are currently due to take place between the 10^th and 20^th of February. It is also true that the weather will play a significant role in any timing decisions, as there are areas of the Ukrainian border which are only theoretically passable when frozen over.

Many defence experts are of the belief that any invasion will likely begin through a ‘false flag operation’, in which staged aggressions from the Russian military will in fact be attributed to Ukrainian forces. This would in part be intended to muddy the waters of the Western narrative, but also to sell any action that will result in the possible deaths of Russian troops as a necessary response of self-defence to the Russian people.

More broadly, while there has been much understandable focus on the question of the likelihood of invasion, the West should also be asking the question of what President Putin would likely seek to do next. Is his plan to progress further inland from the East and then to make Russia’s retreat a condition of a new settlement, which may or may not be granted? Or to seize Kyiv to demonstrate the full breadth of his power and undermine the morale of the Ukrainian people, and then retreat and leave the clean-up to others? Or is he genuinely seeking to occupy the entire nation of Ukraine in the longer term?

It is essential that we seek to understand his intentions beyond the act of invasion, and to game-plan for multiple scenarios, as Putin himself has been preparing for the past decade. Moreover, to consider the likely scenarios that may emerge in the aftermath of this crisis, in terms of Ukraine’s long-term prospects for prosperity and the functioning of its government.

Why Now?

There are a number of theories as to why President Putin has mobilised at this particular moment. Certainly, the pandemic has weakened his domestic position, as has the persistent scourge of slugging economic growth. Putin enjoyed a substantial bounce in his approval ratings after the seizure of Crimea, so he is well aware of the potential gains he could make in successfully fostering a moment of national prestige and might on the world stage.

President Putin’s calculations also seem to be highly responsive to the evolving circumstances in the West. In particular, the chaotic and painful withdrawal of American, British and other allied troops from Afghanistan was studied carefully, and taken as an indication of structural decay and dysfunction in the Western alliance. Putin is moreover attuned to the delicate domestic political situations in many Western powers, both in terms of the financial and social costs of their pandemic experiences, and the pressures to focus inwards to bolster their national resilience. There is also some speculation that the departure of Angela Merkel, who – for better or for worse – has been a consistent leader in shaping the EU’s relationship with Russia, has also played into Putin’s instincts around a potential European leadership void and a crisis of transition.

What does Putin want?

President Putin has been playing a long game in his efforts to destablise Ukraine. He promotes a narrative of Ukraine as central to the conception of Russian history and civilisation, arguing that these two countries are inseparable and intrinsically linked in ethnic and cultural ways. The end game is for Ukraine to be declared a failed state, fundamentally eroding the patriotism and morale of its people, and creating a vacuum of leadership in which Russian-backed leaders can swoop in and reclaim the full prizes of this ‘lost territory’.

In geopolitical terms, Putin is also seeking new guarantees from the West to limit the expansion of the NATO alliance. Russia regards NATO as a proactive, antagonistic security force pushing up against its territorial integrity, while NATO allies regard the alliance as a necessary defence responding to persistent Russian aggression into the free and sovereign states of Central and Eastern Europe.

Despite some inconsistent messages in the earlier phases of this crisis, it has now been made clear that the United States and its Western allies will not be negotiating with Russia about the future composition of the NATO membership – which they maintain must be kept open to all who wish to join. Both the United States and NATO have issued formal written responses to Russia’s demands, making this clear. Indeed, NATO members recognise that Putin’s own actions are currently reinforcing the value of the alliance and its ongoing relevance in the 21^st Century.

Putin is also keen to renegotiate the terms of the Minsk Protocols, which were drawn up in the aftermath of its invasion of Crimea, forged between Ukraine, Russia, and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe – with mediation from Germany and France (known as the ‘Normandy Format’). The Protocols were intended to prevent further fighting and bloodshed in the occupied Eastern territories of Ukraine, and provide pathways to legitimate regional elections. Russia met with the Normandy Format leaders on the 26^th of January and all parties committed to the principles of the Minsk II Protocol and maintaining a ceasefire. Given many aspects of the Minsk agreements remain unimplemented, it is hard to assess the specific value of these commitments.

Valuable consolation prizes

Beyond securing these two major prizes, there are plenty of other possible wins for President Putin in this crisis – many of which are already being realised without him having needed to put another foot across the border.

Weakening Ukraine – socially, democratically and economically – increases the opportunity for domestic political corruption and other threats to the functioning of the nation’s institutions and its good governance, which in turn reduces the likelihood that the country will be able to seek pathways to join NATO, let alone the European Union, in the future. Certainly, this new crisis has not encouraged NATO nor the EU to offer any further commitments to advancing Ukraine’s possible future applications for accession.

As has been demonstrated in Belarus, creating instability on Europe’s borders incites internal fissures within the EU and weakens the West, by drawing huge amounts of oxygen and political attention towards these border crises and the consequences of internal squabbling about the best course of action. It is expected that an invasion of Ukraine could prompt a substantial migration crisis heading towards the European Union, which would need to be carefully, centrally managed and absorbed.

A Russian invasion, and the ensuing application of sanctions, may also disrupt much-needed energy supply towards the many countries in Europe still dependent on Russian gas. The diversification and securitisation of Europe’s energy pipelines urgently needs to be addressed, but the short-term impacts of such a crisis taking place in the winter months could prove practically and politically devastating.

Putin’s provocations are already testing the Western alliance as it moves through a strained period of maturation. The vastly different interpretations of the individual and collective risks at stake in this crisis, and the sight of major powers such as Germany and Italy dragging their heels and shying away from providing defensive support for Ukraine, is as much a crisis for the West as it is a crisis for the nation of Ukraine. In the short term, it concretely undermines the credibility of the EU as a cohesive foreign policy actor, and in the longer term – as the United States re-evaluates its regional and global roles – raises significant questions about the future of the European security settlement.

Can we deter Putin?

The Ukrainian land army is relatively strong, and its people will defend their nation with passion and resolve, but the country lacks significant air and naval capabilities. NATO and Western-led defensive instruments will be essential to credibly challenging Russia’s powerful presence, not only as a deterrent but as a potential front line. But we will only achieve this through many individual contributions. The UK and the United States, the Baltics and Poland stand at the helm of the Western efforts to bolster Ukraine’s defences, with some important input – of varying scales – from a range of other European nations, as well as contributions from both Turkey and Canada.

It is important to note that many of these defences stand not within Ukraine but are based in other strategic locations surrounding Ukraine, such as Latvia and Estonia – where the UK has long stationed its most substantial troop presence. The West is seeking to convey the message that even if Russia does progress further into Ukraine, it will not tolerate any further advancement into Europe’s borders in a ‘smash and grab’ operation.

One of the main tools the West has discussed in terms of a collective response to Russian aggression has been economic sanctions, although these are also the subject of some debate between major powers due to their potential to interfere with regional and global economic markets and financial payment systems. There appears to be a relatively solid basis of agreement that some robust punitive economic instruments will be applied to Putin’s regime and the Russian economy in the event of any further incursions into Ukraine, although the Ukrainian Government has argued that these should be considered a deterrent rather than harnessed as a response.

Some politicians may feel it is a difficult sell to explain to their citizens that national troops and resources should be deployed to defend Ukraine – which is not a member of NATO – after the quagmire of Afghanistan, and in a time when populations are weary and anxious after the pandemic, and becoming increasingly sceptical about the merits of military interventions. The UK’s Defence Secretary, Ben Wallace, recently published an excellent explanation of how he sees the nation’s interests in defending Ukraine, and other leaders should think about how best to proactively build public consent as a foundation for their nations’ participation in staving off this crisis. Putin carefully monitors these dynamics and is aware of the serious limitations that weak public support can pose to governments’ foreign policy decision-making.

What happens next?

The Ukrainian people are steadfast in their loyalty and willingness to defend their nation, and will not support any capitulation to Russian demands. They stand on the frontline of the aggressions of the nation we have clearly, consistently, designated as the primary security threat to the whole of Europe, and we therefore owe them our support in defending their interests – which also happen to be our own.

This is a fast-moving situation and it is difficult to predict how the coming weeks will unfold, but the West must begin absorbing the lessons of both the first phase of this crisis and also the longer-term revelations about the future of European security.

As a matter of urgency, liberal nations need to get serious about reducing and removing the entanglement of Russian interests in our financial markets and in our critical national infrastructure, including our energy supplies. This crisis has underscored the unsustainable reality of mixed dependencies on Russian-owned and -financed services and investments, and so long as these vulnerabilities remain, the costs of defending Europe’s territorial integrity will remain significant and steeped in unpalatable trade-offs.

The UK appears to have learned from its Afghanistan experience and has sought to pursue crisis preparations rather than simply a crisis response, as well as forging agile new partnerships – ie. a trilateral with Poland and Ukraine – rather than waiting for the old guard to come to the table. Some will wish to apply the lens of Brexit to the UK’s choices in this crisis. The UK’s firmly established interests in Ukraine, NATO and the Baltics, and in challenging Russian security interests in Europe, make it difficult to argue the case of Brexit as a primary motivating factor in our leadership on this issue. However, it is certainly the case that the challenges surrounding UK-EU relations have encouraged the UK Government to think anew about its role in the wider European neighbourhood – compelling, for example, our recent decision to send a Special Envoy to the Western Balkans.

It is also plain to see that this crisis in Ukraine cannot be entirely resolved through a series of small, clustered alliances, nor is this situation entirely the domain of the NATO alliance. We must progress with the advancement of a new framework of European foreign policy and security cooperation, accommodating the UK’s departure from the EU, the EU’s own ambitions as a foreign policy actor, and the evolving role the United States will play in the region.

This will involve all sides accepting the realities of their respective strengths and limitations, building a new structure of collaboration that emphasises the power of a shared baseline of values and interests, but with the flexibility to remain cohesive and effective should any key powers choose not to step up to the table on any given issue. The past decade has strained the Western alliance to its limits and enabled the emergence of existential risks to the future to liberal democracy, but this crisis should underscore that naval-gazing and petty bickering between allies are luxuries we simply cannot afford.

Understanding Ukraine

For those interested to learn more about modern Ukrainian society and politics, I conducted social research in Ukraine with a team of exceptional UK and Ukrainian researchers from Arena just before the pandemic. We looked at the issues of polarisation in Ukrainian society in politics as an obstacle to the nation’s cohesion, unity and prosperity, and examined how Russia was seeking to exacerbate these through a concerted campaign of disinformation.

The post Making Sense of the Russian Threat to Ukraine appeared first on British Foreign Policy Group.

It had long been expected that the Beijing Winter Olympics would be a stage for geopolitical wrangling, but the inconsistency in the positions of Western nations towards China – all seeking to achieve ‘balance’ but making independently defined choices around its trade-offs – meant it was unclear just how extensive any diplomatic boycotts would prove to be. The past six months, however, has seen an effort among G7 and Five Eyes partners in particular to better coordinate approaches on China, evident in a series of new joint statements, sanctions and cooperative initiatives.

China, which remains largely closed to the world, has viewed the Games as an opportunity to reopen its doors and reframe its global image after a bruising period as the origin point of the coronavirus pandemic, and in light of dramatic shifts in tone and policy amongst Western democracies and liberal nations. Its efforts to advance its international soft power during the pandemic have generated mixed results, and the domestic landscape – with the CCP’s regime underpinned by a compact around continuous economic growth – is troubled by elements of fragility. In the eyes of President Xi, the Olympics could offer a branding reset with the potential for gains at both home and abroad, hitching modern China’s story to the enduring mythology the Games promotes around universal human achievement.

All nations seek to tap into the patriotism and collective goodwill that can be inspired by cheering on their athletes on the world stage, and these moments can be particularly significant as advanced democracies struggle to articulate a sense of shared national identity and common purpose. For China’s leaders, however, there has been a long-standing narrative project to emphasise the nation’s historical continuity and align its story with the great civilisations, including Ancient Greece as the home of the Olympic Games. The CCP is approaching the staging of these Olympics with the same degree of focused, ruthless enthusiasm it applies to all of its nation-building priorities.

It is unhelpful as a general principle to draw comparisons between contemporary China and the Soviet Union of the Cold War era, but in this instance, the parallels to be made between two superpowers seeking to promote a narrative of domestic self-sufficiency and international competitiveness via the Olympic Games feel more appropriate than most. In particular, the link that is being made between the ‘health’ and ‘virtues’ of China’s people, their unfaltering devotion to the nation, and the relationship drawn between the pursuits of sporting and scientific excellence.

In some ways, the political attention being devoted to these Winter Olympics is a direct contrast and perhaps even a direct response to the enthusiasm with which Beijing’s hosting of the 2008 Summer Olympics were received. Despite many aspects of the Games’ preparation and staging sending very clear alarm bells about the instincts of the Chinese leadership, they were held at a time in which the belief that an approach of economic and diplomatic inclusivity with China would inevitably encourage its democratic transformation prevailed. Fourteen years on, the Beijing 2022 Winter Games mark the final unravelling of this ambition in the West, with disillusionment, cynicism and mistrust towards China’s regime increasingly embedded among both political elites and citizens.

These Olympics will be staged against the backdrop of the convening of the Chinese Communist Party’s Congress, at which President Xi will almost certainly secure permission to break the conventions of the traditional term limits and entrench his power for a potentially indefinite period of rule. The certification of Xi’s legitimacy will remove any blinkers from the West about the prospects for any kind of fundamental improvements in Chinese relations in the coming decade.

While geographically distant from China, the risk of a further Russian invasion of Ukraine is also casting a spectre across the Games – in part because of the rising concern about some elements of meaningful Chinese-Russian cooperation, but also because of the potential role that the timing of the Games may play in influencing the theatre of warfare. President Xi does not want the Winter Olympics to be staged against a narrative of war, and both he and President Putin want the opportunity to realise the full benefits of the Games for their own national self-interest. The West cannot forget that it was in the aftermath of the Sochi Winter Olympics in 2014 that President Putin broke forth and annexed Crimea, as well as seizing Eastern territories along the Ukraine-Russia border.

It is unclear whether other Western partners will fall in behind the Five Eyes powers in their diplomatic boycott; while France has suggested it will chart its own course, the new German Foreign Minister has proposed an EU-wide approach is forged – which could, in the end, lead to the same ends. The boycotts themselves should be seen as less of a shot across the bow towards influence China, which has already made its ‘offence’ clear, and more an expression of the new lines being drawn around the baseline of engagement with this authoritarian superpower. Once again, the question of China becomes a test for the West to determine where and how it is most productive, and most feasible, to forge consensus.

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While technically a demotion from one of the traditional ‘top dog’ roles, Nandy’s appointment to the Levelling Up agenda is clearly an endorsement of her capabilities on the Government’s single most prominent election platform. While the phrase ‘Global Britain’ hasn’t taken hold amongst voters, the language of ‘Levelling Up’ has gained a resonance that also necessitates fierce accountability. Calls to move Lisa Nandy from her international portfolio have been growing over recent months, spurred by a frustration that her political talent wasn’t being given sufficient space to shine.

On one level, this may seem curious. Many aspects of the UK’s foreign policy have been firmly front and centre since the 2019 General Election, with the ongoing issues around UK-EU relations, the Channel migration crisis, the election of Joe Biden, the publishing of the Integrated Review, the Afghanistan withdrawal, the global coronavirus pandemic, and the UK’s hosting of both the G7 and COP26 summits, all prominent in the news. This is clearly not a problem brought on by a deficit of issues. The lack of visibility of the Shadow Foreign Secretary rather reveals something about the way in which the Global Britain project is playing out in practice.

Lisa Nandy’s appointment had signalled that Labour wanted to construct a foreign policy mindful of the tensions within the openness-security paradigm. This is a non-negotiable for Western governments as we remain in a period of deep political instability, in part spurred by social and economic change linked to the advance of globalisation. It appears that this straddling of the domestic-international bridge is a capability more important for the Government than the opposition right now – in part because so much of this bridge is realised in practice through coordination with other portfolios and therefore must be a holistic project. Our international legitimacy on climate, for example, is underpinned by our capacity to smoothly make the transition at home to net-zero, without fostering a new narrative of ‘winners and losers’. The Government has not yet fully reorganised its machinery to meet the needs compelled by this symbiosis, and therefore it is difficult for the Shadow Foreign Secretary to have an impact in drawing such links.

It is also true that much of the basic architecture of the UK’s foreign policy is increasingly becoming bipartisan. There are a number of longer-term trends underpinning this, including the evolution of the nature of the threats we face, and the choices being made by our strategic rivals. It is also the case that the decision made by Labour to not engage on the substance of the ongoing battles over the implementation of the Brexit deal, which matches the unwillingness to-date within HMG to talk substantively about broader areas of UK-EU cooperation, has taken a suite of issues of possible contention off the table. The consequence is that the opposition is challenging the Government less on policy substance and more in terms of holding them to account for delivery. This may suit the new Shadow Foreign Secretary, David Lammy, a former barrister and powerful speaker – although he has been very outspoken about Brexit and it is unclear how he will wish to approach this area of his portfolio. (It should also be noted that international development remains a separate Shadow post, despite these having been functionally combined within the FCDO).

As the BFPG’s social research has made clear, Labour’s voting base remains deeply polarised on foreign policy, but to come to power they will need to peg their foreign policy strategy into the centre. It is essential that Labour understands that Government is leading from the front in imbuing much of its foreign policy with a more internationalist, values-based and ambitious streak than many of its own voters may instinctively desire – and hence is also pitching to the middle ground. This must be taken into account when Labour considers its opposition strategy – it is difficult, for example, to see Labour winning the next election by promoting “an ethical foreign policy”.

Labour should rather focus on methodically restoring its legitimacy on national security over the remainder of the parliamentary term. The disastrous Corbyn years have left deep scars on Labour’s credibility in this space, which could conceivably take a decade to heal. Against such a backdrop, even just being able to sit at the table in a framework of bipartisanship should be seen as a win. After all, not many voters wake up thinking about foreign policy, but they certainly notice if they feel insecure going to bed at night.

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The 2021 conference is not seeking to forge a new collective agreement, but is rather about the roadmap to actualise the promises made six years ago. Perhaps the most central task is to keep the 1.5C global warming prediction within reach – a target that is currently well beyond scope even on the back of recent accelerated commitments. Many countries have begun setting new parameters for emissions reductions by 2050, but the situation requires more concerted action in the next ten years.

One area the UK is looking to drive pledges is the phasing out of coal, which is one of the most polluting fossil fuels. The UK wants wealthier nations to strip coal from their energy production mix and for developing nations to agree to no longer seek to establish new coal plants to underpin their economic growth. There is also a push to reduce high-emitting vehicles from national car markets and increase incentives for both manufacturers and consumers to transition to cleaner vehicles. In line with the increasing role that biodiversity is playing in the climate action conversation, the UK will also lead a call for nations to reduce deforestation, make agriculture more sustainable, and seek to conserve up to a third of global oceans and land by the end of the decade.

Another major area of focus at COP26 will be the willingness of wealthier nations to deliver climate financing for smaller and less affluent nations, to support their transition to net-zero and also address the myriad environmental and economic impacts of extreme weather events. Resolving this financing question is central to developing a productive framework around climate action that establishes conventions of burden-sharing, and will be an essential foundation on which G7 nations and other powers convey their legitimacy to smaller countries on the frontline of climate impacts.

These four areas come together under the slogan: ‘Coal, Cars, Cash and Trees’. Yet the work to be done in Glasgow is as much about procedures as it is about policies, as some practical aspects of the Paris Agreement still need to be hammered out. For example, it is currently unclear how the reporting and assessments around climate action plans (called ‘NDCs’) are to be captured and reviewed by the United Nations, and shared timeframes and standards are needed to ensure this process is effective. There is also much to be determined to support Article 6 of the Paris Agreement, which addresses the issue of carbon markets in which nations could purchase carbon credits to fund ‘green’ initiatives.

As world leaders begin to jet into the UK, the absence of some high-profile participants is dampening expectations about what can be realistically achieved. China, a leading global emitter determined to forge its own path on climate action unshackled by what it regards as Western-led cooperation frameworks, will only be sending a muted presence to Glasgow, with President Xi absent from the negotiating table. Russia’s President Putin has also indicated that he will not be in attendance. Both of these strategic rivals of the West recognise that climate action is perhaps the single most urgent area of truly global cooperation at the moment, which can only be advanced through the common participation of all nations, and therefore are keen to maintain and extend their leverage to serve their domestic audiences.

Nonetheless, the UK has done well to secure the presence of many other developing nations, as well as bringing Prime Minister Modi of India to Glasgow – particularly in light of the ongoing situation of the pandemic and its uneven impacts in different parts of the world. The COP26 Summit shares many similarities with the G7 Summit the UK also hosted in June, with the emphasis on the outcomes of the conference matched by the urgency to shore up the legitimacy of the forum itself. Also in the spotlight is the Global Britain project, brought to life in the UK’s capacity to lead, persuade and corral others behind its vision for collective action.

One of the most important tools the UK has in the fight to achieve tangible outcomes at COP26 is the Government’s new Net Zero Strategy – its domestic roadmap to guide the ‘green’ transition, which has been rightly recognised as both ambitious and practical. This document shows the UK Government is capable of joining the dots between vision and application, and is serious about its narrative, framing net-zero as an economic opportunity. Perhaps most importantly, the Strategy recognises the social dimensions to the transition and shows the Government is putting serious thought into how these can be managed in a way that supports governance and a cohesive democracy.

Our foreign policy capabilities and our influence are built on domestic foundations, and while certainly the task of securing global commitments has not been without its challenges, it is the process of translating these into domestic economic and political realities that will consume the next decade. One key question will be the nature and composition of the machinery of Government tasked with taking forward this enormous project – which, like the ‘whole-of-society’ resilience agenda prompted in the Integrated Review, will have many cross-departmental touchpoints, and require fresh procedural thinking to service. The COP26 Summit has been led by a team in the Cabinet Office, but the substance of its ambitions will fall under the remit of many individual units and portfolios.

The stakes of the COP26 Summit are significant, and the UK once again finds itself leading a conversation in which many of our partners and competitors alike share a vested interest. Leaders must agree on some tangible new commitments, as well as reaffirming the future of this forum as a constructive platform for negotiation. However, it is important that scrutiny does not end with the Summit itself, as many of the most critical decisions determining climate outcomes will be made as leaders travel home and sell their transition roadmaps to their own citizens.

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At the most fundamental level, Germany’s outsized economic and strategic role in the European Union means it will remain an essential partner in shaping the negotiations that will need to take place about the UK’s future foreign policy and security role in Europe. While the UK has signalled via the Integrated Review that it wishes to play a leading role in NATO and that it recognises the supremacy of geography in terms of the prioritisation of its defensive resources, it will not be possible for the ambiguity around the UK-EU foreign policy relationship to persist indefinitely. It is obvious that the United States, while remaining an indispensable and committed partner in many areas, is pursuing an independent pathway that means its interests or motivations may not always align with its closest Western allies. And that one consequence of this is that Britain, the EU and other European nations may find themselves on the same side of an issue, but without any framework around which to move forward in collective action.

It is also evident that the practical realities of geography will necessitate coordination on themes outside of NATO’s existing remit, such as the security of essential supply chains, and the migration flows that will inevitably stem from the effects of climate change and other regional conflicts. It had been hoped that once the initial teething problems of the trading relationship were able to settle, there would be space to begin to have this conversation – but the ongoing tensions around the implementation of the Northern Ireland protocol, the practical challenges of the new border arrangements, and the disputes with the French Government over irregular migration in the Channel have proven an obstacle to cooperation. The new German Chancellor will undoubtedly play a role in setting the tone of the next period of the UK-EU relationship, and could be crucial in encouraging the EU institutions and its member states to look to the future – or allowing this unhelpful current impasse to persist.

It is also true that, with the former German Defence Minister Ursula von der Leyen in post as the EU Commission’s President, the relationship between the Commission and the Bundestag has the potential to become frostier than at any other time in recent history. President von der Leyen has a muted or even conflicted relationship with many of her former domestic rivals in the SPD (Social Democrats), including with Olaf Scholz, the current narrow frontrunner to become Chancellor. In her bid to become President, she also succeeded the official candidate of the EPP – the EU voting bloc of her former party, the CDU – which also fostered ill-feeling among certain factions of the German conservatives. The prospect of a Liberal Party finance minister may also signal some bumpy conversations ahead about the future of the EU’s debt and deficit management.

President von der Leyen’s relative social liberalism and her history embedded in the CDU render her both more flexible and more at risk. Ultimately, while it is expected that all candidates for the German Chancellorship will wish to maintain at least the impression of a respectful state of affairs, the departure of von der Leyen’s mentor Chancellor Merkel will undoubtedly unsettle the Commission-Bundestag relationship. The Commission President may take the opportunity to step up fully into her position without the shadow of her former leader, but she may also find herself untethered. One possible beneficiary of this transition could be President Macron, who is likely to seize the vacuum of Merkel’s absence to further raise his influence in shaping the future of the European Union. It is therefore prudent for Britain to simultaneously consider its investments in both bilateral relationships, and the future of the E3 partnership as a vehicle through which a greater degree of productive consistency could be reached.

Under Angela Merkel, Germany has sought to keep a relatively low profile on foreign policy and security, resisting calls to increase its defence spending and shying away from questions about European strategic autonomy. The Chancellor’s preference for a particular interpretation of ‘moderation’ and ‘pragmatism’ has in fact led Germany to take a number of active foreign policy choices with significant consequences for both the EU and the Western alliance – in particular, maintaining that constructive economic partnerships with authoritarian Russia and China are both possible and desirable, that channels of dialogue must remain open, and that investments in security measures must be deemed ‘proportionate’. At various points in her leadership, Merkel has conjured praise and admiration as a beacon of Western principles, yet two of her last acts as Chancellor – seeking to advance the ill-fated EU-China investment partnership (the CAI) and pushing through the controversial gasp pipeline with Russia (Nord Stream 2) – could be judged as failing to align with long-term Western interests.

Chancellor Merkel’s complicated foreign policy legacy means that the subject of Germany’s – and, linked to this, the European Union’s – role in the world looms large within these national elections, despite the majority of the domestic televised debates being largely dominated by domestic matters. As ever, given a coalition-building process will need to take place after the elections, it is important to consider the positions of all the major parties, as the question of which will hold the foreign ministry will need to be thrashed out in the weeks and months to come.

The Greens

The Greens have historically been a ‘pacifist’ party, however their current leader Annalena Baerbock is from the more hawkish wing of the party. Baerbock advocates a more confrontational approach to both Russia and China, and has been forthright in backing NATO as an ‘indispensable actor’. She is a fierce advocate for a ‘values-driven’ foreign policy, and wants Germany to take a stronger role in promoting a narrative of an existential battle between authoritarianism and liberal democracy and holding China to account on human rights. There are practical consequences of this view, as the Greens oppose the CAI, and want to block Huawei from involvement in Europe’s digital infrastructure. They hold a similarly robust perspective on relations with Russia – strongly supporting EU sanctions, opposing Nord Stream 2, defending Ukraine’s independence, and condemning Russia’s role in digital influence operations in Germany.

Nonetheless, the German Greens still oppose the prospect of Germany raising its defence commitment to 2% of GDP – which they describe as “arbitrary” – and it is certainly the case that Baerbock has previously called for Germany to sign the Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty and pull out of NATO’s nuclear sharing programmes. Baerbock has spoken favourably of Joe Biden and has signalled areas of cooperation on climate action, but her party’s unwillingness to rise to America’s challenge on defence spending may limit the ultimate scope of the partnership.

The Greens are, understandably, ambitious in their climate action policies and in coalition negotiations they will be keen to ensure that they are able to hold relevant ministries or form new ones through which to advance their agenda – recognising the significance of the finance portfolio in guiding future taxation settlements around the climate transition. Perhaps the most significant attribute of Baerbock’s international approach is her instinctive preference for the EU becoming a ‘self-reliant’ and cohesive foreign policy actor, with Germany’s interests and ambitions primarily advanced collectively through Brussels as an EU-wide agenda.

The CDU (Christian Democrats)

Chancellor Merkel’s successor as the leader of the CDU, Armin Laschet, has troubled some outside observers in allied capitals for his somewhat ambiguous views on Russia and China. To some extent, this reflects a degree of continuity with Merkel herself, with Laschet making clear that German-China relations should remain cordial despite the two nations’ divergence in values, and that economic interests should be protected. He favours behind-the-scenes diplomacy over public statements, and believes there is no contradiction in pursuing economic and other forms of engagement while also condemning China’s choices and behaviour. Laschet also takes a similar approach towards Russia, wanting to maintain a ‘sensible’ relationship that allows space for dialogue and economic exchange, and as such, wholeheartedly supports Merkel’s approach to Nord Stream 2 as a practical commercial solution.

Despite his cautious – or some may say, relaxed – approach to these bilateral relationships, Laschet is more robust in his view about the role that Germany should play within NATO and in the regional security framework. His party supports the formation of an EU army and defensive union, and Laschet has committed to work towards the 2% NATO spending ambition and nuclear deterrence. And despite the red flags that may be perceived around Laschet’s views on Russia and China, Washington will be pleased by his interest in investing in transatlantic trade and in developing a common climate policy. Laschet is also committed to European integration and wants it to play a strong role in global foreign policy, including the formation of new ministries and competencies in a range of areas – including intelligence and security. He has previously called for a system by which EU member states could voluntarily join a common European foreign policy – a potential workaround that in practice could bridge the possible future transition to qualified majority voting on such matters.

The SPD (Social Democrats)

Olaf Scholz is considered a remarkably resilient political figure and appears to have a striking capacity for reinvention, so we can anticipate that his foreign policy views may well evolve to meet the demands and opportunities of the outcome of the elections. He has largely avoided forming a distinct position on China and has been relatively vague on his opinion regarding the CAI, although he has previously called for a more constructive dialogue with China and has had significant exposure to trade with China via his previous role as the Director of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and as Mayor of Hamburg. Scholz’s approach to Russia is also relatively unemotional and bears some resemblance to the stance taken by Chancellor Merkel, in terms of being comfortable with criticism while remaining open to debate and discussion. Scholz has indicated he would seek the creation of a new strategy for dealing with Russia, acknowledging that further European integration – of which he is an ardent supporter – will naturally increase regional tensions.

The SPD take a strong position on NATO, to the extent that he has declared he would not form an alliance with any party that was not clearly committed to the Alliance as a matter of principle. This is seen to be a reference to the prospect of a Red-Red-Green coalition, in which the far-left Die Linke could theoretically form a coalition with the Greens and the SPD. Like Laschet, Scholz also supports the notion of an EU army and defensive union, and has indicated that he would aim to pursue greater cooperation with France on foreign policy as the foundation of a more cohesive EU international strategic capability – which would also see the EU partnering with other nations on large-scale joint initiatives, including on climate action. In the final debates ahead of the elections, Scholz expressed his support for France in the AUKUS dispute, and indicated that Europe must consider its collective security as a matter of sovereignty.

The FDP (Liberal Party)

FDP leader Christian Lindner has described himself as a foreign policy ‘realist’, but his pro-business stance is balanced against his support for Germany taking a tougher stance on China, with his party opposing the ratification of the CAI. Similarly, while asserting a desire to see stronger relations between Russia and Europe in the longer term, the FDP has been a loud voice in calling for continued EU sanctions against their authoritarian neighbour, as well as challenging the Nord Stream 2 project, and calling for greater engagement with opposition groups challenging the government’s authoritarian rule. The party is also a fierce advocate of NATO, and in fact holds a manifesto commitment to spend 3% of GDP on international security, as well as promoting an intensification of relations with the United States. Like most of the other candidates, Lindner favours investment in greater EU competencies in foreign policy.

Die Linke (The Left)

Perhaps the most distinct foreign policy offer of the parties in the mix for a potential coalition is Die Linke, whose leaders Janine Wissler and Martin Schirdewan have historically opposed NATO and have previously proposed replacing it with a collective security system that would involve Russia. They have since sought to soften this position, but it remains difficult to see what their new approach would be in practice. The party wants to end all arms exports, and opposes many existing and proposed EU functions, including the European Defence Agency and the prospect of an EU army. It also opposes any German military deployment abroad, and wants to remove all nuclear weapons from German territory. Its attitude towards Russia is unusual, regarding it as a somewhat disruptive actor but certainly not framing Russia as a rival or threat. Die Linke has supported Nord Stream 2 and wishes to pursue a policy of greater engagement and dialogue with the Russian Government. Its worldview is partly shaped by its generalised antipathy towards the United States, which it regards as self-interested and belligerent, resisting a multipolar world order in favour of its own hegemony. As such, Die Linke is also open towards cooperation with China and is broadly untroubled by its rising power.

Conclusions for the UK

With Chancellor Merkel bowing out after 16 years in power, there is no question that the German elections will be consequential for the nation’s future, and – in part because of the presence of a German EU Commission President – for the future of the European Union. Both of these relationships with be crucial to advancing the UK’s cooperation within its neighbourhood on key security and strategic issues. And, given Britain and Germany’s individual strengths and capabilities, the state of the bilateral relationship will also be influential in shaping the future of the Western alliance, particularly as the United States becomes less predictable in its actions and intentions.

Looking at the possible outcomes of the elections, it is fair to say that the differences between the other candidates and parties pale in comparison to the potential consequences of Die Linke’s role in any future coalition, particularly if it was able to negotiate a position with any influence over foreign policy. It appears, however, that this is an extremely unlikely prospect, with the SPD – the most likely to have opened coalition negotiations with Die Linke – already indicating they will not support a coalition with a party that does not support the NATO alliance.

Turning to the other candidates, the most significant distinctions pertain to their attitudes towards China and Russia, their commitments to German defence spending, and the extent to which they wish to project influence through the European Union. In a way, the Greens’ foreign policy may appear in fact closest to the UK Government position on a range of areas, although perhaps ironically, they are also the party the most likely to advocate for these being advanced through the European Union. Both the SPD and the CDU will in many ways offer a degree of continuity with the Merkel era – a preference for ‘moderation’, ‘hedging’ and ‘caution’ which we may no longer feel sufficient to meet the challenges of the day. Chancellor Merkel also provided a significant degree of stability in her complex personal relationships with many key international leaders, and it is unclear as to how these will transition across with her successor. It will not be in Britain’s interests for Germany to be weak, indecisive or inward-looking, and we should therefore hope that we have yet to see the real foreign policy mettle of these candidates.

What is clear, is that the strength and ambition of the German leadership will determine the nation’s relationship with both Brussels and Paris, and that Britain will need to be prepared for Paris to potentially become an even more vital actor in forging the future of the European Union. And while the EU’s credibility as a centralised foreign policy actor remains theoretical, it would be unwise to underestimate its capacity for targeted influence and the importance of its stability for our own regional interests. The task of reinvigorating and repairing relations with both Germany and France remains urgent and these elections, and the French elections in the Spring next year, present an opportunity for a clean slate and renewed resolve. Westminster should be watching closely.

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