Nearly nine years on from the self-immolation of Mohammed Bouazizi, the Tunisian fruit seller prevented from selling vegetables by state officials, that kickstarted the ‘Arab Spring’, protests are once again gripping several Arab countries. Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Tunisia and Morocco have seen protests. Demonstrations in Algeria and Sudan have ousted the authoritarian leaders of their countries – Algerian president Abdelaziz Bouteflika on 3rd April, and Omar al-Bashir, the Sudanese dictator, on 11th April.

In Sudan, protests continue as civilians call for total regime change. Sudanese security forces have reportedly killed tens or hundreds of peaceful protesters, with rape and other methods of torture used as an act of repression, in violation of international law. A transition agreement between protesters and the army looks shaky, and the risk of conflict escalation remains high.

The British public and MPs have joined international calls for action in Sudan to protect civilians. Should tensions escalate, the international community could be pushed towards intervention by the UN’s ‘Responsibility to Protect’ commitment. However, for the UK government, lessons from their failures the Iraq War and intervention in Libya are still fresh. How can the UK learn from these lessons whilst continuing to stand up for international law and norms? 

Military Intervention?

Since the British invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the mass public opposition that accompanied it, the UK government has been reluctant to spearhead protracted international interventions into other countries. During the Arab Spring, for example, whilst the UK and France were the primary backers of the NATO coalition’s intervention in Libya to enforce UN Security Council Resolution 1973, which called for a cessation of violence and an implementation of a no-fly zone, they were quick to withdraw. The coalition withdrew in October 2011 following the death of dictator Muammar Gaddafi, after the UN Security Council voted unanimously to end the military operation. 

The NATO coalition has since drawn criticism for lacking a well thought-out plan for the post-Gaddafi transition of Libya, as the National Transitional Council, and subsequent Government of National Accord, which have lead the opposition in Libya, have struggled to retain control over the country, leaving it divided by warring factions. 

These criticisms have left the UK government and public opinion reluctant to support armed intervention. In 2018, 52% of British adults said they opposed military intervention in other countries, with only 27% in favour. 2019 polling conducted on behalf of the BFPG found that only 16% of British adults view war as an important international issue. Despite the protracted and brutal civil war in Syria, for example, UK intervention has been limited to air strikes against ISIS and attacks on Syrian chemical weapons facilities. 

However, the government has continued to uphold its commitments to UN peacekeeping missions and other international coalitions. The UK currently has about 600 personnel deployed on UN peacekeeping operations and is the sixth largest contributor to the UN peacekeeping budget. Illustrated on the map below, as of July 2019 the British Armed Forces have troops deployed on operations or based across every continent on the planet – a feat that only France and the USA have the capacity to do.

Further, a change.org petition calling for the UK government to stop the use of excessive force by the Sudanese government and militias, and a second calling for the UN to investigate the 3rd June suspected human rights violations by the military, have collectively garnered nearly 800,000 signatures. This suggests that the public would sanction a UN-backed operation. Indeed, much of the controversy behind UK involvement in Iraq, Libya, and Syria, was that the interventions were not backed by the UN Security Council, and thus breached the UN Charter. The 22nd July announcement that the UK is to send 250 troops to boost the UN peacekeeping mission in Mali has been largely met without criticism, giving further credence to the suggestion that intervention in the name of peacekeeping and backed by international law would be acceptable both in government and in public. 

 

 

Towards a responsible approach 

What more can the UK do to protect civilians in Sudan and similar situations and uphold commitments to international norms of peace and civilian protection? First, it could help to increase national awareness both of the UK’s commitments to these norms and of the UK’s capacity to enforce them. In a 2018 YouGov survey which asked UK adults what it means for the UN to authorise military action, only 7% of respondents chose the correct response. The UK has a privileged position as a permanent member of the Security Council, and it could use this to lobby for and seek international support for missions to protect civilians. Britain’s military and geopolitical strength could be an asset in this respect – the Henry Jackson Society’s Audit of Geopolitical Capability 2019 ranked the UK as the second most powerful country in the world, suggesting it has the capacity to join and lead international coalitions, and lobby other powerful states to contribute to the protection of civilians worldwide.

Secondly, care and responsibility could be taken to ensure missions are well-executed and structures are put in place for military withdrawal and transition. By maintaining a focus on the transition period after military intervention, the UK can avoid repeating the mistakes of the Libyan conflict and increase the chance of a successful democratic transition or regime change. 

Finally, in order to strengthen its international position and ability to act in instances like the Sudanese demonstrations, the government could benefit from the development of a long-term Middle East Strategy. Both in reacting appropriately to the escalation of conflict, and in proactively avoiding international pressures from instability such as migration and terrorism, a coordinated Middle East strategy would be useful. This will enable foreign policy to respond more strategically to crises in the region, and allow Britain to begin to look at the region from a long-term perspective, rather than a crisis-to-crisis reaction. The Court of Appeals’ recent ruling that UK arms sales to Saudi Arabia were unlawful is indicative of a lack of joined-up government focus on the region, as the FCO has focused on implementing peace talks in Yemen, whilst permitting the arms sales that have fueled the conflict. Developing an in-depth and coordinated knowledge base of the region could prevent these issues arising in future and allow for the better executed-missions suggested above.

Broader movements from across government and related civil society groups could also be incorporated into this strategy to improve civilians’ lives in affected countries. Organisations such as the British Council and the Westminster Foundation for Democracy are already joining international coalitions to improve the situation. In Algeria, the British Council, International Labour Organisation, and World Bank have started an initiative to encourage economic diversification, youth employment and education; and the Westminster Foundation for Democracy has partnered with the United Nations Development Agency, National Democratic Institute and BBC Media Action to improve political inclusivity and the media in Algeria.

By harnessing the best of our international capacity and hard and soft power reserves, the UK has the potential to become a world leader in standing up for international law and the protection of civilians in dangerous and high tension situations like Sudan. The government’s response must be well-planned, strategised, and sanctioned by the UN or else it risks repeating old mistakes.

Current news cycles have been dominated by growing tensions between American and Iranian forces. The foundations of this tension lie with Trump’s decision to withdraw the US from the Iran nuclear deal last year and reimpose US sanctions.

Although Iran had been complying with the terms of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Trump decided to reimpose sanctions which has driven Iran into economic recession. In response, Iran appealed to the international community for assistance with its recovery. The UK should demonstrate its commitment to denuclearisation and continue supporting the JCPOA.

The Iran deal is of great importance for the UK for several reasons. Importantly, as a signatory of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the UK has pledged to pursue global nuclear disarmament and prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. It has been the consistent view of the UK that non-nuclear states are needed for international security.

Hence, the UK has remained committed to the JCPOA, despite the US’s withdrawal. The JCPOA represents the greatest hope of preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon through its limits on uranium enrichment and regular inspections by international regulators. With the JCPOA now in jeopardy, the UK and the wider international community could lose the ability to regulate Iran’s nuclear development. Considering Iran’s links to terrorist organisations, the number of enemy states it has in the region and its hostility to the West, the JCPOA has been imperative for the security of the Middle East and the West.

Historically, the UK and Iran have had strained relations. Recent events have resulted in this relationship worsening, as the trust between both states has completely collapsed. As part of the EU, the UK imposed sanctions on Iran relating to the severe human rights violations by the Iranian regime. In the Syrian and Yemen Civil Wars, the UK and Iran have found themselves on opposing sides, with the UK critical of Iran’s support of Assad and Houthi forces. Regarding diplomatic relations, the UK Foreign Office has urged dual nationals against travel to Iran in light of the imprisonments of Nazanin Zaghari-Ratcliffe and Aras Amiri. Both prosecutions are indirectly related to a £400m debt from a 30-year old arms deal owed by the UK government to Iran. Despite these issues, the UK should remain committed to the JCPOA. As significant as the JCPOA was for restricting nuclear proliferation, the deal was also meant to be an advancement for British-Iranian relations. With a stronger diplomatic relationship, it is possible that Iran and the UK would be able create a dialogue to solve these issues more effectively. Future cases similar to Zaghari-Ratcliffe and Amiri could have a more beneficial conclusion.

To incentivise Iran to remain compliant with the JCPOA, the UK alongside the other members of the E3 – France and Germany, announced the creation of the Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX). INSTEX was a new trade mechanism designed to facilitate European trade with Iran without violating US sanctions. It was thought that INSTEX would alleviate some of the hardships on the Iranian economy by encouraging European and Iranian trade. However, INSTEX has faced widespread criticism from Iranian officials. Despite the mechanism being announced in January, it is not yet fully functional. Furthermore, INSTEX only applies to humanitarian goods, such as agricultural food, medical devices and pharmaceutical goods, in order to comply with US sanctions. These sectors do not contribute a significant amount to the Iranian economy, compared to their main exports, oil and natural gas, which have been banned by the sanctions. Therefore, Iran sees INSTEX as a symbolic gesture, not intended to provide relief for Iran’s economy.

In response to the lack of protection Iran was getting from the international community, on May 8^th President Hassan Rouhani sent a letter to each of the JCPOA signatories. This letter set a 60-day deadline for the signatories to provide Iran with access to banking and oil markets restricted by US sanctions. If this was not achieved, Iran threatened to abandon the JCPOA’s 3.67% limit on uranium enrichment, severely reducing their break-out time. It had been estimated that Iran would only need a few months to develop a nuclear weapon once it surpassed the JCPOA’s enrichment limits.

UK Foreign Secretary Jeremy Hunt has warned Iran that violating the JCPOA could result in further sanctions for the state, as he has reiterated his support for the US amongst the growing tensions. However, the choice is not simple for the UK. The UK’s main interest in this issue should be restricting Iranian nuclear proliferation. Iranian development of a nuclear weapon would have alarming consequences for the security of the Middle East and the West. Backing Iran into a corner will only further isolate them and increase their hostility to the UK amongst others. Therefore, ensuring Iran remains committed to the JCPOA is the best course of action to facilitate British interests. The Iranian economy is already suffering from US sanctions after failing to receive substantial backing from other states. Despite the UK and others reiterating their commitment to the JCPOA through initiatives such as INSTEX, its postponement has meant that Iran’s economy has had no relief.

A more constructive option for the UK would be to work with the international community to circumvent US sanctions. The other signatories of the deal; China, Russia, France, Germany and the EU all remain committed to ensuring the endurance of the JCPOA. INSTEX’s operation could be accelerated or include non-European states to increase the market size. However, the most effective action INSTEX could take would be to explore the inclusion of the trading of oil and natural gas. With crude oil accounting for 71.7% of total Iranian exports, it is crucial for the recovery of their economy that Iran is able access oil markets. The collapse of Iran’s economy will increase their hostility towards the West and give support to extremists who claim Rouhani has been too conciliatory towards the West. Of course, the trading of oil would anger those in Washington as these transactions are currently not permitted under US sanctions. Thus, any moves to undermine US sanctions is likely to render consequences. Look at China, who are feeling the effects of a tariff war.

The UK and the US have a strong, historically close alliance, and this is likely to increase in importance now because of Brexit. However, the UK must consider the complex balance of its interests and its primary goal in this issue is to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, rather than following President Trump’s policy. If the UK worked alongside the international community, and not in isolation to help alleviate Iran’s woes, Iran could be somewhat shielded from US actions. With Iran being able to export its oil and natural gas reserves, it could remain committed to the JCPOA and satisfy the UK’s nuclear proliferation restriction attempts.

 

 

On Monday the Foreign Secretary Jeremy Hunt gave a speech at the Mansion House in London on the UK after Brexit. The speech was noted in particular for straying beyond the traditional limits of foreign policy into defence and domestic issues. But whilst it is no secret that Mr Hunt is one of the many contenders to be the next Conservative leader, and perhaps Prime Minister, the speech was perhaps more valuable in signposting the growing recognition that the UK’s international and domestic prosperity and security priorities are intimately bound up with each other. Whilst the top level political disfunction of the UK continues, there is an important paradigm shift taking place inside government. Whilst Brexit and the political fallout is somewhat of a catalyst, the trends driving this have been emerging for some time, including the successes & failures of globalisation, technology and social changes. This now includes an increasingly widely accessed but confused and atomised information environment, especially vulnerable to insurgent, extreme and malign agendas.

Through this prism, the three areas of focus for Jeremy Hunt’s speech on the UK’s prospects for national renewal – the economy, hard power and democratic renewal – have more of an international focus than a pure focus on his leadership ambitions might suggest.

This may have some significant implications for the shape of the domestic economy at home, and where possible should be leveraged to invest into those very communities that have felt alienated. This is all the more important because it is these communities who are particularly vulnerable to populist or subversive messaging. But quality jobs and economic investment, though critical, are not enough. More respect for and engagement with perspectives from across the UK in discussion of critical national issues, including foreign policy issues, will become increasingly key for viable and sustainable policy making. This is important if our democracy is to become robust enough to resist the siren calls, particularly of foreign powers and private interests seeking to weaken the UK at home and its support for the rules-based order abroad.

The consolation, and perhaps irony, is that despite the top line political chaos, the UK sits in an enviable geopolitical position across a series of islands off an overall remarkably benign, stable and likeminded continent. On the other side of the ocean are other close friends and partners. The great strategic challenger to the biggest of our partners is China. The UK can afford to play the role of constructive, principled and robust broker alongside others as the world responds to this. The most immediate military threat to the UK is from a declining and unstable Russia, still possessed of some formidable and advanced military capability.

It is here that the UK requires the most investment in hard power, but there are opportunities too. The UK will soon be in possession of two of the most advanced aircraft carriers in the world that with right investment at home in advanced robotics, artificial intelligence and other technologies, could provide platforms for a formidable combination of air, sea and subsurface capabilities. With scaled up defence investment, in partnership with regional allies such as Norway and Canada, the UK could preserve its global reach, but focus on securing the North Atlantic and Western Hemisphere of the Arctic. Not only would this save the US tens of billions of dollars to be redirected to the Pacific and elsewhere, but it would secure for the UK a sphere of unilateral capability around the UK homeland unknown for decades.

The UK cannot and should not isolate itself completely from the dramatic changes unfolding around the world. Indeed the UK, for its own and global benefit, needs to remain an active champion of an open, interconnected and rules based international system. However, to ensure it can continue to do so from a position of strength and security we require responses that cut across the traditional divisions between domestic and foreign policy. Whatever Mr Hunt’s motivations in making such a cross cutting speech at the Mansion House, his reference to the interplay between our economy, hard power and democratic culture points to the fact that consideration of the implications of this are being considered elsewhere in government. Despite the turmoil at the top, we should prepare for some potentially significant changes in how the UK domestically is organised to meet the wider global challenges we are facing in years to come.

 

Huawei is facing an existential crisis throughout Europe and North America. The Chinese tech giant is the world’s largest telecommunications equipment maker and has recently overtaken Apple in becoming the world’s second-largest supplier of smartphones. Founded in 1987, boasting 180,000 employees and over $92.55 billion in revenue, Huawei has been deemed the crown jewel of Chinese tech. Huawei has won over 25 commercial 5G contracts worldwide. It has supplied equipment to primary UK telecommunications networks such as BT, EE and Vodafone. Huawei is now however, locked in intense legal disputes regarding its alleged breaches of US sanctions and was recently hit with 23 US sanctions. There is growing fear amongst Western leaders about whether Huawei is a vessel for espionage for the Chinese government. The West has already acted to limit if not rescind Huawei’s involvement in infrastructure. The EU’s technology commissioner has warned that countries “have to be worried” about Chinese manufacturers. The US has banned all Huawei products in infrastructure. The UK’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) recently concluded however, that the risks posed by Huawei can be mitigated and should not be banned from UK networks.

This article will explore whether Huawei poses a genuine threat to the UK. New legislation requires private companies in China to “co-operate” with intelligence agencies and previous cases of espionage through private entities illustrate the potential threat. Some commentators argue that no private company in China is truly free from extensive government influence. Conversely, others assert that the UK has robust safeguards and Huawei can be considered an anomaly. The tech giant received NCSC approval and is closely monitored by GCHQ. This regulatory scrutiny from our security agencies should provide sufficient assurance that the potential risks of undue influence are duly mitigated. We will explore the merits of these arguments and consider the extent of action required by the UK, if any.

Huawei has become integral in the UK’s network infrastructure but there is growing evidence of the tech giant’s potential threat to national security. Whilst Huawei is keen to portray itself as wholly independent from the Chinese government, critics question how free any major Chinese business can be from government influence. China’s 2017 National Intelligence Law stipulates that organisations must “support, co-operate with and collaborate in national intelligence work.” On the surface this legislation could oblige private companies to disclose confidential information of any nature or even carry out espionage if requested. The introduction of this legislation has raised serious security questions about Huawei and other Chinese tech firms.

Additionally, Huawei’s denial of government influence cannot necessarily be taken at face value. There are several cases where China has been found to be stealing trade secrets through private and state-owned companies.  In November 2018, the US Justice Department charged state backed chipmaker Fujian Jinhua Integrated Circuit Co. Semiconductors, with stealing trade secrets from US semiconductor company, Micron. Fujan Jinhua denies all allegations. In October, Bloomberg revealed that chips were inserted in computer motherboards manufactured in China for US-based supplier Super Micro Computer, a company which supplies the likes of Amazon and Apple (who all also deny the allegations). China also refutes any wrongdoing.

In January 2019, a Huawei executive was arrested in Poland after being charged with spying for the Chinese government. Huawei claimed this was a rogue employee and had nothing to do with the company’s operations. The Polish security services concurred. The Polish Prime Minister did, however, urge for joint NATO action to restrict Huawei, illustrating the global concerns over security.

Huawei’s CEO Ren Zhengfei was recently asked how the company could deny a request from the Chinese government to access data or to create network “back-doors”.  Zhengfei stated “China’s ministry of foreign affairs has officially clarified that no law in China requires any company to install mandatory back doors….Huawei and me personally have never received any request from any government to provide improper information.” It is not clear however, the extent of collaboration required by the National Intelligence legislation or what is classed as “improper information”. While Huawei is not obligated to install back doors, they ostensibly have no legal power to decline a government request for data. Therefore, Zhengfei’s assurance does little to alleviate concerns. There is mounting evidence against Huawei, illustrating that the company poses a risk to the UK’s national security and governmental action is warranted.

Many commentators argue Huawei’s threat is overstated as the UK’s network infrastructure security framework is robust. Furthermore, unnecessary restrictive action against Huawei could come at the expense of the UK’s development of 5G technology, given Huawei’s position as a trailblazer in the technology. This is a fair assessment as in the UK, Huawei’s security threat is mitigated. The UK government setup the Huawei Cyber Security Evaluation centre in 2010, which monitors Huawei’s UK operations in collaboration with GCHQ’s national cybersecurity centre. The government regularly subjects Huawei equipment to GCHQ intelligence agency testing and over the years GCHQ had consistently provided assurances that the company poses no risk to national security.  The last GCHQ report however, found “shortcomings” in products and could only give “limited assurance” that the firm posed no threat to national infrastructure. Subsequently, Huawei agreed to a series of GCHQ technical demands that strengthen its products against attackers. Huawei’s willingness to co-operate and take remedial action undermines the allegations of mandatory backdoors. Crucially, a NCSC recent review claims that as long as precautions are taken, they are confident that risks can be sufficiently mitigated, undermining any potential security threat.

In addition, unlike most billion-dollar Chinese companies, Huawei is not government owned and is transparent with its ownership. Huawei’s CEO holds 1.4% while the rest is held on behalf of employees and “no external institution or government institution owns shares”. Without state ownership the influence of the government is substantially reduced.

The British government should act proportionately to the identified threat, as has been done in previous cases. State-controlled Chinese telecommunications equipment maker ZTE was phased out from the UK in 2015 after the National Cyber Security Centre warned of national security threats. This illustrates that where legitimate threats are identified, action has been taken. Fundamentally, the government is well placed to identify risk and take appropriate action. Huawei may pose a threat but we should follow the guidance of our security services who are confident that any threats are managed effectively by this close monitoring and therefore, does not warrant a total ban.

Taking all into account, Huawei does pose a legitimate risk to the UK. In December 2018, UK Defence Minister Gavin Williamson revealed “grave concerns” about Huawei. The Chinese government exercises significant influence over all large Chinese private companies and the National Intelligence legislation could facilitate espionage. Robert Hannigan, former director of GCHQ best summarises the dilemma facing the UK government. He notes “It’s a difficult balance…We want the benefits of Chinese technology and inward investment and we should find ways of managing the risks, pushing back where necessary.” Telecoms equipment was the UK’s largest import from China account for 14% of our total trade, illustrating the importance of striking this balance. The concerns raised over Huawei are however, substantial enough to warrant action. These concerns could prove to be misplaced but whilst they exist it would be irresponsible not to take them seriously. The government’s current approach is proportionate and adequate, given that the monitoring of Huawei significantly mitigates the highlighted risks. This is the view of the NCSC, but the UK government is yet to make a decision on the matter. For now, we won’t be saying our goodbyes to Huawei just yet.

Theresa May’s recent decision to provide £92 million to the UK Space Agency (UKSA) to test the feasibility of building a sovereign Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS),  amid concerns that the UK will have restricted access to Galileo’s Publicly Regulated Service(PRS) post Brexit has re-ignited discussion on the future of the UK’s Space programme. There are genuinely awkward political, security and financial implications to the UK having restricted access to the PRS. But regardless of the outcome around Galileo, the issue should be seen as a catalyst which could help the UK to revive its current space policy, including a better alignment with UK foreign policy. One overlooked way in which this revival could occur would be through the government prioritising the delivery of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (UN SDGs), via the International Partnership Programme (IPP).The question is, why would a space policy focused on the delivery of SDGs help the UK to revive its foreign policy post Brexit?

UKSA’s IPP is the world’s largest ‘space for development programme’, and helps to provide valuable insight into how the UK’s space sector could serve as a driving force to revitalise UK foreign policy. The IPP functions by cooperating with developing countries to identify and resolve key developmental challenges through space technology. Funded by the BEIS’s Global Challenges Research Fund (GCRF – part of UK’s Official Development Assistance ring-fenced budget) and in line with the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee requirements, the programme comprises of a project consortium which brings together expertise across the academic and space sector, to deliver tailored solutions to developmental challenges in the global south.

Graph sourced from UK Space Agency’s International Partnership Programme: project overview report 

More often than not, such solutions are developed by using geospatial technology to help deliver country specific UN SDGs. An example of an IPP helping to promote sustainable economic growth in developing countries is the ACCORD project in Rwanda & Kenya, which works to advance coffee crop optimisation for rural development. The aim of the project is to achieve UN SDGs 1 (no poverty) and 2 (zero hunger).

The IPP SDG delivery strategy is in line with the  United Nations Office for Outer Space Affair’s  Space 2030 agenda, an initiative set up in 2017 to encourage space faring nations to work together to deliver the UN SDGs. By working together these nations stimulate multilateralism in international relations at a time when cooperation on issues of trade, development, human rights and security appear to be in decline.

Critics may be quick to point out that states can and do primarily cooperate for strategic reasons, rather than for the sake of delivering SDGs. Yet, an overall rise in non-traditional security threats (NTS) is a global phenomenon and requires international cooperation. The rise NTS we’re currently seeing across the globe have predominantly occurred from intrastate conflict. This has led to more countries than ever experiencing violent conflict, contributing to states spending $1.04 trillion a year, in order to combat conflict. Surely then, it is time for states to try to collaborate in order tackle these disruptions to global peace and security. Space technology offers smart, and sustainable solutions to the great geopolitical challenges of our time.

So how can we use space technology to mitigate NTS; and why is this important for the UK’s foreign policy?

The UK’s NovaSAR serves as an excellent example of how the UKSA, can work closely with the FCO to tackle threats to human security. The main purpose of NovaSAR is to utilise its automatic identification system to detect illegal shipping activity. The aim of using this satellite monitoring system is to help curb the threat of piracy illegal drug and human trafficking, in order to increase the potential of safeguarding geopolitical stability. The issue of combating illegal migration and human trafficking is a key priority for the UK. In August, Theresa May announced that the UK will launch a new project together with France in order to foster international cooperation with key West African states to tackle this international issue. This underscores the value in prioritising the delivery of SDGs to help the government deliver its Global Britain vision, as well as better integrating the UK’s space policy with its foreign policy objectives. This is important given that the UK is trying to reposition itself in an increasingly volatile multipolar environment.

So, whilst restricted access to Galileo’s PRS system is cause for some concern for the UK’s Space policy, it is misleading to assume that the future success of the UKs space programme is solely dependent on the development of a separate GNSS or Space Security Defence programme. There are alternative ways through which the UK’s space sector can thrive post Brexit. One solution would be to prioritise prolonging the IPP programme. The key issue is, whether or not the government will continue to re-invest in the programme to help with the delivery of SDGs to enhance the UKs foreign policy post Brexit. None the less, in 2019, the UK will have to report on its progress at the UN High Level political forum for SDGs. So now is the time to re-invest in a space programme focused on strengthening multilateral engagement to revamp UK foreign policy.