While this is understandable and necessary, it would be a mistake for government to abandon soft power in this unstable moment, or to view geopolitics as an “either-or” trade-off between hard and soft power. At this very moment, we are seeing a USA burning through it’s soft power capital at breakneck speed and, with its recent closing down of old capabilities from cultural diplomacy in the State Department and US AID ceasing operations, it has fewer means to put into rebuilding (should it decide to do so). Indeed, the complexity of global geopolitics means that the UK must be even more strategic. As a middle power that relies on alliances to pursue its goals and interests, it is essential and ensure it draws on all of its international capabilities to navigate choppy international waters. That must include soft power as well as defence.

Hard power alone cannot achieve a nation’s goals

The case for increased defence spending is not in dispute here. NATO commitments matter, and the UK is right to take them seriously. But the idea that hard power and soft power pull in opposite directions fundamentally misunderstands how influence actually works.

Military capability provides deterrence. It does not, on its own, build the coalitions needed to use it, sustain it, or legitimate it in the eyes of the world. Those coalitions matter because no serious objective, whether sanctioning an adversary, securing shipping lanes, or holding a diplomatic line, can be delivered by the UK alone, and with UN multilateralism visibly fraying, the work of assembling partners falls increasingly to states themselves. The government’s own emphasis on flexible, issue-based partnerships with new strategic allies depends on exactly this groundwork: cultural and institutional engagement that opens doors long before harder objectives are on the table. Coalitions are built on relationships and on years of cultural presence, diplomatic credibility, and the kind of institutional trust that cannot simply be procured by government contracts.

When the strikes on Iran began, Prime Minister Starmer joined the leaders of France and Germany in condemning the Iranian counter-strikes and calling for a resumption of diplomacy. The UK’s positioning as an independent voice for de-escalation, only carries weight if the UK is perceived as a principled and engaged actor in the region.

That perception is built through long-term engagement, by the government but also by soft power institutions: the BBC, the UK’s universities teaching future leaders around the world, and other forms of, often unheralded, cultural exchange that build up trust and understanding. These are the channels through which diplomacy actually functions. Trust accumulated over years keeps lines of communication open in a crisis, widens the space for compromise, and gives counterparts a reason to listen when hard conversations begin. Even if the UK had reached defence spending targets of 3.5% of GDP, we would still be relying on soft-power levers to help push for a diplomatic solution to the conflict.

The UK’s adversaries are not pulling back from soft power

The UK remains in a strong position thanks to historic soft power, but the gap between the UK and adversaries is closing. Other nations recognise that warfare in the modern age is increasingly hybrid, with information playing a key role. When the BBC pulled Arabic radio services out of Lebanon it was quickly replaced by Russian state media. A recent report by the Public Accounts Committee estimated that Russia and China spend between £6-8bn a year on international state media, and that trust in these sources has risen markedly.

Adversaries increasingly treat the information environment as contested ground, where the aim is not to persuade but to disrupt and degrade open systems. UK institutions work under different constraints, bound by norms of transparency and editorial independence. Russian and Chinese state media are not. A UK that cannot defend its own information space will struggle to be heard abroad.

The 2023 attack on the British Library illustrates the importance of the UK’s institutions, and the increasing conflict over information. One of the UK’s most significant cultural institutions suffered what has been described as one of the worst cyber incidents in British history, carried out by the Rhysida ransomware group, believed by researchers to be operated by Russian-speaking actors. The attack shows that UK soft power institutions matter enough to be worth targeting, and that the information environment they inhabit is actively contested. Whether the attack was state-directed or simply tolerated by a government that looks the other way when its criminals target Western institutions, the effect is the same.

The British Council’s Trends in Soft Power 2020-2025 report, which tracks the soft power investment and strategy of twenty-five leading economies, also found that the United States has undergone substantial retrenchment. USAID has formally ceased as a standalone agency, Voice of America staff have been placed on administrative leave, and there have been significant reductions across public diplomacy programmes. The gap ceded by the United States will be filled, but not necessarily by a friendly nation. The UK faces an opportunity here, but so too do our adversaries.

The strong benefit to cost ratio of soft power

Given the importance of soft power, it is worth stressing the point that the relative cost to government is exceedingly low when compared to hard power. The BBC World service has an annual budget of £400m, of which only a third comes from direct government funding. Given the estimated 300m weekly users of the world service, the cost per user is only around 44 pence.

The British Council operates on a comparable scale, receiving £163m in government funding in 2024-25 and generating £1bn for the UK economy. Against the cost of a single defence procurement programme, these are modest sums. Many of the UK’s soft power institutions have little-to-no government funding, yet play a key role in building up the nation’s soft power. These organisations could also benefit from more clear direction from government on its soft power goals, and how they can play a role.

For a government simultaneously increasing defence spending and managing genuine fiscal pressure, soft power offers something that is increasingly rare: substantial strategic return for relatively modest investment. That arithmetic makes the case for protecting these institutions and placing them in a central position to generate soft power capital.

The government must continue its good work on soft power

The government has, to its credit, recognised what is at stake. The most recent funding settlement for the BBC World Service saw the FCDO increase its funding by 8%. In January 2025, the Foreign Secretary and Culture Secretary launched the UK Soft Power Council, with the stated aim of developing a national soft power strategy. By July 2025 the Council had discussed a draft strategic framework, including proposed goals and outcomes. However, the strategy remains unpublished as of April 2026.

The institutions that carry UK soft power abroad have been direct about what they need. The UK Soft Power Group, which BFPG and the British Council co-convene, and which brings together organisations from the Premier League to the Wellcome Trust has called on government to provide clarity on strategic priorities, long-term planning horizons, and develop predictable funding mechanisms.

Publishing a strategy is not a be all and end all for soft power. However, it is an important signal, to our institutions, allies and adversaries that however much hard power may be the “currency of the age”, without soft power, this currency devalues considerably.

The post Soft power is the edge in a hard power era appeared first on British Foreign Policy Group.

April has been a busy month for the BFPG, with four events spanning across the full breadth of foreign policy issues and engaging everyone from diplomats to politicians to academics to students.

We were delighted first to host His Excellency Sir Andrew Mitchell, British Ambassador to Germany, for a private roundtable to discuss UK-German and wider UK-European relations. We also had the opportunity later in the month to hear from Shadow Foreign Secretary Dame Priti Patel, who spoke at an in-conversation with our Chair David Landsman to discuss the wide-ranging foreign policy challenges facing the UK.

We have been proud to see the BFPG/BISA undergraduate network continue to produce fascinating events, including a panel discussion at the University of Manchester on Latin America, and an event at the University of Warwick on the future of UK-EU relations with His Excellency Pedro Serrano, EU Ambassador to the UK. If you are an undergraduate with an interest in international relations, geopolitics and foreign policy, then you can find out more or sign up to the network here.

Elsewhere, our Director Evie Aspinall has been promoting the work of the BFPG and the role of the public in foreign policy, speaking on a panel on national resilience and cyber security at the National Growth Debate.

Latest Analysis

Following the public intervention of Lord George Robertson criticising UK defence spending, Director Evie Aspinall argues that the key issue for defence spending isn’t how to do it militarily, but how to do it politically.  – READ HERE

As King Charles’ visits the United States, we explore what the visit will mean for UK-US relations, and why, once it was announced, there was never any realistic prospect of cancellation. – READ HERE

The post BFPG’s March 2026 Review appeared first on British Foreign Policy Group.

As King Charles III prepares to address a joint session of Congress this week, the familiar pageantry of a British state visit is being deployed with an unusually heavy burden. Officially, the trip is a celebration of the 250th anniversary of American independence and the long-standing friendship between the two nations. But beneath the surface, the atmosphere is anything but celebratory. 

King Charles will be only the second British monarch to take the podium before Congress, following in the footsteps of his late mother. However, while Queen Elizabeth II’s 1991 address which took place in the optimistic glow of a post-Cold War world and the immediate aftermath of the Gulf War, King Charles’ address is set against the backdrop of friction and volatility. 

The most immediate tension is the Iran war, a conflict that has fundamentally strained the transatlantic alliance. President Trump has pushed the UK and Europe to support its war in Iran, while the UK has tried its best to distance itself, with the Prime Minister declaring that it’s “not our war”. The UK has allowed the use of its bases only for defensive attacks, and has sought to use its diplomatic levers to de-escalate tensions and re-open the Strait of Hormuz. President Trump has branded the UK’s response a “tragic mistake” as he makes increasingly provocative jibes about Prime Minister Keir Starmer, and threatens to rip up the recently agreed UK-United States trade deal.

With Trump distracted by Iran, and frustrated by what he sees as a failure of Europe to support him in the Middle East, the divide between the UK and the United States on Ukraine has grown wider, with Trump once again threatening to leave NATO. 

It is therefore unsurprising there have been calls by politicians and commentators in the UK for the visit to be cancelled, with many fearing the visit – designed to appeal to the President’s love of pomp and ceremony – rewards his behaviour.

But the reality is that once the visit was offered, there was no going back. Short of Trump actually leaving NATO or invading Greenland, rescinding the state visit was never on the cards. The damage that would do to an already fragile relationship with a man with a delicate ego, who holds significant military and economic leverage over the UK was never worth it. The UK is not in a strong enough position for diplomatic grandstanding, and the King and Keir Starmer both know it. 

So for the next week or so, King Charles will have to just grin and bear it. And the goal is clear, survival. Avoid deeply embarrassing moments, smooth over the friction between Trump and Starmer, and keep the channels of communication open by sheer force of Royal personality. 

The King’s speech will therefore be a carefully calibrated dance of diplomacy. Expect a speech designed to reassert the importance of the transatlantic relationship, and which speaks in clouded terms about the importance of democracy, unity, stability and collaboration. The underlying subtext though will be a polite, regal plea: Please stop destroying the global order, and please, just for a moment, be nice to us. 

Will it make much of a difference? Probably not. President Trump, particularly in his second term in office, has proven himself to be a deeply volatile character with little regard for the rules based international order. But in a moment of major geopolitical uncertainty the UK is, rightly, using every diplomatic tool it can, to mitigate the impacts of the worst excesses of the Trump presidency. Cancelling the visit could have caused a crisis, and even if there are only minor gains to be made, the UK should make the most of any opportunity to protect its interests. 

So don’t expect any big announcements from this state visit. Or any material, long term change in fracturing UK-US relations. Just hope that it goes off without a hitch and that it buys us, even just a moment, of light reprieve.

The post A Careful Diplomatic Dance: What to Expect From King Charles’ Visit to the United States appeared first on British Foreign Policy Group.

Lord George Robertson’s scathing attack on the UK’s defence capabilities has sent alarm bells ringing across the UK’s foreign policy and security community. The comments by the ex-NATO Chief and lead of the UK’s recent Strategic Defence Review are uncharacteristically forthright and public-facing. They are the comments of a traditional insider exasperated at the UK’s ability, or lack thereof, to respond to emerging global threats. 

And while his accusations of Treasury ‘vandalism’ of UK defence, ‘corrosive complacency’ within government and warnings that ‘our national security is in peril’ are intended to shock government into action, there is clearly truth to the argument that the UK urgently needs to invest further in its own defence. The very public difficulties of sending a warship to Cyprus and the depleted size of the UK army speak to the major challenges facing UK defence at a time of growing global insecurity.  

There are a number of practical challenges, from procurement to investment, which are undermining the UK’s defensive capabilities. But as much as anything, the challenge is political. This is something Robertson begins to scratch the surface of when he declared ‘we cannot defend Britain with an ever-expanding welfare budget’. Defence is expensive. And if the threats are as real as everyone says they are, then some very difficult, very real tradeoffs will have to be made. 

The problem is that the public isn’t ready for that. Our research last year found that Britons felt safer than at any point since 2017. When we ask Britons about feelings of safety they talk about knife crime, the cost of living, and very occasionally about terrorism. They very rarely mention Russia, China or the Middle East. These international challenges feel far removed, distant from their everyday concerns about energy prices and their local schools and hospitals. Of course, the UK’s ability to continue to deliver all these things is contingent on a stable and secure international environment, but that is not a simple nor exciting message to deliver.

So while Britons broadly support increasing defence spending, our research consistently shows that they are unwilling to make the necessary trade offs, either in the form of cuts to welfare, health or education, or through increases to their taxes to fund it. That puts our democratically accountable leaders in a tough position.  They have very little fiscal or political headroom. Certainly not enough to fund the vast and rapid increases in defence spending that military leaders would like to see. 

So while Robertson and others are right to call out the need to invest more heavily in defence, it is important to do so with an understanding of the politics of the situation. The politics of a government desperately fighting off Reform, whose traditional voter base are not only instinctively nervous about defence spending but who are strong supporters of areas that would need to be cut. 

This is not to let the government off the hook. Rather it is to say we must accept the political reality of the situation. If the assessment is that we must increase defence spending, the question isn’t just how do we do it militarily, it is how to do it politically. Here there are a whole raft of options, of which Robertson’s SDR’s proposals of a ‘National Conversation’ about defence are part. It requires honest and frank conversations with the public, framed in the language that works – language such as resilience rather than conflict, conveyed by people they respect (not just military leaders who are assumed to be self interested), and via platforms they actually engage with. That won’t be easy. It will require a mindset shift in how we talk about national security and creativity in how we communicate it. But rather than just berating leaders for not taking national security seriously, it is time defence woke up to the political realities, and supported government in this mammoth mindset shifting task. 

The post The Public: The Missing Piece in UK Readiness appeared first on British Foreign Policy Group.

The UK has found itself largely sat on the sidelines, doing its best to avoid being drawn into another major war in the Middle East, a war which Britons are clear they do not support and do not want to be involved with. Talk then has quickly turned to how to keep oil prices down and whether King Charles’ state visit to the United States should be cancelled.

On the former, the answer is, in many ways, easy. The quickest way to bring down oil prices is to do everything we can to end the war. On the latter, the question is, for many, more uncomfortable. While the risks of the visit being derailed and King Charles being embarrassed are very real, the UK is too far down the line to rescind the offer. Withdrawing the visit now would have far too great a geopolitical and economic risk at a time when the UK desperately needs some stability. Instead, and short of President Trump actually leaving NATO or attacking Greenland, the UK will have to grin and bear it, work out how best (if at all) it can leverage the visit to improve relations, and perhaps pray for a time machine.

Evie Aspinall
Director of the British Foreign Policy Group

Latest Analysis

Senior Advisor David Landsman examines how the war in Iran is forcing the convergence of UK foreign and domestic policy in key areas including net zero, defence spending, and economic resilience.
READ HERE

Associate Fellow Michael Martins explores the United States’ strategic objectives in Iran, in particular for the strait of Hormuz. He examines the difference of opinion between the United States and UK in the conflict, and what it might mean for the special relationship.
READ HERE

Amid geopolitical instability, guest authour David Allfrey sets out the concept of “subtle power”, the influence that operates through norms, institutions and trust, shaping how others act, and explores its role in foreign policy in an increasingly volatile environment.
READ HERE

BISA-BFPG Undergraduate Network

This month BFPG were proud to officially launch the BISA-BFPG Undergraduate Network, alongside the British International Studies Association, at our launch event at the University of Edinburgh on Scottish foreign policy. The event was the first in a series the network will host throughout the academic year, connecting undergraduates across the UK with a shared interest in foreign policy and international relations and providing them with an opportunity to engage with leading foreign policy thinkers.

This month also saw the network’s second event, an online webinar for the network on careers in foreign policy and international affairs. We are very grateful to the speakers at both events and are looking forward to continuing to grow the network.

If you are an undergraduate with an interest in international relations, geopolitics and foreign policy, or know someone who is, then you can find out more or sign up to the network here.

The post BFPG’s March 2026 Review appeared first on British Foreign Policy Group.

His speech reflected a geopolitical moment shaped by war in Europe, intensifying great-power competition, and mounting security anxieties – trends underscored still further by the latest flare of conflict in the Middle East and the stark visibility of hard power in action.

Yet it is precisely at such moments that the quieter instruments of influence – persuasion, legitimacy, culture and values – become decisive, shaping how power is interpreted, supported and ultimately sustained.

Across much of the Western world, the language of power has hardened.  Defence budgets are rising and strategic competition dominates headlines.  Hard power is visible, measurable and politically saleable.

Yet, almost quietly, many of the institutions that shape long-term influence are being constrained.  In Britain, our soft power anchors – the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, the BBC (particularly the World Service), the British Council and the GREAT Britain Campaign – all operate under sustained financial pressure.

Meanwhile, many other aspects of our extraordinary society struggle to see how they fit into a coherent national endeavour.  How best to contribute?  The recently established Soft Power Council represents a welcome recognition of the issue, but its public footprint has so far been rather restrained and a clearly articulated national strategy has yet to emerge.

The paradox is clear.  While we seek to strengthen our shield in the face of perceived threat, we risk allowing the quieter foundations of influence – those that sustain balanced, constructive and trusted relationships – to diminish.

Discussions of soft and hard power do not accurately capture Britain’s advantage

Far from being ‘broken’, the United Kingdom retains an extraordinary density of knowledge, institutions, cultural assets, heritage, energy and global relationships.  The strategic question is not whether Britain possesses influence.  It is whether we are sufficiently deliberate in integrating and encouraging the assets we already hold.

In recent years, much commentary has described ‘soft power’ in terms of what countries “project” – projecting culture, projecting values, projecting influence.  It is an appealing description, but a misleading one.

Soft power is not projected.  It is ambient.  It is perceived by others and, if judged credible or beneficial, it is absorbed. This distinction matters.  Influence of this kind does not reside with the sender; it lives in the judgement of the receiver.  A country may invest in culture, diplomacy, education or communications, but none of these automatically generate influence.  They only become powerful when external audiences regard them as legitimate, consistent and worth embracing into their own preferences and mental maps.

Understanding this reshapes how we think about power.

Hard power is readily understood: military strength, economic leverage, coercive tools.  It is visible, measurable and immediate.  It shapes events through pressure and generally delivers some sort of short-term effect.

Soft power, defined by the late Joseph Nye as the ability to influence through attraction rather than coercion, flows principally from three sources: a country’s values, its political system and its foreign policy – when these are seen as legitimate and worthy of respect.  Culture, institutions and education matter most when they align with how a country behaves and what it represents.

We also hear of ‘smart power’ – the deliberate combination of hard and soft power in coordinated strategy.  Capability reinforced by legitimacy.  This became central to US thinking under Barack Obama, when policymakers recognised that force without legitimacy breeds resistance, while attraction without leverage lacks weight.  Yet smart power depends upon maintaining scale in both domains.  For countries that are not superpowers, this blend is often constrained by capacity.

Yet even this framework does not fully capture Britain’s comparative advantage.

‘Subtle power’ offers a new frame for understanding Britain’s role in the world

There is a form of influence less discussed but potentially decisive: ‘Subtle Power’.

In a world defined by great power rivalry, information overload and political polarisation, the states that matter most are not only those that can coerce or attract.  They are those that shape the context in which others think, decide and align. This is where the United Kingdom presents a remarkable case – and a significant opportunity.

The UK is seldom pre-eminent in any single category of influence.  It does not dominate global manufacturing, population size, military mass or technological scale.  But it is consistently strong across a remarkable range of domains: our businesses, culture and creative industries, education and research, media reach, diplomatic networks, legal traditions, sport, civil society and institutional credibility.

This breadth is itself strategic.  Britain’s influence does not depend on being the best in any one field.  It depends on being reliably strong across many fields at once.  Trust built in one domain reinforces credibility in another.  Few countries combine so many globally connected institutions with such depth of historical and contemporary relationships.

Subtle power operates below the level of overt persuasion.  It shapes what feels legitimate, normal, trustworthy or professional.  It works through tone, networks, norms, institutions and relationships.  It influences the environment in which decisions are made, often without participants consciously noticing the influence at work.

The United Kingdom’s advantage lies in aggregation, credibility, continuity, familiarity and trust.  Through history and habit, British influence often feels familiar rather than imposed.  It is encountered before it is noticed.  It operates through norms, language, formats, rules, humour and understatement.  It rarely demands alignment; it encourages participation.  That makes it less dramatic and less measurable – but potentially more durable.

A nation’s brand – intrinsic to its soft power – is carried through a layered web of communication.  It appears in political statements, foreign policy decisions and in our individual and collective approach in the round.  It is reflected in media narratives but perhaps most influential of all is the person-to-person level.  For many around the world, perceptions of the UK are shaped less by official messaging than by relationships with British visitors, colleagues, teachers, partners, friends and neighbours.  Reputation travels through experience.  In this sense, influence is lived as much as it is broadcast.  Everyone becomes part of the signal.  Everyone is, in effect, an ambassador.

These assets matter because they are inseparable from conduct.  When British politics, institutions and foreign policy are seen as principled and predictable, cultural and institutional reach carries greater weight.  When credibility falters, attraction weakens.  Soft power, in Nye’s sense, cannot be separated from behaviour.

For generations, Britain has functioned not primarily as a power of domination, nor solely as a power of attraction, but as a Subtle power nation.  Through its universities, legal frameworks, language, cultural reach, diplomatic habits and media presence, the UK has helped shape the mental and institutional architecture within which international life operates.

That influence rarely announces itself.  It is not spectacular.  But it is embedded, widely trusted and globally connected.

Effort must be made to maintain Britain’s subtle power advantage

In a more fragmented world, this matters more, not less.  As louder forms of power generate friction, influence rooted in credibility and familiarity becomes more valuable.  The ability to convene, connect, translate and frame legitimacy is itself a strategic asset.

This advantage is not self-sustaining.  It depends upon continued investment in trust, culture, institutions and international engagement.  It also requires national confidence and cohesion; a country that persistently undervalues itself risks weakening the credibility on which its influence rests.  Where these foundations are neglected, Britain’s influence does not collapse dramatically – it quietly erodes.

Soft power, in the British case, is not a legacy to be spent but a capability to be maintained.  Its strength lies in accumulation.  Its vulnerability lies in complacency.

This now demands intent rather than nostalgia.

If soft power flows from values, politics and foreign policy, it cannot be delegated to culture alone or assumed to run on historical memory.  It requires coherence between what the UK says, what it does and what its institutions and people represent.  It asks policymakers, institutional leaders, educators, diplomats and cultural actors to see themselves not as separate actors but as contributors to a single national ecosystem of trust – to embrace and exhibit unity of purpose.

The opportunity is not to add more noise to an already crowded world.  It is to reinforce credibility, coherence and connection – to ensure that the UK remains a place where others want to study, partner, invest, collaborate and align because it is seen as serious, fair, creative and dependable.

In an age of sharper power, faster narratives and rising distrust, the countries that will matter most are those others feel able to work with.  By fortune and effort, the United Kingdom has spent generations building that position.

This is no sentimental plea for soft power, nor an argument for privileging it over credible defence and other priorities.  Hard power underwrites security.  But strategy is incomplete if it assumes that deterrence alone secures long-term advantage.  Influence accumulates in universities, media, diplomacy, science, business networks, culture and values – often long before it manifests in policy alignment or alliance cohesion.

Britain’s advantage lies precisely in this depth and breadth.  The challenge is not national decline, but national coordination.  If cultural, educational and diplomatic institutions are treated as peripheral luxuries, they will erode quietly.  If, however, they are recognised as strategic infrastructure and integrated deliberately alongside defence, Britain’s influence does not need to be rebuilt.  It simply needs to be encouraged, aligned and sustained.

The task now is to recognise what we have, protect it, speak of it with confidence, and use it deliberately.

This is the huge opportunity in Britain’s wealth of subtle power.

The post A huge opportunity: Britain as a ‘subtle power’ superpower appeared first on British Foreign Policy Group.

This would represent the second blow to China’s energy security, following the United States’ extraction of Venezuelan President Maduro last month and the selection and propping up of his successor, Delcy Rodriguez. Over a fifth of Chinese energy consumption is imported, and Beijing has routinely flaunted US sanctions when purchasing oil from Venezuela and Iran. Those days look likely to be at an end.

Ever the controversial decisionmaker, President Trump has gambled that the United States’ international partners and allies would tacitly support his aims, if not his methods, and will eventually come into the fold as the regional and global repercussions begin to affect their national interests. At the same time, China is unlikely to provide military assistance to its satellite supporters, Iran and Venezuela included.

Both have proven true.

The gamble may also pay off in the longer-term. “Swing countries”, those that have traditionally relied on American security guarantees but Chinese economic demand, will be more inclined to rely on America for both, rather than try to play off one against the other. Following these series of dramatic and successful military operations, it will take a very courageous leader to flaunt American hard power, especially after China has come to the aid of precisely zero (0) of its allies.

The only things standing in the way of these objectives were, of course, international law and international stigma, but these are two hurdles that President Trump has never shown much regard for.

So, although President Trump is becoming less clear about Iran’s future, viewed through this prism of American interests, Trump has secured another series of wins, at least as his administration sees them.

Of course, the dust has barely settled in Tehran, and these outcomes continue to unfold precariously. Yet, PM Starmer’s decision to not allow US forces to use the UK’s regional bases, although in line with both British public sentiment and international law, will increasingly become a thorn in the side of the leaders’ relationship.

That is because both sides have a point.

On the US side, the United States military does not need British bases in the region to achieve its aims. But they would of course help logistically and provide legitimacy to the strikes. On the British side, the UK does not want to be drawn into a regional conflict that does not have a clear end goal in sight, flaunts international law, and is becoming increasingly irked by what can at times feel like a one-way relationship. How many state visits will it take to secure some goodwill in the White House, likely goes the thinking in No. 10.

That discrepancy has lent itself to the President remarking that Starmer is “no Winston Churchill” while Starmer has softened his position by allowing US military access for “defensive and refuelling” operations, albeit “after the war had already been won.”

This has prompted many to ask what comes next in the Special Relationship?

The US Energy Secretary Chris Wright recently deleted a tweet about a US Navy ship escorting an oil tanker through the Strait of Hormuz. Although it turned out to be untrue, it may not have been far off the mark regarding intention.

If the US military is able to secure the Strait of Hormuz, as it’s shown an initial willingness to do via destroying Iranian minelayers and drones pestering the passage, then at a certain point, President Trump will start to think of the UK as free-riding on the US military for cheaper global energy. After all, one of Starmer’s flagship policies is lowering the cost of energy. It will not take much of a political leap for Trump to begin pressuring the UK to take a more active role in the Strait’s security to “keep the lights on.”

The ground has already been softened. The United States Ambassador to the UK, Ambassador Stephens, has frequently and consistently criticised the UK’s approach to effectively turning off the North Sea as a massive own goal on energy security. Similarly, Vice-President Vance and Secretary of War Hegseth lambasted their European allies toothlessness in protecting the Strait of Mandeb in the leaked Signal chat group from last year.

Against that backdrop, it is not difficult to imagine Trump pressing London to play a more visible role in securing maritime energy routes. Few themes are more consistent in Trump’s worldview than his frustration with European allies “not pulling their weight” when it comes to security, defence, and energy policy.

These are going to be difficult problems for Starmer to solve, especially after losing the recent by-election in one of the Labour Party’s safest seats to the Green Party.

The events in Iran have also prompted another issue for Starmer.

I recently tuned into the Cypriot national news and there is clear resentment, and near-anger, from the Cypriot political class about the British response to Iranian drones aimed at the UK’s military bases on the island. If those British bases provide little protection, as the need for the French and the Greek governments to send military assets to defend the bases showed (while also giving a pretext for Turkey to do the same in the illegally-occupied North), then a UK presence may no longer create a security layer. Instead, it becomes a giant bullseye, damaging British standing and ability to project power in the region. This may end up especially true at more vulnerable bases that Starmer initially refused American use of for the Iran campaign. Many of these have traditionally relied on an American presence as a form of cost-free security. However, they may not have that luxury if the United States leaves the UK bases to their own devices “if Starmer cares about international law that much,” as those around President Trump have begun to say.

Other governments in the Gulf have taken notice of this rift between the United States and the UK and begun to question the UK’s privileged position through the Special Relationship with the United States, and what that means for hosting the UK’s forces on their own territories.

It seems to have finally dawned on Starmer that all of these moving parts matter. Sometimes the benefits of abiding by international law arrive in the future, while the political and military problems are immediate, especially with such a bellicose President and fragile domestic political coalition. Hence the UK’s current rush to do damage control with the political leadership in the White House. The problem that Starmer now faces, however, is that the President will have already settled on a view on who backed him during this high-stakes gamble, and who did not.

And so far, Trump’s view will likely be that Starmer was a day late and a dollar short.

The views expressed in this article are the authour’s own and do not necessarily represent those of BFPG.

The post Playing it straight and narrow in Hormuz has hurt the Special Relationship appeared first on British Foreign Policy Group.

The United States’ objectives in Iran are unclear

Despite Donald Trump’s tough rhetoric, it’s still not clear what the real United States objective is, or rather what will be considered sufficient to declare victory. Although initially he claimed to be seeking to neutralise the threat of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons, he has since made clear that this is now not enough for him. In any case, success on the nuclear issue would need to go well beyond the terms of the Obama-era JCPOA which Trump rejected from the outset. Having worked on the “E3” negotiations with Iran in the early 2000s, I saw them as, for both sides, an effective if often turbulent way of kicking the can down the road.  Given the potential for conflict and, in particular in the aftermath of the Iraq war, the attraction for the West was obvious, but the road was never likely to extend indefinitely. At some point, the nuclear question and the future of the Islamic Republic would become inseparable. Donald Trump has forced that moment.

This brings us de facto to regime change. It it’s clear that regime change is extraordinarily difficult to achieve “from the skies”. What we don’t know is how much the US and Israel, with the support of other less evident allies, have been able to do to prepare the ground with those Iranians keen to overthrow the regime. It’s also unclear what a new regime that would satisfy the US and Israel would look like.  We certainly shouldn’t expect something which resembles an imported liberal democracy. From the Israeli perspective, a weak Iran in any form would be a huge improvement on the status quo ante. US and Israeli interests might not be identical, but an Iran which is internally (more or less) stable and externally unthreatening would surely count as a substantial victory for President Trump. The West, including the UK, would doubtless be content with this outcome too, however much some may be uncomfortable with the way in which it had been brought about.

The conflict risks consequences far beyond Iran

Meanwhile, the conflict has spread beyond Iran and Israel with attacks in the Gulf States and to United States and UK interests, including on Cyprus. Observers focused on the geopolitics should also not underestimate the (domestic) political importance to a democratic government of the imperative to protect their nationals caught up in a crisis abroad; this will also inevitably drive policy including military decisions. The economic consequences, driven by increased energy prices, are already being felt.  A protracted conflict could lead to a rise in Iranian-inspired terrorism outside the region, including in Europe as well as increased migrant flows which could also be weaponised in order to destabilise Western interests. A weakened Iran would also be vulnerable to centrifugal pressures from its many minority groups, particularly those in areas touching Iran’s borders. In short, the US/Israeli action is a high-risk strategy, though the reward – an Iran no longer aggressively interfering in the region and beyond – would be transformational.  Only time will tell whether the gamble pays off: this will depend in good measure on how good the preparations for the “day after” have been and for how long the US and Israel are prepared to sustain the action before “declaring victory”.

Five key takeaways for UK domestic politics

As a legacy of Britain’s history and, more recently, of the post-Cold War period of Western hegemony, the public debate on foreign policy can often appear rather detached from an urgent sense of national interest. There’s a tendency to debate the rights and wrongs, argue as to who’s the good guy and who’s the bad and stand in judgement on how the world should be, as though from a lofty distance. Often international law is cited without an understanding of what it is and where its limitations lie and as though it is just domestic law writ large.

In reality, like every other country, The UK is an actor with interests to defend in a difficult world – and certain capabilities with which to defend itself. A few thoughts on what this means today:

1.) The gap between a polarised domestic debate focused on international law, reflecting different constituencies and sets of values, is at increasing odds with geopolitical reality. Though there are good arguments that the United States action is consistent with international law (as some of the United States’ European allies have accepted), Trump is certainly not relying on them. The UK alongside European and other allies like Australia and Canada will be increasingly squeezed between a desire to retain “values” which they have come to see as defining, and their national interests which for the foreseeable future depend on a close collaborative relationship with the United States. With the UK political parties from Reform UK to the Greens taking opposed views on these questions, understanding how domestic identities and framings (“how do we want to see ourselves?”) influence positions on foreign policy becomes all the more important. Just as not all positions on Brexit were driven by calculations about trade flows, so not all views on international law reflect an understanding of the UN Charter.

2.) Until last week, the UK’s foreign policy focus was primarily on Europe, Ukraine and NATO. In the short term, increased oil prices – absent more stringent and effective international sanctions – can benefit Russia. In the long term, if Iran is (at least) neutralised, Putin loses a valuable ally. A protracted conflict and/or post-conflict instability could distract Trump from attention to Ukraine and maybe also make American opinion less willing to devote resources to “foreign wars”. The UK and allies may find it harder to retain US support if Trump’s resentment at our stance on Iran persists. The interdependencies can play in opposing directions: attacking Iran can be seen as an unnecessary distraction when we should be focusing on Russia or at least accidentally beneficial if regime change weakens Moscow’s power.

3.) As with previous conflicts in the Middle East, the implications for energy will be key: 2026 is not 1974, especially for the US, but for Europe and the UK seeking to constrain Russia, gas supplies from the region remain essential in addition to oil. The UK is particularly poorly placed to handle inflationary shocks. The UK could mitigate the impacts of a prolonged shock by moderating its outlier energy policies, but this would cut across not only climate policies strongly entrenched in domestic politics, including the governing Labour Party, but also vested producer interests. What started as a geopolitical problem may directly impact on what is for many a defining domestic “net zero” debate. This is an additional reason for the UK to have a strong interest in the early establishment of stability in the Gulf.

4.) The elite discussion on funding the UK’s defence capabilities prompted by Donald Trump’s return to the White House has so far scarcely cut through, certainly not as far as a significant additional government commitment. But the UK’s inability to deploy assets at scale, for example to protect the Cyprus SBAs, could well accelerate pressure particularly if we are seen to be relying on others to protect our own citizens and assets in the region. While this is clearly the result of decades of underinvestment, it falls to the government of the day to take the necessary steps, not just in terms of money but also in terms of a coordinated – and much more efficient – national effort to fill the gaps and demonstrate to allies, notably the US, that we are prepared to pull our weight in our own and collective defence. With public trust in domestic politics very much lacking, it may only be possible to take this step if some kind of cross-party consensus can be built.

5.) The imperative of building up hard power quickly depends on a strengthening economy. At a time of potential headwinds from energy prices and wider inflation, the defence crisis contributes itself to an economic crisis. Strong leadership, again with as much of a bipartisan element as possible, would see this as a moment to press ahead with otherwise difficult structural reforms to accelerate growth, with the national interest in defence as a counterbalance to otherwise entrenched economic interests. This would require not only political will but also the ability to argue more clearly for the links between foreign and domestic policy decisions.

The Gulf is farther away from the UK than the Czechoslovakia that inspired Chamberlain’s long-remembered observation “of a quarrel in a faraway country between people of whom we know nothing”. But the very direct implications of today’s conflict in the Middle East also very much call into play the interaction between our national security and economic health and require a domestic as much as foreign policy response.

The post There are few “faraway places” left: how the United States’ attack on Iran pushes UK foreign and domestic policy even closer together appeared first on British Foreign Policy Group.

Speaking of young people, and I’m delighted to say that next week we’ll be launching our BISA-BFPG Undergraduate network in Edinburgh. The network is an opportunity for undergraduate students across the UK to engage with UK foreign policymaking. If you, or someone you know, would like to get involved, they can sign up here.

Elsewhere this month, the UK foreign policy ecosystem was firmly focused on the Chagos Islands, as President Trump once again changed his position on the Chagos Islands, calling on Keir Starmer to abandon the deal. Trump was backed firmly by the Conservatives and Reform, the latter of whom have particularly made the Chagos Islands a centrepoint of their foreign policy. It is relatively unusual to see this level of division between parties on a foreign policy issue, and certainly, President Trump turning on the deal hasn’t helped the government, which now faces both a domestic and international wrangle on what to do about the islands.

Evie Aspinall
Director of the British Foreign Policy Group

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Although diametrically opposed in politics, both Reform UK and the Green Party have enjoyed a recent surge in support, profiting from growing disillusionment with the traditional parties. The result of the recent Gorton and Denton by-election shows that these parties are increasingly major players in national politics. While a general election is some years out, British politics is increasingly driven by those who control the conversation on key issues. Should their support hold or grow, they will be increasingly called to speak on issues that reach beyond their usual areas of focus.

Given its economic dominance in vital industries, rising status as a global rule maker, and the threats and risks it poses across multiple domains, it is vital for all UK parties to be thinking seriously about China. However, neither party’s manifesto for the 2024 General Election mentioned China. At the time, both were relatively fringe parties without serious expectation of entering government and a focus on specific issues. As others have recently argued, the rising prominence of these disruptor parties makes it important for them to spell out their foreign policy approaches beyond headline commitments.

The Green Party

The Green Party’s approach to China, insofar as it exists, appears to be grounded largely in human rights concerns. When contacted about the Green Party’s China policy for this article, a Party spokesperson responded that the Green Party’s foreign policy core stances would apply equally to critical issues, focusing largely on human rights concerns such as the human rights violations against the Uyghurs, freedoms in Hong Kong and Taiwan, and government suppression of dissent. Other issues, such as globalisation, migration, trade, and climate justice were mentioned, although no specific policies for these issues were described.

Green Party MPs have barely mentioned China in Parliament since the 2024 election; at the time of writing, only two passing references to China were found in Hansard. A House of Lords speech by Green Party Peer and former leader Baroness Natalie Bennett may offer some insight into the Greens’ thinking. Baroness Bennett argued that it is important to not let business interests interfere with a strong response to human rights concerns, but also, somewhat predictably, that “on the climate emergency and nature crisis, it is a crucially important actor.”

While admirable in terms of its overt focus on human rights, this position makes clear that little to no direct consideration has been given to China in Green policymaking circles. A general commitment to rights and justice is unlikely to be adequate for managing the UK-China relationship, given China’s economic heft, the highly unequal trading relationship and longstanding security concerns about Chinese government-backed interference in the UK. The clearest challenge the Greens would face in government would be the tensions between human rights and China’s dominance in green tech and sustainable energy. The case of solar panels being made in China using forced labour encapsulates this dilemma starkly – raising the question of how a governing Green Party would meet its foreign policy commitment to a ‘Fairer, Greener World’.

Reform UK

As a new party mostly defined by its opposition to the traditional parties, Reform currently lacks a detailed China policy. However, statements by various senior party figures such as Nigel Farage MP and Richard Tice MP paint a broadly hawkish picture of their views toward Beijing. Calls for a more autarkic manufacturing base is a key theme among these figures, who criticise the UK’s reliance on China and the UK’s comparatively small manufacturing output. This aligns with Reform’s broadly populism-driven foreign policy.

Many of Reform’s policy statements describe grievance, rather than strategy.  Indeed, while threats from China are clearly identified under Reform’s armed forces policy, vague approaches such as ‘invest in capability and readiness’ and ‘end woke’ are listed as solutions, with no clear vision for strengthening UK resilience to the various domains – cyber, economic, political, defence – in which threats from China can and do arise.

When asked in 2025 what his policy on China would be, Reform leader Nigel Farage MP responded that “because of Hong Kong, we have a direct relationship of trust with the CCP being broken,” referring to violations of the Sino-British Joint Declaration. He added, “we’re reliant on them, so until we can start building up our own manufacturing base, we’re not in an easy position” and that it was a “good thing we kept Huawei out of our 5G phone network”. In turn, Farage called for the UK to be able “to make our own stuff, at a decent price, that is decent quality, and if [the United States does] it, and we do it, we will not be dependent upon China.” Farage also made  criticised criticism the Prime Minister’s decision to visit China, focusing on the high-profile case of Jimmy Lai, the convicted media magnate and British citizen and China’s history of spying in and on the UK.

Reform’s Deputy Leader, Richard Tice MP, has also been relatively strident on China, criticising the country’s perceived support for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and stating that, should China invade Taiwan, it should be made clear that “the West would come down on them like a ton of bricks”. Tice previously tabled a debate on British steel production 16 October 2024, criticising the decision to sell British Steel to its Chinese owner Jingye Group. Later, in June 2025, Tice called for the full nationalisation of British Steel. While calls to reduce dependencies in areas in which China is willing to use it monopolies to political ends are clearly important, it is unclear how this will be achieved amid Reform’s wider nativist policy approach, which would see the UK withdrawing from prominent international agreements and likely souring relations with likeminded countries. Diversifying the UK’s supply of key resources such as critical minerals will require widening, not narrowing, cooperation with key partners, as emphasised by recent positive steps such as the G7 Critical Minerals Action Plan.

Few new ideas in sight

Our relationship with China represents one of the most important foreign policy challenges facing the UK. Navigating the complicated and paradoxical dynamics of this relationship is something no party in the UK has yet managed effectively. This broad lack of vision across Britain’s political parties is dangerous, and developing a coherent China policy should be a foreign policy priority for any party serious about governing.

So far, for all the other ways in which they are upheaving UK politics, neither the Green Party nor Reform have put the policy foundations in place to suggest anything different. In this regard, the disruptor parties are keeping up the status quo, proving that, when it comes to China, policymakers in all parties still have a lot more thinking to do.

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