As King Charles III prepares to address a joint session of Congress this week, the familiar pageantry of a British state visit is being deployed with an unusually heavy burden. Officially, the trip is a celebration of the 250th anniversary of American independence and the long-standing friendship between the two nations. But beneath the surface, the atmosphere is anything but celebratory. 

King Charles will be only the second British monarch to take the podium before Congress, following in the footsteps of his late mother. However, while Queen Elizabeth II’s 1991 address which took place in the optimistic glow of a post-Cold War world and the immediate aftermath of the Gulf War, King Charles’ address is set against the backdrop of friction and volatility. 

The most immediate tension is the Iran war, a conflict that has fundamentally strained the transatlantic alliance. President Trump has pushed the UK and Europe to support its war in Iran, while the UK has tried its best to distance itself, with the Prime Minister declaring that it’s “not our war”. The UK has allowed the use of its bases only for defensive attacks, and has sought to use its diplomatic levers to de-escalate tensions and re-open the Strait of Hormuz. President Trump has branded the UK’s response a “tragic mistake” as he makes increasingly provocative jibes about Prime Minister Keir Starmer, and threatens to rip up the recently agreed UK-United States trade deal.

With Trump distracted by Iran, and frustrated by what he sees as a failure of Europe to support him in the Middle East, the divide between the UK and the United States on Ukraine has grown wider, with Trump once again threatening to leave NATO. 

It is therefore unsurprising there have been calls by politicians and commentators in the UK for the visit to be cancelled, with many fearing the visit – designed to appeal to the President’s love of pomp and ceremony – rewards his behaviour.

But the reality is that once the visit was offered, there was no going back. Short of Trump actually leaving NATO or invading Greenland, rescinding the state visit was never on the cards. The damage that would do to an already fragile relationship with a man with a delicate ego, who holds significant military and economic leverage over the UK was never worth it. The UK is not in a strong enough position for diplomatic grandstanding, and the King and Keir Starmer both know it. 

So for the next week or so, King Charles will have to just grin and bear it. And the goal is clear, survival. Avoid deeply embarrassing moments, smooth over the friction between Trump and Starmer, and keep the channels of communication open by sheer force of Royal personality. 

The King’s speech will therefore be a carefully calibrated dance of diplomacy. Expect a speech designed to reassert the importance of the transatlantic relationship, and which speaks in clouded terms about the importance of democracy, unity, stability and collaboration. The underlying subtext though will be a polite, regal plea: Please stop destroying the global order, and please, just for a moment, be nice to us. 

Will it make much of a difference? Probably not. President Trump, particularly in his second term in office, has proven himself to be a deeply volatile character with little regard for the rules based international order. But in a moment of major geopolitical uncertainty the UK is, rightly, using every diplomatic tool it can, to mitigate the impacts of the worst excesses of the Trump presidency. Cancelling the visit could have caused a crisis, and even if there are only minor gains to be made, the UK should make the most of any opportunity to protect its interests. 

So don’t expect any big announcements from this state visit. Or any material, long term change in fracturing UK-US relations. Just hope that it goes off without a hitch and that it buys us, even just a moment, of light reprieve.

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Lord George Robertson’s scathing attack on the UK’s defence capabilities has sent alarm bells ringing across the UK’s foreign policy and security community. The comments by the ex-NATO Chief and lead of the UK’s recent Strategic Defence Review are uncharacteristically forthright and public-facing. They are the comments of a traditional insider exasperated at the UK’s ability, or lack thereof, to respond to emerging global threats. 

And while his accusations of Treasury ‘vandalism’ of UK defence, ‘corrosive complacency’ within government and warnings that ‘our national security is in peril’ are intended to shock government into action, there is clearly truth to the argument that the UK urgently needs to invest further in its own defence. The very public difficulties of sending a warship to Cyprus and the depleted size of the UK army speak to the major challenges facing UK defence at a time of growing global insecurity.  

There are a number of practical challenges, from procurement to investment, which are undermining the UK’s defensive capabilities. But as much as anything, the challenge is political. This is something Robertson begins to scratch the surface of when he declared ‘we cannot defend Britain with an ever-expanding welfare budget’. Defence is expensive. And if the threats are as real as everyone says they are, then some very difficult, very real tradeoffs will have to be made. 

The problem is that the public isn’t ready for that. Our research last year found that Britons felt safer than at any point since 2017. When we ask Britons about feelings of safety they talk about knife crime, the cost of living, and very occasionally about terrorism. They very rarely mention Russia, China or the Middle East. These international challenges feel far removed, distant from their everyday concerns about energy prices and their local schools and hospitals. Of course, the UK’s ability to continue to deliver all these things is contingent on a stable and secure international environment, but that is not a simple nor exciting message to deliver.

So while Britons broadly support increasing defence spending, our research consistently shows that they are unwilling to make the necessary trade offs, either in the form of cuts to welfare, health or education, or through increases to their taxes to fund it. That puts our democratically accountable leaders in a tough position.  They have very little fiscal or political headroom. Certainly not enough to fund the vast and rapid increases in defence spending that military leaders would like to see. 

So while Robertson and others are right to call out the need to invest more heavily in defence, it is important to do so with an understanding of the politics of the situation. The politics of a government desperately fighting off Reform, whose traditional voter base are not only instinctively nervous about defence spending but who are strong supporters of areas that would need to be cut. 

This is not to let the government off the hook. Rather it is to say we must accept the political reality of the situation. If the assessment is that we must increase defence spending, the question isn’t just how do we do it militarily, it is how to do it politically. Here there are a whole raft of options, of which Robertson’s SDR’s proposals of a ‘National Conversation’ about defence are part. It requires honest and frank conversations with the public, framed in the language that works – language such as resilience rather than conflict, conveyed by people they respect (not just military leaders who are assumed to be self interested), and via platforms they actually engage with. That won’t be easy. It will require a mindset shift in how we talk about national security and creativity in how we communicate it. But rather than just berating leaders for not taking national security seriously, it is time defence woke up to the political realities, and supported government in this mammoth mindset shifting task. 

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1. The UK is moving to a position of ‘war-fighting’ readiness. 

If you thought the 2023 Integrated Review was a sombre read, the 2025 Strategic Defence Review sets out an even bleaker picture of the global environment, and issues a rallying cry for a ‘whole-of-society’ approach to national security. Particularly striking is the outline on page 31 of the ‘potential effects of war on the UK’s way of life’ which succinctly and clearly elucidates what might happen if the UK were to engage in state-on-state war as part of NATO in 2025. 

In response, the Review’s guiding principle appears to be the dictum, ‘If you want peace, prepare for war’. The Review therefore calls for the UK to move to a position of ‘war-readiness’, through a swathe of commitments to improve defence capabilities, such as a £1.5 billion investment in an ‘always on’ pipeline for munitions. It also includes plans for the creation of a ‘Defence Readiness Bill’ which would give the Government ‘additional powers in reserve to support the mobilisation of industry and Reserves’. 

2. However, still no commitment to 3% GDP defence spending. 

Despite the clear sense of urgency in scaling up and transforming the UK’s defensive capabilities to meet growing global threats, the Review doesn’t commit to increasing defence spending beyond its existing “ambition to reach 3% in the next Parliament, subject to economic and fiscal conditions” outlined earlier this year.

While there are very real challenges of increasing defence spending further, and it would require difficult trade offs, it is near impossible to achieve many of the ambitions outlined in the Review without a further increase in defence spending. 

The commitment also falls short of the 5% GDP defence spending target United States President Trump is pushing for from NATO allies, and the 3.5% GDP spending target that NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte wishes to see. The latter is particularly challenging given the Review’s strong focus on ‘leading within NATO’, especially given other NATO members are rapidly scaling up their defence spending. Poland, for example, has increased its defence spend from 2.7% in 2022 to 4.2% in 2024, with a further increase to 4.7% expected in 2025.

3. A ‘NATO-first’ and Europe-focused defence and security policy. 

With war still raging in Europe, and the United States ‘adapt(ing) its regional priorities’ – as the Review very diplomatically puts it – it is unsurprising that NATO and Europe take pride of place in the Review. The Review emphasises the ‘unequivocal need’ for the UK to step up its support for NATO and for Euro-Atlantic security, arguing that ‘the Alliance must be the starting point for how the (UK’s) Armed Forces are developed, organised, equipped, and trained’.  

While the Review states that ‘NATO-first’ is not ‘NATO-only’, the limited attention given in the Review to regions beyond the Europe-Atlantic highlights how regionally concentrated the UK’s defence and security efforts will be. The Indo-Pacific and the Middle East are recommended as the ‘next priority regions after the Euro-Atlantic for Defence engagement’, but there are no substantive new commitments to either, and engagement there is caveated by the fact they must avoid ‘detracting from deterrence efforts, warfighting, and capability development in the Euro-Atlantic’. Notably too, the Review states that efforts to deepen bilateral and minilateral relationships should be ‘geared to strengthening Europe’s security architecture’, reaffirming the centrality of Europe in UK defence and security policy. The so-called ‘Indo-Pacific tilt’ which dominated the 2021 Integrated Review, and featured in the 2023 version, is all but phased out.

4. Nuclear deterrence is the ‘bedrock’ of UK national security. 

Gone are the days of former Labour Leader Jeremy Corbyn declaring that he wouldn’t fire nuclear weapons if he were Prime Minister, with nuclear deterrence now taking a front seat in the Strategic Defence Review. The Review warns that ‘Russia’s increasing reliance on nuclear coercion will be the central challenge for the UK and its NATO Allies in the coming decades’ and declares that sustaining the nuclear deterrent should therefore be Defence’s ‘top priority’. 

In response, the Government has pledged to invest £15 billion in the sovereign warhead programme this Parliament and to build up to 12 new attack submarines. The Review also recommends that the UK explores enhancing its participation in NATO’s nuclear mission and that it commits to ‘not extending the life of the Dreadnought class submarines beyond their intended end-of-service dates from the mid-2050s’.

5. A ‘Defence dividend’.

A central premise of the Review is that defence should not only deliver for the UK in terms of security, but it should also drive growth and jobs in the UK. Through a £6 billion investment in munitions this Parliament and building at least six new energetics and munitions factories in the UK, the Government aims to generate over 1,000 jobs and boost export potential. A pledge to build up to 7,000 new long-range weapons in the UK is also said to support around 800 jobs, while 9000 will apparently be supported by a £15 billion investment in the sovereign warhead programme. 

At the same time, a new Defence Exports Office in the MOD will help to drive UK defence exports, and the MOD will also seek to establish a new partnership with industry that ‘maximises internal and industrial expertise, accelerates acquisition processes, manages risk and cost, and engages a wider set of suppliers’. The forthcoming Defence Industrial Strategy is therefore seen as an important opportunity to put some meat on the bones and to embed radical reforms that ensure Defence delivers for the UK economy.

6. No extra troops but a better deal for the armed forces. 

The British army is currently the smallest it has been in 300 years, with just 70,860 full-time trained soldiers, below the target of 73,000 and with more personnel leaving than joining each year. While the Review recommends that ‘a small uplift in Regular personnel should be considered when funding allows’, it stops short of committing to increasing the number of full-time trained soldiers in the immediate term (something it is widely rumored Defence secretary John Healey had pushed for).

It does, however, focus heavily on how to stem the workforce crisis in the armed forces. This includes commitments to £7 billion in funding in this parliament to modernise military accommodation, as well as establishing a career education pathway for the whole force by 2026 and developing a plan for creating more novel pathways into the armed forces, including offering shorter commitments to engage such as the MOD’s forthcoming plans for ‘gap years’. 

7. A ‘Tech-enabled’ defence power. 

Responding to the changing nature of conflict, not least lessons from the war in Ukraine, the Review outlines ambitions for the UK to be a ‘leading tech-enabled defence power’ by 2035. This includes plans for a new ‘Digital Warfighter Group’ to be deployed alongside conventional warfighters, the creation of a Cyber and Electromagnetic (CyberEM) Command cohering, but not executing, military action in this arena, as well as the creation of a ‘digital targeting web’ to enable more rapid, integrated battlefield decisions. The Review also recommends that at least 10% of the MOD’s equipment procurement budget is spent on novel technologies each year, to enable rapid commercial exploitation.

8. China is a ‘sophisticated and persistent challenge’. 

Having already moved the UK closer to China, and without the prominent internal China hawk wing that consistently challenged the last Government’s China policy, this Review hasn’t been plagued by debates about whether or not to declare China a ‘threat’ in the way the Integrated Reviews were. Instead it opts to refer to China as a ‘sophisticated and persistent challenge’. 

Nevertheless, the Review does highlight some of the threats China poses, focusing particularly on Chinese technology, its rapid military modernisation and growth in nuclear weapons. Despite identifying these challenges, the Review does not identify any direct solutions to them, although the Government will hope that efforts to modernise the UK’s own capabilities, particularly in cyber and technology, will help mitigate some of these challenges indirectly.

9. Public opinion matters. 

A highlight, and welcome innovation, in the Review is the inclusion of quotes from members of the public who engaged in the Reviews’ ‘Citizens Panel’ throughout the Review process. The panels and quotes reflect a renewed recognition of the importance of domestic consent for international decisionmaking. This is also reflected in a number of the recommendations, including around the need for a ‘‘National Endeavour’ public campaign around nuclear deterrence, as well plans for two years of public outreach events and improved education about the armed forces in schools. Domestic consent for foreign policy decisionmaking has always been a top priority for BFPG and it is great to see its importance recognised. Stay tuned because BFPG’s annual public opinion survey be back soon, featuring analysis of public perspectives of many of the issues covered in the Review.

10. …But public and parliamentary scrutiny could be better. 

All 144 pages of the Strategic Defence Review dropped in Parliament at 5pm on a Monday, just as wonks, journos and politicians had begun to close their laptops for the day, and after days of endless leaks and major press statements from the Prime Minister and Defence Secretary earlier in the morning. The result has been days of media coverage of the big headlines – like defence spending – and much less scrutiny, in public and in parliament, of the detail. This is only compounded by the fact the Review is, as these Reviews often are, long and unwieldy. Reading it is a slog, and while the two-page version of the Strategy (which I’d definitely recommend reading) is very welcome as a more accessible digest, it is to the detriment of the strategy that the full version is not more digestible, and that public and parliamentary scrutiny were not prioritised more highly in the launch of the Review. If the Government wants a whole-of-society response to defence, it has to start by enabling and encouraging proper scrutiny.

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1. How can the UK engage with Europe?

Straight out of the starting gate, a new government will be pushed to the forefront of European politics, with the UK set to host the European Political Community on the 18th July, just two weeks after the election. This provides an early opportunity for the next government to make clear their approach to Europe. For Sunak that would mean being able to push for European cooperation on tackling illegal migration and strengthening support for Ukraine, although it is clear the focus on illegal migration will ruffle some feathers in Europe. 

For Starmer, hosting the EPC would provide an opportunity to quickly cement Labour’s pro-European credentials, and win early friends and allies across Europe. But it may also come too soon – two weeks is hardly enough time for a new government to have a fully fleshed out strategy on how to approach one of its most important and complex relationships. And crucially, the agenda for the EPC has already been set by Sunak. The Summit’s focus on illegal migration could prove particularly challenging, not least as Starmer plans to rip up the Conservatives’ Rwanda policy. While the Summit therefore provides an opportunity to quickly signpost the trajectory of the UK’s relationship with Europe, Labour will also need to think strategically about how to maximise an opportunity that would come hurtling at them if they come into office.

Beyond the immediacy of the EPC, developing a clear set of priorities for engagement with Europe will be crucial for both parties in defining the UK’s role in the world against the backdrop of war in Ukraine and an increasingly isolationist United States. Much has been said about the parties’ respective plans for UK-EU relations but little attention has been paid to how receptive European partners may be to different forms of engagement. Indeed, from my own conversations with European counterparts it’s clear that while individual nations may be eager to engage bilaterally with the UK, the EU itself remains bruised by Brexit and reluctant to strike major deals with the UK. Both political parties would therefore do well to thoughtfully consider Europe’s perspective on the relationship, particularly within the context of next week’s European parliamentary elections which are expected to see a rise in the populist right, in order to assess the feasibility of their plans for the relationship.

2. How ‘special’ should the special relationship be?

While the general election may bring some certainty to the UK policy sphere, a new government will face a large amount of uncertainty about the future of its relationship with the United States. It’s too early to tell who will win the White House, and, particularly in the case of Trump, to predict what their precise approach to foreign policy or to the UK specifically might be. However, regardless of who wins in the United States, the UK and Europe will undoubtedly face growing pressure to increase investment in European defence and security, as the United States increasingly focuses inwards and on China. For both parties it is therefore crucial that they consider how much they can reasonably rely on the United States and what partnerships and alliances to focus on in order to mitigate some of the potential impacts. 

Labour, though, has a particularly big stake in the outcome of the US election. Shadow Foreign Secretary David Lammy’s friendship with Obama and Labour’s growing ties with the Democrats place them on a strong footing to make the most of the special relationship if Biden wins another term. And while Labour has said it will look to find a ‘common cause’ with Trump, and key Republicans have been vocal in their preference for David Lammy over David Cameron, there is no denying that the relationship between Starmer and Trump would be particularly difficult. Not only do Trump’s ambitions on the world stage vary substantively from both parties’ (not least on Ukraine), but they will also face difficult questions about how closely to align with a newly convicted felon. 

Of course, the US-UK relationship has endured many difficult relationships in the past, and no doubt whatever combination of individuals end up in No.10 and the White House, the special relationship will largely endure. But both Conservatives and Labour will need to think carefully about how to navigate an increasingly complicated relationship and how to prepare for some potentially uncomfortable conversations with one of its biggest partners.

3. How much of a risk is China? 

The two main parties’ approaches to China are broadly aligned. The Conservatives’ approach is to – ‘protect’ the UK’s national interests, ‘align’ with allies on the UK’s approach to China and ‘engage’ with China bilaterally and on major global issues. Meanwhile, Labour define their approach as the ‘3 C’s’ – compete, challenge and cooperate. The language is different but its clear the broad premise is the same – engagement and collaboration with China where it makes sense to do so, while also shoring up national resilience to protect the UK against any potential threats China may pose. And the rationale for this is clear – China is a major global power on whom the UK relies but also, and as recent revelations not least about Chinese hacking and spying have made clear, a growing risk to UK security. 

However, it is a bit like having your cake and eating it – picking and choosing when to engage with China, with no particularly coherent strategy. A clear example of this is in regards to Tiktok, an app banned from government electronic devices because of the potential security risks it poses. Yet both major parties have been using the app extensively in their election campaigning, as a way to drive up engagement with younger voters. But whether Tiktok (and by extension to some extent China) are a security risk or not, the risk levels haven’t changed in the last week, and our assessment can’t just be driven by what is politically expedient in that moment.

Labour will no doubt hope their proposed China audit will provide some of the answers – creating clarity on the current state of Chinese involvement across critical UK sectors. But the tough questions will still follow about what the concrete actions and plan that stem from it should be. To be a success, this will require whoever wins the election to move beyond the vague and towards instead defining a very clear set of priorities and principles for the UK-China relationship, and making clear how they will be applied in practice.

4. Should the FCDO remain merged?

Even among its strongest proponents, the FCDO merger is understood to have been far from smooth. Ostensibly driven by a desire to ensure the UK’s foreign and development policy are coherent and aligned, the FCDO merger has been a long and difficult process. Indeed, a recent National Audit Office investigation found that the merger had been costly and lacked clear direction.

This has generated renewed calls, led particularly by the development sector, for development to be separated out from the foreign office once more – a move it hopes would strengthen UK leadership in development. There are clear pros and cons to both joint or separate departments, which, in its crudest terms, boil down to the benefits of joined-up thinking versus ensuring international development gets due attention. But also crucially important is the impact undoing the merger, or not, would have on the FCDO internally, particularly on staff morale, which has taken a significant hit during the merger process. However, many FCDO staff would also baulk at the idea of having to go through yet another restructure.

Labour have been very vocal in their critique of the merger, but still need to iron out whether or not that means they should actually undo it. And if not, Labour faces the same question as the Conservatives (who show no sign of wishing to restructure the organisation again) of how to imbue the FCDO with a clear sense of purpose and boost morale after a very challenging few years for the department. That will be no mean feat.

5. Where can the UK authentically lead?

One of the biggest issues with UK foreign policy in recent years has been its desire to be everything to everyone, all at once. The Integrated Review and (to a lesser extent) its subsequent Refresh advocate for the UK to achieve ‘superpower’ status across a vast array of policy areas. But in an increasingly competitive and fast changing world, there are limits to the opportunities for the UK to lead. It will be critically important then for any future government to reflect inwards on what its strengths are and where they lie – from education to law to sport – and to place these front and centre of its international offer. Not only will this help drive clearer trade and investment opportunities, it will also enable the UK to enhance its international development offer, strengthen its contribution to multilateral institutions and better utilise its soft power. 

Focusing on strengths might sound simple, but especially for a new government facing influencing efforts from every angle, it can be difficult to cut through the noise. Leading with our strengths will require trade-offs. It will require frank and honest conversations about where the UK’s USPs lie and a willingness to prioritise (and deprioritise) areas of UK foreign policy. Something the UK has been notoriously bad at doing.

6. How do we pay for it all?

Speaking of trade-offs, a future government will need to answer difficult questions about resourcing for its international activities. Both parties are now committed to increasing defence spending to 2.5% of GDP, a commitment that is widely understood to be essential to meeting the severe resourcing gaps currently facing the military, and to meeting pressures from the US for Europe to take on a bigger role in its own security. And now the conversation has already quickly turned to whether the UK should be further increasing defence spending, up to 3% of GDP. Both Labour and Conservatives are also committed to returning to spending 0.7% GNI on international aid and development at some stage, although the vagueness of timelines on this makes it impossible to know when (if ever) either party may do it.

Regardless, it’s clear that the foreign policy resource requests are racking up, at a time where government departments across the board are also feeling the squeeze. And while it’s all well and good to talk in the abstract about the need to increase foreign policy spending, the reality is that the money has to come from somewhere. It is therefore critically important that a prospective government asks itself some difficult questions about where its priorities lie – whether cutting NHS waiting times is more important than providing more financial aid to Ukraine, whether increasing investment in primary education in the UK is more important than increasing access to water in developing nations. These are not always easy or comfortable to answer. And they become even more difficult when you have to prioritise between different areas of foreign policy too. While defence will no doubt always take a large proportion of the budget, not least because it’s a very expensive endeavour, there are opportunity costs, not least in long-term resilience building, in prioritising defence over, for example, development or diplomacy. 

Of course this is a rather crude illustration of the point – in reality foreign and domestic policy (and spending) are deeply intertwined. Investments in international climate action can help increase the production of clean energy and help reduce energy bills in the UK. Global cooperation on infectious diseases can help reduce the impact of a potential pandemic on the NHS, and so on. But it would be wrong to deny that, as with any form of government spending, foreign policy spending presents some degree of opportunity cost. An incoming government will therefore be confronted with some difficult choices about what, both domestically and internationally, it can afford to prioritise and what the costs and trade-offs of that might be.

A Difficult Set of of Questions

This list isn’t exhaustive. There will also be questions around climate, economic security, trade, diplomacy, and much more besides. There will also be big questions to answer on the topics that have received significant coverage so far including both defence and migration. It is clear then that, even where the debate so far has focused rather narrowly on national security and while there is a rather large degree of consensus between the two parties on foreign policy, there are lots of big questions and few easy answers. The world around us is changing. Fast. And the UK has yet to work out precisely what its role in that world should be. Maybe it will never really know. But a future government will have the difficult mission of trying to work that out. It will be no easy task.

The post Moving Beyond National Security: Key Questions for a Future Government appeared first on British Foreign Policy Group.

Straight out of the starting gate, Prime Minister Sunak’s election announcement focused heavily on the two parties’ abilities to deliver a ‘secure future’ for Britain. Of course this is multifaceted, incorporating economic security as much as defence itself, but in drawing his initial battlelines, Sunak has made clear that national security will play a major role in the election debate. In part this is driven by the very turbulent geopolitical times we live in – there is no denying that national security is, and will continue to be, a major challenge for the UK. It is also clearly a significant concern for the British public – who, our research has consistently found, display very strong feelings of insecurity and high levels of concern about national security.

But perhaps most importantly of all for the Conservatives, national security is one of the areas where, with the public at least, their reputation has fared best in recent years. In large part this is due to former Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s very vocal support for Ukraine, which won him major plaudits in the UK and beyond. And with Sunak ‘one upping’ Starmer’s 2.5% GDP defence spending target, by adding a clear timeline (2030) for when the Conservatives would hit the goal, it’s clear that Sunak is eager to build on Johnson’s legacy and position the Conservatives as the party of defence.

Defence isn’t all plain sailing for Sunak though. The public still trust Labour more than the Conservatives on defence, albeit to a lesser degree than in other policy areas. And the very public debates between ministers, departments and the public about the state of the UK’s defence capabilities over the past few years will no doubt hang over his efforts. 

The other major foreign policy and security debate in the election will centre around illegal migration, with both the major parties looking to flex their muscles over their plans to ‘stop the boats’. Indeed, it is widely touted that one of the reasons Sunak called the election early is because the optics of large numbers of migrants crossing the Channel in the Summer (as is usually the case), would risk further worsening the Conservatives’ position heading into an Autumn election, especially if they had failed to get a Rwanda flight off the ground over Summer.

Illegal migration is also high on the list of public concerns, with 65% of Britons believing the UK should do more to exclude illegal migrants from the UK. It is also a hot topic among the tabloid newspapers, for whom barely a week seems to go by without a front page on channel crossings. No doubt they’ll seek to use the election as an opportunity to push both of the major parties to get tougher on illegal migration, pushing illegal migration firmly into the spotlight in this election.

Meanwhile, the conflict in the Middle East will also throw up some difficult questions during the election campaign, particularly for Labour. With just 18% of the public approving of the UK Government’s response to the conflict, and just 12% approving of Labour’s response, both parties have a long way to go to build back public support. And the local elections have already made clear the electoral impact the crisis can have. Despite a fairly emphatic local election victory, Labour experienced an almost 18% drop in support in areas of England where more than a fifth of people identified as Muslim. The conflict will also likely pose some challenges for Labour among younger voters, particularly in university towns, which have been sites of a large number of pro-Palestine encampments.

On this, Labour may well benefit from the early election, limiting time for grass-roots opposition candidates and independents to build a coordinated platform, in specific seats, on a pro-Palestine platform. But that won’t stop some difficult questions for both parties, but particularly for Labour, during the election campaign.

Elsewhere, debates about climate change and economic security will no doubt play a role, particularly among those most vulnerable or concerned about energy prices, and those with strong views about climate change. The UK’s relationship with Europe also still sits high on the agenda for many potential voters.

Of course, this isn’t to say that foreign policy will impact every vote. No doubt individuals most impacted by or most personally attuned to global issues will be more likely to have their vote shaped by foreign policy. It’s also almost impossible to predict how an election will play out, which depends as much on how opponents play the election and on global factors beyond our control, as it does on any individual party stances. But we shouldn’t underestimate the importance of foreign policy in this election. Foreign policy will impact the outcome on July 4th. It would be foolish for parties not to prioritise it.

The post Why Foreign Policy Really Will Matter in the General Election appeared first on British Foreign Policy Group.

Against this backdrop, the outcome of the war now looks set to be determined more by actions off the field than on it. The future of Ukraine therefore lies as much with the actions of Ukraine’s Western allies as it does with the actions of Ukraine or Russia.

The elephant in the room then is the growing prospect of a second Trump Presidency in the United States. Inward-looking by nature, Trump has little interest in the Ukraine war, or indeed in European security in general, fed up with what he sees as Europe’s failure to contribute adequately to its own security. His priorities instead lie firmly with the domestic, not least with the Mexico border, and with the growing tensions between the US and China. Indeed, Trump claims he could end the war in Ukraine in a day. It is unclear quite how he expects to do that, but given his friendly relationship with Putin during his first term in office and his recent remarks about his unwillingness to protect NATO members from Russia, it is unlikely this would meet the demands or expectations of Ukraine, or the hopes of many European powers.

Of course, Trump has still yet to win the Republican nomination, let alone the Presidency. And some of Trump’s recent remarks will be boisterous electoral flair and are unlikely to translate into action if in office. But even with a Democrat President, US support for Ukraine is floundering. There have been months spent wrangling to get additional aid passed the Senate, only for it to face further delays in the House. And with war raging in the Middle East and growing hostility between the US and China, the US (like many others) finds its bandwidth increasingly constrained when it comes to foreign policy, leaving Ukraine to quickly fall down the priority list.

It is increasingly clear then that the burden of ongoing support for Ukraine will lie with Europe. And the European Union’s recent approval of $54 billion in financial assistance to Ukraine will go some way to helping meet Ukraine’s most immediate needs. However, there is still a long way to go. The EU has so far delivered just half the aid it has promised Ukraine, pledges of military aid are significantly below Ukraine’s needs and Europe would have to more than double its current pace and level of arms assistance to Ukraine to fully replace US arms in 2024.

And while, so far, the prospect of a more absent US has rallied Europe around increasing investment in Ukraine and in European security, this is not a given. Recent polling in twelve European countries found that more of those polled (41%) favoured Europe pushing for Ukraine to reach a peace settlement with Russia, than favoured Europe supporting Ukraine taking back the territories occupied by Russia (31%). And if the US withdraws support for Ukraine, the same poll found more support in Europe for following the US’ lead, limiting support for Ukraine and pushing for a peace settlement, than for attempting to fill the gaps in Ukrainian aid left by the United States. 

With European elections in June and many European national elections this year as well, public opinion is more important than ever, and there is a danger that Ukraine becomes a political football as electioneering enters full swing. With Hungary, Russia’s closest ally in the EU, also expected to take up the rotating EU Presidency in the Summer, maintaining support in Europe is set to become even harder at a time when it is needed most.

The reality of the divides in views on Ukraine can feel somewhat alien in the UK, where support for Ukraine has remained remarkably robust. And regardless of who wins the next election, it is clear that the UK will continue to lead from the front when it comes to support for Ukraine. Indeed, at this pivotal juncture, Ukraine has been top of the agenda in Foreign Secretary David Cameron’s recent conversations at the Munich Security Conference, the G20 and the UN. 

But the UK faces an increasingly challenging environment to advocate in. Away from our closest circle of friends, momentum is also proving increasingly hard to build. The West finds itself under growing criticism from the Global South for perceived hypocrisy in the West’s relative approaches to Ukraine and to the conflict in the Middle East. The King of Jordan, for example, has argued that international law means nothing when applied selectively, a charge also levied by UAE officials. The UK, and its allies, therefore find themselves at a particularly challenging juncture – trying to maintain interest at a time of proliferating global challenges, and where the legitimacy of their leadership, particularly on rights, values and international law are under growing scrutiny.

Meanwhile, Putin, while biding out his time before the Russian ‘election’ next month, is watching on with glee. The fractures in the Western alliance, and the West’s inability to maintain the Global South’s interest and support for Ukraine, provide an opportunity for Russia. While Russian resources are low, if Europe (and the US) fail to continue to stand with Ukraine, Russian capacity will vastly outstrip Ukraine’s. Of course, Putin faces his own challenges and we cannot assume that the Russian people will be willing to endure the human and financial cost of the war forever. But Putin will be confident that if the Western alliance falters, he can hold on long enough to seize the opportunity. The UK must do everything it can to make sure that doesn’t happen.

The post Two Years On: Can the West Maintain Support for Ukraine? appeared first on British Foreign Policy Group.

Suspension of Normalisation in the Middle East

The last few years have been characterised by attempts to ‘de-escalate’ tensions in the Middle East and normalise relations between Israel and a number of Arab nations. The Abraham Accords in particular, which normalised relations between Israel, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, were genuinely groundbreaking. However, recent events have quickly undermined that progress, threatened domestic stability in many states in the Middle East, and exposed the deep-rooted challenges that remain in normalising relations.

Particular strain has been placed on Israel’s relations with Egypt and Jordan. While both nations have had normalised relations with Israel for decades, relations have long been cold and have only worsened in recent weeks. Jordan’s King Abdullah II has condemned Israel’s military campaign as a ‘war crime’, while Egypt has criticised it as ‘collective punishment’. This comes even as Egyptian President El-Sisi holds his own concerns about Hamas, who are one of the last remaining embodiments of the Muslim Brotherhood, whom El-Sisi took power from in a military coup a decade ago. Both nations have particular concerns about an influx of refugees and the potential wider security consequences for their nations. But at the heart of their concerns is the swelling of Palestinian support among their own populations, many of whom empathise with the Palestinian cause, which they believe mirrors their frustrations with their own autocratic governments. At a time of economic crisis and domestic instability, both nations are cautious of awakening the underlying discontent within their own populace by failing to support Palestine.

However, while many Gulf states are vocally critical of Israel’s attacks on Gaza, their language has been much softer than it would have been even a few years ago. That’s because much of the rationale for the rapprochement in recent years remains true. With the world attempting to move away from oil and gas, many Middle Eastern nations are looking to diversify their economies, for which they require economic and political stability. They also remain deeply concerned about the threat posed by Iran and by Iran-backed groups in their own countries.

It’s a careful balance for nations to strike. Each nation will adopt its own narrative and there were particularly notable divides in approaches in the immediate aftermath of the Hamas’ attack. The UAE and Bahrain, for example, condemned the October 7th attack by Hamas but many others in the region have not. However, as the situation evolves, there is a growing sense of consensus among Arab nations. In a joint statement earlier this week, Foreign Ministers from nine Arab nations condemned the targeting of civilians and what they regard as violations of international law in Gaza.

Their positioning will no doubt continue to be impacted by how events unfold in the coming days and weeks. The United States has intercepted cruise missiles fired by Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen towards Israel, meanwhile Israeli missiles have hit Damascus and Aleppo international airports. The greatest concern at this stage, though, is the prospect of Hezbollah joining the war. The Iran-backed militant group based in Lebanon has declared that they are ready to join the conflict, with exchanges between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon already escalating. The danger is that as more and more parties get involved in the conflict, the potential for the conflict to spread across the Middle East increases, even as many nations call for peace.

A US/Iran Proxy War?

While the frontline of this conflict is between Israel and Hamas, it is quickly becoming as much about the larger military powers who support the two sides. Iran, which supports both Hamas and Lebanon’s Hezbollah, has already begun to refer to the ‘US and its proxy Israel’ in its messaging around the conflict, blaming the United States for the escalation of violence.

The United States has long been Israel’s biggest and most powerful supporter. Acting as a guarantor for Israel and providing the country with US$3.8bn of defence aid a year, the United States’ ties with Israel, which is the largest recipient of US foreign aid, are longstanding. They are based on a sense of shared ambition for the Middle East, historical links and domestic public opinion. Unsurprisingly then, since Hamas’ attack on October 7th, the United States has been forthright in its support for Israel. This has included sending two aircraft carriers to the region to deter other actors from attack, gather intelligence and provide air defence. The United States also used its veto to block a Brazilian-drafted UN Security Council resolution on the conflict because the resolution did not mention Israel’s right to self-defence.

Meanwhile, and while there is nothing to suggest it was directly involved in planning the October 7th attack, Iran has long supported Hamas, financially, militarily and economically. Indeed Iran was training Hamas fighters as recently as September and Iranian officials have vocally congratulated Hamas for the surprise attack on October 7th. The United States also claims that Iran is monitoring and even facilitating attacks on US troops and military bases in the Middle East.

While both the United States and Israel have been forthright in their support for their respective sides, it remains unclear how far either side would be willing to go to support their allies. Iran has publicly called for an end to Israel’s attacks on Gaza and threatened to get involved should the conflict spread, but will no doubt be torn between its desire for regional ascendancy and concern about being drawn into a costly conflict at a time of economic crisis and domestic instability. The United States faces a similar quandary – while it will want to protect its interests in the Middle East, and there is strong domestic support for Israel in the United States, the challenges Biden has faced in securing financial support for his military aid package to Ukraine, the United States’ recent experience in the Middle East, and pressure from Arab leaders will no doubt drive some caution about being heavily involved in the longer-term. Indeed, there are growing signs that while the United States is firmly backing Israel, growing international pressure is beginning to shift America’s position as Biden increasingly focuses on the humanitarian situation in Gaza.

A Role for China?

With Iran and the United States’ perspectives on the conflict clear, the question is how other nations will respond, who might look to assume a mediator role and the implications for wider geopolitics. Many have looked to China as a potential mediator due to its relatively strong relationship with Iran and the role it assumed in brokering the rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia. However, with the United States sitting across the table, there is a limit to China’s negotiating power, even while it will no doubt wish to be seen as a relevant actor in the debate.

Indeed China’s approach so far has largely mirrored its approach to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine – to position itself as a neutral, peace-seeking world power. Of course, China is not neutral in this – it is looking to expand its Belt and Road Initiative in the Middle East and therefore has a clear interest in peace and stability in the region. It also has strong links with Iran and has so far avoided condemning the attack by Hamas. Indeed, only in recent days has China recognised Israel’s right to self-defence, and even then this was strongly caveated by a focus on international law and the protection of civilians. The rhetorical gap between China’s language around the conflict and that of the United States is striking. Nonetheless, as the United States and Iran face-off, China’s approach seems to hinge on the premise that, for now at least, there is little for them to gain by getting directly involved.

Russian Advantage

While primarily preoccupied with its own conflict with Ukraine, Russia has more actively sought to adopt a mediator role in the conflict, on the basis that, according to Putin, Russia has “good” and “traditional” relations with both sides and therefore “no one could suspect (Russia) of playing up to one party”. However, with Russia welcoming Hamas and Iranian officials to Moscow, it is clear that any claims of neutrality, or potential for playing the role of mediator, are quickly fading away.

Russia’s stance is, in part, rooted in its growing ties with Iran, which have strengthened since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, with Russia assisting Iran’s missile and space-launched vehicle programmes in return for Iranian combat drones and military gear. Any Russian support for Hamas will be tempered by concern about further alienating Israel, with whom it has strong connections, not least through the Russian-Israeli diaspora, who make up 15% of the Israeli population. Indeed Israel has, so far, declined to join Western sanctions on Russia or to send arms to Ukraine. However, with Ukraine looking to use Russia’s wavering as an opportunity to warm relations with Israel, and with a leading member of Israel’s governing party threatening to make Russia ‘pay the price’ for supporting Hamas, that may already be a lost cause.

Ultimately though, Russia’s first and foremost priority is still Ukraine. In this sense instability in the Middle East plays into Russia’s favour. A year and a half on from Russia’s invasion and there is clearly a sense that in certain corners, particularly within the United States, appetite for ongoing support for Ukraine is waning. Putin will no doubt hope that the conflict in the Middle East will consume time, energy and resources that would otherwise be channelled towards Ukraine, which remains heavily reliant on support from the West. At the same time, Russia is using the Israel-Hamas war as an opportunity to discredit the United States by blaming the crisis on the failure of American diplomacy. The United States has put significant energy into trying to normalise Israel-Saudi relations and these efforts could well become collateral damage in the conflict, to the benefit of Russia.

This is not to say that Russia would favour full-scale war across the Middle East, not least because of the threat this could pose to its interests, including its air and naval bases, in the region. Indeed, there is a risk that if Russia associates too closely with Hamas, it increases the likelihood of Biden successfully getting a joint Israel/Ukraine support package through the United States House of Representatives. For now at least, for Russia the conflict at least serves as a welcome Western distraction as the conflict with Ukraine rages on – how long that is the case still remains to be seen.

Where to Next?

With a conflict so volatile and fast-moving, it is incredibly hard, and perhaps even counterproductive, to predict what will happen next. One move from one actor can fundamentally alter the course of events. You only have to look at the EU’s sharp U-turn from deciding to withdraw aid from Palestine to calling for the urgent provision of aid to see how quickly things can change. Similarly, we already see pro-Palestinian sentiment growing across the West as the humanitarian situation escalates, creating the potential for a fracturing in the Western alliance and growing divergence in approach between the United States and its allies. 

There are then still many unknowns. It is clear though that current events have undermined progress towards stability in the Middle East, pose a growing challenge to the Western alliance and its global relationships, and that the repercussions of the conflict will be felt for decades and generations to come.

The post The Geopolitical Consequences of the Israel-Hamas War appeared first on British Foreign Policy Group.

International Development

At both conferences we learned most, in foreign policy terms, about the parties’ ambitions for international development – likely the result of the spotlight on the sector ahead of the upcoming International Development White paper, as well as the sheer number of international development-focused events at Conservative party conference and the sharp message of clarity Lisa Nandy delivered to her new international development brief.

On the Conservative side, Minister for Development and Africa, Andrew Mitchell, announced that despite the tight turnaround times, the government received hundreds of submissions during the Call For Evidence for the International Development White Paper. Mitchell also announced that the paper will be released on the 20th of November, at the Global Food Security Summit – an indication, perhaps, of one of the themes likely to feature prominently in the report. 

Meanwhile, Lisa Nandy, who has been in post less than a month, made clear that women and girls would remain a top international development priority under a Labour government, as it has been under the Conservatives. Nandy also emphasised that Labour would focus on where there is most need and where the UK is best equipped to lead (with a particular focus therefore on education, skills and finance). ‘Respect’ quickly became her buzzword of the conference as she advocated for the building of partnerships with developing nations, helping them develop their knowledge and skills, and limit their long-term aid reliance. She also, on multiple occasions, congratulated and thanked Minister Mitchell for his work on international development, even while critiquing wider Conservative development policy – a striking sign of how well respected Mitchell is in the sector.

It is still the case that neither party will commit to precisely if and when they would restore the UK’s commitment to spending 0.7% GNI on aid and development, and given the lack of public support for such a move, it is unlikely that either party would commit to it in their manifesto or during the run up to the election. It also looks increasingly unlikely that Labour would fully undo the FCDO merger, instead only partially separating aid and focusing on boosting morale among FCDO civil servants.

Middle East

With the devastating conflict in the Middle East breaking out between the two party conferences, the conflict unsurprisingly dominated foreign policy conversations at the conference. In statements made at the conference and since there has, so far, been little to differentiate the two parties on the conflict, made evident not least by the embrace between Foreign Secretary James Cleverly and Shadow Foreign Secretary David Lammy as they both spoke to Sky News about the conflict. For both parties, the official line so far has been an unequivocal condemnation of Hamas, support for Israel’s right to defend itself within the bounds of international law, and a growing emphasis on the need to ensure humanitarian aid and safe escape routes for civilians in Gaza.

Europe

The two party conferences further made clear that Europe, and in particular relations with the European Union, will provide the sharpest foreign policy divide between the two parties heading into a general election. Cleverly used his conference speech to criticise Labour for being unable to imagine a world beyond Brussels, espousing the benefits of UK independence from Europe and emphasising the importance of the Indo-Pacific, with particular attention given to the perceived importance of a UK-India FTA. Meanwhile, Lammy used the analogy of dating to describe what the UK-EU relationship could look like under Labour. As a starting point for a rebuilding of relations, or ‘dating’, Lammy would focus on creating a more structured dialogue with the EU, starting with strengthening trade relations when the trade and cooperation agreement is up for review. Lammy also reiterated Labour’s commitment to pursuing a defence pact with the EU.

National Security

On national security, Cleverly and Sunak alike used their speeches to highlight the Conservative’s track record on defence, particularly emphasising the leading role the UK has played in support for Ukraine. Lammy similarly sought to emphasise his commitment to Ukraine, although he refused to be drawn on whether Labour would commit to spending 2.5% of GDP on defence.

On China, Cleverly used fringe events to defend his China policy, emphasising the importance of being in the room with China. It’s an approach echoed by Lammy whose ‘three C’s’ approach to China (compete, challenge, co-operate) has a striking resemblance to Cleverly’s three-pronged approach to China. One notable difference though is Lammy’s commitment to a full audit of UK-China relations on Day 1, should Labour come into office.

Migration is also taking up a growing part of the national security conversation, with illegal migration presented as a threat to the UK’s sovereignty and stability. With tackling illegal migration one of Sunak’s five priorities on assuming office, he used his conference speech to highlight that small boats crossings are down 20% this year, and while he made no reference to the ECHR, he made clear he would “do whatever is necessary to stop the boats”. Although Starmer mentioned ‘the movement of people’ in passing, migration was a notably less prominent component of the Labour leader’s speech.

Climate Change and Net Zero

Following announcements of a row-back on a number of the government’s climate commitments in the lead up to the conference, Prime Minister Sunak used his conference speech to reaffirm his commitment to adopting a more ‘pragmatic, proportionate, and realistic approach to net zero’. This shift is underpinned by a belief that, particularly in the context of the current cost of living crisis, household budgets cannot tolerate what Sunak regards as the burden of the economic costs of the climate transition. This was a hotly debated topic at the Conservative party conference and the number of net zero-focused events was striking as the climate sector and climate activists scrambled to win back what had previously been bipartisan support for the net zero transition. 

In contrast, Labour is looking to sharpen its green credentials. Leader Keir Starmer used his speech to reiterate his commitments to the UK’s net zero targets and to announce a proposal for community renewable energy. Elsewhere Shadow Chancellor Rachel Reeves highlighted plans for a more extensive windfall tax on fossil fuel companies, while Shadow Energy Secretary Ed Miliband was forthright in his commitments to clean energy. It’s clear another new foreign policy fault line is emerging heading into the election.

Where to Next?

As we head towards a general election, the party conferences have given us a glimmer of insight as to where each party will lie on key foreign policy issues. Climate change and relations with the EU are quickly emerging as the big dividers, with the two parties increasingly polarised in their views. On national security, there is much consensus, although there will no doubt be a significant debate to be had over the two parties’ track records in this regard. Meanwhile, international development, Ukraine and the Middle East, for now, are being afforded fairly broad cross-party alignment. Only time will tell whether that holds.

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1. A green(ish) tilt – A lot of time in the speech was given to the Green Deal, including the announcement of a series of Clean Transition Dialogues. However, many will be disappointed by the lack of reference to COP28 or plans to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 2040.

2. Caution on China – Von Der Leyen was vocal in her critique of China’s ‘unfair trade practices’ and announced an anti-subsidy investigation into electrical vehicles from China. There is now a clear push from the EU for businesses particularly to be more cognisant of the security challenges China poses.

3. EU expansion? – Von Der Leyen heavily endorsed enlarging the EU to 30 members, specifically referring to EU candidates Ukraine, Moldova and Serbia, but made clear that accession would be contingent on a number of key reforms in these countries.

4. AI Leadership – Von der Leyen sought to position the EU as a leader in AI – giving high-performance computers to AI start-ups and advocating for minimum global standards for safe use of AI. With the UK hosting a global AI Summit in November this could present an opportunity for UK-EU collaboration.

5. Ukraine still a priority – Von der Leyen emphasised that ‘the future of the Ukraine is in (the European) Union’. On Ukraine she focused on refugees and reconstruction, announcing plans to extend temporary protection for Ukrainians in the EU, but the lack of focus on military support for Ukraine was notable.

6. Legislation to tackle legislation – Von der Leyen highlighted that next month she will introduce legislative proposals towards reducing European level reporting obligations by 25%.

7. Focus on food security – Von der Leyen announced a strategic dialogue on the future of agriculture in the EU as it looks to shore up the long-term sustainability and security of the EU’s food supply. This mirrors the strong focus on food security at the G20.

8. Social Partnerships – A ‘Social Partner Summit’ was announced together with next year’s Belgian Presidents to work with social partners to address gaps in the labour market. Draghi (former Italian PM) will also prepare a report on European future competitiveness.

9. Getting tough on migration – Von Der Leyen was keen to look tough on migration reiteraitng her ‘steadfast conviction that migration needs to be managed’. Particular focus was placed on human smugglers, with Von Der Leyen announcing the Commission will organise an International Conference on fighting people smuggling.

10. VDL’s Second Term? It would have been too political VDL to use the speech to announce her intentions to re-run as President, but her heavy courting of farmers and unions in her speech and the very strong focus on the future suggest that it’s certainly not off the cards.

The post A Quick Summary: the EU State of the Union Address appeared first on British Foreign Policy Group.

1. Western powers compromise on Ukraine to secure G20 consensus

While Prime Minister Sunak argued that the G20 had agreed ‘very tough language’ on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Russia came out of negotiations by far the most jubilant. Gone were the statements that most members ‘strongly condemned the war in Ukraine’ and all mention of Russian aggression, instead replaced with vague statements about how ‘all states’ need to respect territorial integrity and sovereignty. With Russia and China both going into negotiations much more forthright than they had been in Bali last year, compromise was certainly needed to reach consensus at the Summit. Nonetheless, with Lavrov celebrating his success at ‘prevent(ing) the West’s attempts to Ukranise the summit’, while Ukraine condemned the joint statement as ‘nothing to be proud of’, it is clear that Ukraine’s allies ceded the most ground in negotiations.

2. The balance of power in the G20 is shifting

The wording around Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was one of many signs that the balance of power in the G20 continues to shift away from Western powers, even as Russia and China failed to send their leaders to the Summit. It is striking that it was Brazil, India and South Africa who came up with the eventual wording on Ukraine for the communique, as developing and emerging economies look to provide alternative leadership in an increasingly polarised world. This was further evidenced by the decision to admit the African Union as a permanent member of the G20, a move that reflects the growing recognition of the importance of the continent which for so long has been neglected from the world stage.

3. A diplomatic success for India 

This was the first time India had hosted the G20 Summit and it was determined to put on a show, as India seeks to cement itself as a leading diplomatic power. The most important step for doing that was securing a consensus on a final communique, which many thought impossible, and which was made viable in no small part by India’s careful diplomacy. India’s attempts to position itself as a champion and advocate for the developing world will also have been strengthened by its success in securing agreement for the African Union to become a permanent member of the G20. 

4. Climate change remains a top  priority but there’s more to be done

The theme for this year’s Summit was ‘One Earth, One Family, One Future’ and significant focus was placed on tackling climate change. Members pledged to ‘encourage efforts to triple renewable energy capacity’ and announced a Green Development Pact, recognising that future prosperity is contingent on the environmental sustainability of current policy choices. Outside of the main communique, the UK pledged US$2 billion to the Green Climate Fund, while the US, Brazil and India announced a global biofuel alliance. 

However, France branded the Summit’s progress on climate change as ‘insufficient’, with many left disappointed that ambitions to ‘phase down’ the use of coal were not elevated to a ‘phasing out’ of coal, and by the lack of reference to oil or gas in the final communique. Particular concerns remain over the clear dividing line that exists between Western nations (particularly France) who expect emerging economies to bear responsibility for net-zero and coal phase-outs, and developing nations (increasingly being led by India) fed up of what they perceive as lecturing from Western nations. Heading into COP28 in a few months time, the fine balance of who should bear the responsibility (and costs) of climate action look set to continue to dominate multilateral climate negotiations.

5. The quest for a UK-India Free Trade Agreement continues

With Sunak’s meeting with Modi postponed by a day and a security lockdown across the city largely preventing engagement with local people, Sunak’s vision that he would be greeted like ‘India’s Son-in-Law’ was damaged on arrival in India. Initial hopes of securing a free trade agreement with India at the summit had been quelled long before the Summit began, not least due to ongoing tensions around India’s desire for more Indian student visas as part of the deal, and it seems there is still a long way to go. After the UK-India bilateral meeting Sunak emphasised that there is still ‘hard work’ to be done to reach an agreement, though officials hope a deal can now be struck by the end of the year. India’s offer to Sunak of an ‘early’ trip back to India will keep that ambition alive, at least for now.

6. UK-China reset gets off to a rocky start

Hopes that the Summit would provide an opportunity to further rebuild UK-China relations following Foreign Secretary James Cleverly’s visit to China last week were also quickly quashed. It was originally hoped that Sunak would get to meet President Xi, who ultimately opted not to attend the Summit, and Sunak’s 20 minute meeting with Xi’s deputy – Premier Li Qiang – was overshadowed by the news of the arrest of a House of Commons researcher on suspicion of spying for China. The timing could not have been more unfortunate for Sunak, who had hoped to use the bilateral to showcase the value of their policy of  ‘engaging where it makes sense’, and instead Sunak was forced to raise ‘very strong concerns’ about potential Chinese interference in the UK democracy, an allegation China strongly refutes. 

7. UK missing from major transport deal

One of the biggest announcements of the Summit was a new rail and ports deal which was revealed on the sidelines of the Summit. The deal signed by the United States, the EU, India and Saudi Arabia will link Middle Eastern countries by railway and connect them to India by port, to improve the flow of energy and trade from the Gulf to Europe. Pitched as an effort to help low and middle income countries in the region, it is designed as a counter to China’s Belt and Road Initiative, pitching the signatories as alternative partners for developing nations. The UK’s absence from the agreement was notable, not least given its involvement in the G7’s attempts to counter the BRI, and while initiatives from our allies are very welcome, questions remain over why the UK was not, or chose not to be, included.

8. UK strengthens ties with Singapore

While the UK’s diplomatic efforts with a number of key partners may have fallen short of ambitions, the UK did manage to secure a new Strategic Partnership with Singapore, enhancing the UK’s trading and economic relationship with the nation. This includes a commitment to seek to finalise a new bilateral investment treaty, as well as to strengthen cooperation on science, technology and security. The move provides further strength to the UK’s Indo-Pacific tilt, as the UK looks to enhance its partnerships in this increasingly important region.

9. Deep seated divides remain

While consensus may have been agreed on a final communique, it is clear that deep seated divides remain between the nations. The most striking visualisation of this is the absence of a leaders photo for a second year running, allegedly because leaders refused to be photographed. Leaders are rarely shy of a photo opportunity (and indeed many took photos with other individual G20 leaders) suggesting many were cautious of being photographed with their rivals, and particularly with Russia. This speaks to the deep seated geopolitical divides that remain between the G20 nations and which hampered attempts at more transformative commitments at the G20.

10. Brazil 2024, another ‘neutral’ summit?

Looking ahead to the 2024 G20 Summit, which will be held by Brazil, and President Lula looks set to try and position the G20 as a neutral group operating outside of global geopolitics, in much the same way as India has. On Russia, for example, President Lula said in a now backtracked statement, that President Putin would be welcome to attend next year’s summit without concern of arrest (Putin currently faces an arrest warrant by the International Criminal Court for war crimes). Lula has consistently sought to adopt a ‘neutral’ stance in Ukraine, and has previously criticised the United States for encouraging the war. Elsewhere, as Lula accepted next year’s G20 Presidency he took the opportunity to focus on poverty alleviation and sustainable development, again closely mirroring many of India’s priorities, as the G20 faces increasing pressure to listen to a diversity of voices. Times are changing and so too is the G20.

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