President Biden opened the Summit by declaring that “we stand at an inflection point”, with the future of democracy facing “sustained and alarming challenges”. The Covid-19 pandemic has gripped the world during a period of sustained democratic backsliding, with 2021 being the fifth consecutive year in which more nations moved towards authoritarianism than democracy. With Russia escalating its military build-up along the Eastern border of Ukraine – and continuing to occupy areas of Ukrainian territory – and tensions rising between the West and China, the Summit sought to forge a sense of unity during a time in which our strategic rivals appear increasingly empowered.

Tensions leading up to the Summit

The composition of the Summit was decided under a cloud of controversy, with the decision taken to share invitations with a series of nations accused of democratic backsliding, including Brazil and the Philippines. The United States justified its decisions as seeking to galvanise support for democracy, rather than to shame weaker political systems. Nonetheless, several nations with an expectation of participation were also actively excluded. The inclusion of Serbia, Croatia and Poland, but not Bosnia and Herzegovina was seen to be particularly contentious. Criticisms were also made regarding the lack of invitation to nations such as

Hungary, Turkey and Singapore, as the definition of what constitutes a ‘democracy’ ultimately became a grey area. The decision to exclude Hungary as the only EU member state not invited to the Summit saw President Viktor Orban attempt to leverage Hungary’s veto to prevent the EU’s participation being officially classified as an EU foreign policy delegation.

Strategic Rivals React

Russia and China marked the opening of the Summit through publishing a co-authored article by their respective Ambassadors to the United States, denouncing the conference as a product of outdated, Cold War thinking. The Russian Government also produced a long statement outlining the failings of democracy in the United States, and China produced a white paper on the value of ‘consultative democracy’. China’s leaders clearly regarded the Summit as a ‘with us or against us’ occasion, retaliating against various international partners which had agreed to attend and praising those which declined.

Nicaragua, a nation that has had longstanding diplomatic ties with Taiwan, is said to have cut ties with Taiwan following pressure from China leading up to the Summit. On the other hand, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson tweeted that Pakistan is a ‘real iron brother’ for declining its invite to the Summit.

Despite deciding to include Taiwan in the Summit, the United States was cautious to navigate the substance of its tensions with China at the Summit, and censored a Taiwanese Minister’s video while she was presenting at the Summit after she shared a map that showed Taiwan in a different colour to China.

Initiatives and outcomes

Ahead of the Summit, the United States announced sanctions against Iran, Syria and Uganda and against individuals in Kosovo and Central America, in an attempt to rally momentum. President Biden also produced a domestic American anti-corruption strategy, with an emphasis on curbing illicit finance. The initiatives from the Summit include:

• The Presidential Initiative for Democratic Renewal, with a budget of $424 million (subject to approval from Congress) for overseas assistance, including supporting independent media, strengthening anti-corruption measures and enhancing nonviolent social movements.
• The International Fund for Public Interest Media was created with a pledge of $30 million coming from the Presidential Initiative funds.
• The Global Anti-Corruption Consortium was established to strengthen relationships between investigative reporters and civil society to counter corruption that occurs across borders.
• The Export Controls and Human Rights Initiative was created by the United States, Denmark and Norway with support from the UK, Netherlands, France and Canada. This initiative aims to restrict human rights abuses that use technology, such as hacking or surveillance.
• Alongside these initiatives, the United States and the UK launched a joint prize challenge for privacy-enhancing technologies to promote the use of ethical AI when tackling global challenges. Bilateral partnerships were also established with both Japan and the Republic of Korea on emerging technologies.

Where next?

While the outcomes of the Summit were relatively muted to meet the urgency of an ‘inflection point’, success will largely depend on progress made during this coming ‘Year of Action’. We are likely to see further initiatives and pledges agreed at the in-person Summit planned for late 2022. To ensure that the Summit delivers on its promises, invitations to the in-person Summit should be contingent on nations’ individual and collaborative commitments to delivering on its ambitions. Implementing such targets or a benchmark will be necessary to show the Summit has the muscle to enact meaningful change.

The Summit reflects President Biden’s commitment to reversing the anti-democratic trends and narratives seen under former President Trump. As such, Washington made a serious attempt to address democracy at home through its anti-corruption plan, which supported its efforts at global leadership. Despite the political tensions leading up to the Summit to some extent overshadowing its outcomes, the Summit has shown that it is still possible to convene around the concept of ‘democracy’, as an idea which continues to have value and meaning.

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Almost 600 wildfires have broken out across Greece in the month of August, spanning Athens to Pefki and Zakynthos, overwhelming the Greek firefighting forces. Other countries have offered support, including the UK, Germany, France, and Sweden, and the EU has offered assistance, mostly through coordinating these contributions. The EU has mobilised 14 planes, three helicopters, 1,300 fire fighters and 250 vehicles to help local services battle the fires. This assistance also comes after the Greek Civil Protection Ministry announced a €1.7 billion fire protection plan, with funds mostly coming from the EU and the European Investment bank.

However, the Greek Government has faced criticism over the handling of the fires, particularly given that fires in Athens in 2018 killed more than 100 people, and exposed the need for more robust civil protection networks. Prime Minister Mitsotakis addressed the nation on the 9^th of August to apologise for the initial response, stating his first priority is to organise aid for victims and that there would be time for “criticism and self-criticism”. Despite the Greek Government recently appointing a Chief Heat Officer – the first of its kind in Europe and only second in the world – many Greek citizens believe the fires could have been mitigated by increased use of water-bombing aircrafts in the early stages of the fires. These criticisms stem from concerns regarding the longer-term impact of the debt crisis, with all forms of public service spending bearing significant cuts. Research shows that cuts to the fire services from 2010-18 were greater than €1 billion and as a result, at least 30% of fire engines were rendered out of service.

Turkey has also struggled to contain its own wildfires since mid-June, which are said to be the worst the country has experienced. There have been fewer contributions from other nations compared to Greece, as Turkish President Erdogan condemned the use of #HelpTurkey on Twitter, describing the framing of Turkey in crisis as “terror by lies” promoted by the West, and that “Strong Turkey” is the correct message to promote. His Government has come under scrutiny for failing to include firefighting planes in its inventory and for blaming the fires on arsonists, which they claimed were linked to outlawed Kurdish militants. Turkey’s Government continues to lack a significant degree of accountability on climate action, with Turkey one of only six nations that is yet to ratify the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement. President Erdogan has said that he will not commit to the Agreement unless Turkey is classified as a developing country – highlighting the inconsistency of his position in condemning any framing of Turkey as in need of assistance regarding the recent fires.

With assistance varying between Greece and Turkey, and these natural disasters become more frequent, the EU’s firefighting capabilities must be reassessed. Currently, the EU assists mostly through mapping fires and coordinating other countries contributions. The EU Civil Protection Mechanism includes a ‘rescEU’ element which was established in 2019 to create reserves of equipment for emergencies covering health, nuclear, fire and other major disasters. Within this are seven firefighting planes and six helicopters, however these were made available by individual member states. The EU, therefore, does not have its own firefighting resources. As the effects of climate change become more apparent, the EU needs to build up firefighting capabilities to ensure that particularly vulnerable nations do not have to bear the brunt of climate change and further intensify existing inequalities. Establishing these capabilities will enhance the EU’s ability to mitigate the devastating impacts of wildfires, reduce dependency on member states and guarantee that resources are dispersed accordingly.

The Turkish and Greek wildfires have further brought to light the way in which security and climate increasingly intersect, and the practical shortcomings of the EU’s current climate strategy in the face of extreme weather events. While the EU’s 2018 ‘Threat Multiplier’ paper promised to take a security-led approach to climate issues, the focus on reducing carbon emissions has somewhat overshadowed the complex, whole-of-society approach needed to respond to climate-induced crises. For example, encouraging trade and growth that will exacerbate climate stresses while advocating for emission targets is not only counterintuitive but may also lead to instability between states. The recent fires illustrate the need for an integrated security and climate policy, particularly given that the IPCC report released on the Monday 9^th has been described as a “code red for humanity”, and a draft UN assessment is said to have called the Mediterranean a “climate change hotspot”. Managing future crises will require preventative measures, centering civil protection networks and ensuring that climate mainstreaming forms a robust European regional security strategy.

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The Roadmap is the first since the formal ‘Comprehensive Strategic Partnership’ agreed in 2005, and there are mixed expectations about the capacity of the Roadmap to significantly strengthen the relationship. Nonetheless, recognising the need to redress the declining importance of the bilateral relationship – India went from being the UK’s second-largest trading partner in the late 1990s to being 17^th in 2019 – the UK Government is hoping to start afresh in this project with renewed enthusiasm, as part of its Global Britain agenda.

Prime Minister Boris Johnson is a long-term supporter of strong India-UK relations and a self-proclaimed Indophile. The strategic importance of this economic partnership for the United Kingdom, built on strong cultural and diplomatic ties, was emphasised in the UK’s Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy, and will take on particular significance as the UK embarks on its proposed ‘Indo-Pacific tilt’. Recognising the vital security role that India plays in the region, in the face of a rising China, the UK Government have invited Prime Minister Modi to attend this year’s G7 summit in Carbis Bay. Below we set out five key insights from the Roadmap, and consider how feasible its ambitions will be to achieve.

1. The two nations have launched an Enhanced Trade Partnership with aims to speed up negotiations for a Free Trade Agreement.

 The Roadmap announces that India and the UK are launching an Enhanced Trade Partnership, which includes ambitions to double the value of UK-India trade by 2030 and speed up the first phase of pre-negotiations for a future free trade agreement. This is a positive step in UK-India relations, particularly ahead of the EU-India summit that took place days after the Roadmap was released, giving the UK a first-mover advantage. The Roadmap includes the agreement of investment deals valued at almost £1 billion, including commercial deals of £533 million investment from India into the UK, which if they eventualise, could generate more than 6,000 jobs. However, given Prime Minister Modi is yet to sign a single free trade deal since he’s been in power, and has rejected joining both the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, even with the agreement of an Enhanced Trade Partnership, the feasibility of a future free trade agreement remains in doubt.

2. India and the UK will aim to work closely together on issues of climate change and reversing biodiversity loss.

 In the Roadmap, India and the UK commit to working together and co-leading on global climate action, outlining plans to launch the Global Green Grids Initiative at COP26 later this year to help achieve India’s vision of ‘One Sun, One World, One Grid’, aiming to implement a transnational electricity grid to supply solar power across the world. The two nations will also work together and share best practice on the development of offshore wind energy and electric vehicles and will co-chair the Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure.

The new US-India Climate and Clean Energy Agenda 2030 Partnership, unveiled at President Biden’s Leaders’ Summit last month, shows a willingness by India to work with democratic powers to tackle climate change and biodiversity – although India failed to set a concrete net-zero target at the Summit itself. As the third-largest polluter globally, the UK Government recognises that cooperation with India on climate change will be essential to achieving the nation’s ambitions for global commitments at the COP26 Summit later this year.

3. Defence and security is an area of increasing potential alignment for the UK and India.

The Roadmap commits the two nations to collaborate on tackling cyber, space, crime and terrorist threats, with the aim of developing a “free, open and secure Indo-Pacific region” to maximise democratic participation and economic opportunities, and counter the threats posed by a rising China. The UK and India will focus on research, innovation and technology, given these are areas of expertise for both nations, to develop new capabilities within defence and security spheres. Relations between India and China have deteriorated in recent weeks after a social media post from an account linked to the Chinese Communist Party, appeared to mock India’s Covid-19 crisis. With ongoing border disputes in Eastern Ladakh, India is increasingly recognising the importance of greater defence and security cooperation with the UK, the US and the EU, and this commitment is an important first step towards achieving that.

The Quad, a security partnership between the US, Japan, Australia and India, met virtually for their first official meeting in March this year. Following this meeting, the Quad have pledged to cooperate on telecommunications, specifically to strengthen and diversify 5G supply chains to challenge China’s dominance in this arena. While the alliance did not explicitly mention China, all four countries have banned Chinese company Huawei’s 5G technology, recognising the emerging threats and changing security paradigm. Enhanced UK-India defence cooperation will be critical for the UK’s success in the Indo-Pacific region, and the faltering relations between India and China presents a new opportunity to take this forward.

4. Facilitating mobility between the two nations remains a central focus in discussions, and some progress appears to be possible.

Given our shared history, values and culture, the Roadmap outlines the importance of a strong people-to-people relationship between the UK and India. The Roadmap outlines the new Migration and Mobility Partnership for students and professionals, which will be implemented by April 2022. The partnership aims to encourage exchange and migration to facilitate enhanced cooperation in the next ten years, which is likely to be particularly welcomed in India after Theresa May’s decision to abolish graduate visas. Prime Minister May’s trip in 2016 was overshadowed by a lack of consensus around mobility, with her Government keen to implement a tighter border regime and unwilling to offer a loosening of migration barriers as part of trade conversations. Despite now-Home Secretary Priti Patel subsequently implementing a new graduate visa system, immigration policy has remained an obstacle to trade talks. The new Migration and Mobility Partnership includes a Young Professionals Scheme which will support the movement of up to 3,000 young and talented British and Indian graduates to live and work in the other country for up to two years. In return, India has agreed to accelerate processes in deporting citizens who are living illegally within the UK.

The UK and India will continue the biennial ministerial UK-India Science and Innovation Council to set the agenda for science and research collaborations with a focus on promoting the two-way mobility of researchers and increasing exchange between think tanks and universities. Alongside this, the Roadmap outlines plans to encourage diversity through a new Gender Advancement for Transforming Institutions, which will support women in STEM subjects. Other initiatives also include a UK-India Young Entrepreneurship Forum. Cooperation on science and research is likely to be one of the more achievable ambitions, the two nations have strong educational partnerships, with approximately 55,000 Indian students studying at UK universities and UK Research and Innovation opening up offices in India in 2008, resulting in £300 million investments into programmes.

5. India and the UK will guarantee equitable global vaccine supply by April 2022.

 The Roadmap committed to expanding both the breadth and depth of the current India-UK Health Partnership, aiming to increase global health and pandemic resilience, advance their respective roles in promoting Anti-Microbial Resistance, and “promote healthy societies and strengthen both our health systems”. These aims show an ambition by the UK and India to not only tackle more urgent issues relating to Covid-19, but also develop solutions for non-communicable diseases and ageing-related challenges. Alongside this, the two nations have committed to guaranteeing equitable global vaccine supply by April 2022, through an India-UK Partnership on Vaccines, Therapeutics and Diagnostics, as well as expanding the current UK-India Vaccines Hub.

This commitment comes at an important moment, with India’s current Covid-19 wave devastating much of the country. The UK has worked closely with India over the past year, most notably through collaboration between Oxford University, the Serum Institute of India and Astra Zeneca to create a vaccine that is “developed in the UK, made in India, distributed globally”. The UK has also supported India in its most recent wave of infections, through sending over 1,000 ventilators to India to aid pandemic relief in the region. India’s situation only catalyses the importance of the two nations’ collaboration to help tackle the ongoing Covid-19 crisis.

Looking ahead

 The 2030 Roadmap on India-UK relations is ambitious, and offers a much-needed reset at a time of strategic urgency. While there may be questions over whether India is currently in the position to be a world player on global health resilience, and attention understandably drawn to its democratic backsliding and patchy human rights record, the relationship remains of enduring importance to the UK. When Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab was recently questioned about Modi’s choices, he stated that he wouldn’t allow these to affect our bilateral relationship given the huge opportunities and avenues of cooperation, but that “we don’t duck the difficult issues.” In addition to this Roadmap, the G7 and COP26 Summits will provide important opportunities to further enhance partnership between the UK and India, but it is yet to be seen whether the ambitions articulated in this strategic plan will be achieved in practice.

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