{"id":21983,"date":"2025-06-03T07:54:36","date_gmt":"2025-06-03T07:54:36","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/bfpg.co.uk\/?p=21983"},"modified":"2025-06-03T07:54:36","modified_gmt":"2025-06-03T07:54:36","slug":"10-key-takeaways-strategic-defence-review","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/bfpg.co.uk\/2025\/06\/10-key-takeaways-strategic-defence-review\/","title":{"rendered":"The Strategic Defence Review: 10 Key Takeaways"},"content":{"rendered":"

On the 2nd June 2025, after almost a year of waiting, the UK Government released its much anticipated <\/span>Strategic Defence Review<\/span><\/a>. At 144 pages long, the Review explores, in depth, the challenges facing UK defence and national security and provides 62 recommendations (all of which the Government has accepted) on how to respond to these challenges. Here are ten of the key takeaways:<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n

1. The UK is moving to a position of \u2018war-fighting\u2019 readiness.\u00a0<\/b><\/b><\/p>\n

If you thought the 2023 Integrated Review was a sombre read, the 2025 Strategic Defence Review sets out an even bleaker picture of the global environment, and issues a rallying cry for a \u2018whole-of-society\u2019 approach to national security. Particularly striking is the outline on page 31 of the \u2018potential effects of war on the UK\u2019s way of life\u2019 which succinctly and clearly elucidates what might happen if the UK were to engage in state-on-state war as part of NATO in 2025.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

In response, the Review\u2019s guiding principle appears to be the dictum, \u2018If you want peace, prepare for war\u2019. The Review therefore calls for the UK to move to a position of \u2018war-readiness\u2019, through a swathe of commitments to improve defence capabilities, such as a \u00a31.5 billion investment in an \u2018always on\u2019 pipeline for munitions. It also includes plans for the creation of a \u2018Defence Readiness Bill\u2019 which would give the Government ‘additional powers in reserve to support the mobilisation of industry and Reserves\u2019.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

2. However, still no commitment to 3% GDP defence spending.\u00a0<\/b><\/b><\/p>\n

Despite the clear sense of urgency in scaling up and transforming the UK\u2019s defensive capabilities to meet growing global threats, the Review doesn\u2019t commit to increasing defence spending beyond its existing \u201cambition to reach 3% in the next Parliament, subject to economic and fiscal conditions\u201d outlined earlier this year.<\/span><\/p>\n

While there are very real challenges of increasing defence spending further, and it would require difficult trade offs, it is near impossible to achieve many of the ambitions outlined in the Review without a further increase in defence spending.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The commitment also falls short of the 5% GDP defence spending target United States President Trump is pushing for from NATO allies, and the 3.5% GDP spending target that NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte wishes to see. The latter is particularly challenging given the Review\u2019s strong focus on \u2018leading within NATO\u2019, especially given other NATO members are rapidly scaling up their defence spending. Poland, for example, has increased its defence spend from 2.7% in 2022 to 4.2% in 2024, with a further increase to 4.7% expected in 2025.<\/span><\/p>\n

3. A \u2018NATO-first\u2019 and Europe-focused defence and security policy.<\/b>\u00a0<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n

With war still raging in Europe, and the United States \u2018adapt(ing) its regional priorities\u2019<\/span> – <\/span>as the Review very diplomatically puts it – it is unsurprising that NATO and Europe take pride of place in the Review. The Review emphasises the \u2018unequivocal need\u2019 for the UK to step up its support for NATO and for Euro-Atlantic security, arguing that \u2018the Alliance must be the starting point for how the (UK\u2019s) Armed Forces are developed, organised, equipped, and trained\u2019.\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

While the Review states that \u2018NATO-first\u2019 is not \u2018NATO-only\u2019, the limited attention given in the Review to regions beyond the Europe-Atlantic highlights how regionally concentrated the UK\u2019s defence and security efforts will be. The Indo-Pacific and the Middle East are recommended as the \u2018next priority regions after the Euro-Atlantic for Defence engagement\u2019, but there are no substantive new commitments to either, and engagement there is caveated by the fact they must avoid \u2018detracting from deterrence efforts, warfighting, and capability development in the Euro-Atlantic\u2019. Notably too, the Review states that efforts to deepen bilateral and minilateral relationships should be \u2018geared to strengthening Europe\u2019s security architecture\u2019, reaffirming the centrality of Europe in UK defence and security policy. The so-called \u2018Indo-Pacific tilt\u2019 which dominated the 2021 Integrated Review, and featured in the 2023 version, is all but phased out.<\/span><\/p>\n

<\/b>4. Nuclear deterrence is the \u2018bedrock\u2019 of UK national security.\u00a0<\/b><\/b><\/p>\n

Gone are the days of former Labour Leader Jeremy Corbyn declaring that he wouldn\u2019t fire nuclear weapons if he were Prime Minister, with nuclear deterrence now taking a front seat in the Strategic Defence Review. The Review warns that \u2018Russia\u2019s increasing reliance on nuclear coercion will be the central challenge for the UK and its NATO Allies in the coming decades\u2019 and declares that sustaining the nuclear deterrent should therefore be Defence\u2019s \u2018top priority\u2019.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

In response, the Government has pledged to invest \u00a315 billion in the sovereign warhead programme this Parliament and <\/span>to build up to 12 new attack submarines. <\/span>The Review also recommends that the UK explores enhancing its participation in NATO\u2019s nuclear mission and that it commits to \u2018not extending the life of the Dreadnought class submarines beyond their intended end-of-service dates from the mid-2050s\u2019.<\/span><\/p>\n

5. A \u2018Defence dividend\u2019.<\/b><\/b><\/p>\n

A central premise of the Review is that defence should not only deliver for the UK in terms of security, but it should also drive growth and jobs in the UK. Through a \u00a36 billion investment in munitions this Parliament and building at least six new energetics and munitions factories in the UK, the Government aims to generate over 1,000 jobs and boost export potential. A pledge to build up to 7,000 new long-range weapons in the UK is also said to support around 800 jobs, while 9000 will apparently be supported by a \u00a315 billion investment in the sovereign warhead programme.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

At the same time, a new Defence Exports Office in the MOD will help to drive UK defence exports, and the MOD will also seek to establish a new partnership with industry that \u2018maximises internal and industrial expertise, accelerates acquisition processes, manages risk and cost, and engages a wider set of suppliers\u2019. The forthcoming Defence Industrial Strategy is therefore seen as an important opportunity to put some meat on the bones and to embed radical reforms that ensure Defence delivers for the UK economy.<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n

6. No extra troops but a better deal for the armed forces.<\/b>\u00a0<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n

The British army is currently the smallest it has been in 300 years, with just 70,860 full-time trained soldiers, below the target of 73,000 and with more personnel leaving than joining each year. While the Review recommends that \u2018a small uplift in Regular personnel should be considered when funding allows\u2019, it stops short of committing to increasing the number of full-time trained soldiers in the immediate term (something it is widely rumored Defence secretary John Healey had pushed for).<\/span><\/p>\n

It does, however, focus heavily on how to stem the workforce crisis in the armed forces. This includes commitments to \u00a37 billion in funding in this parliament to modernise military accommodation, as well as establishing a career education pathway for the whole force by 2026 and developing a plan for creating more novel pathways into the armed forces, including offering shorter commitments to engage such as the MOD\u2019s forthcoming plans for \u2018gap years\u2019.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

7. A \u2018Tech-enabled\u2019 defence power.\u00a0<\/b><\/b><\/p>\n

Responding to the changing nature of conflict, not least lessons from the war in Ukraine, the Review outlines ambitions for the UK to be a \u2018leading tech-enabled defence power\u2019 by 2035. This includes plans for a new \u2018Digital Warfighter Group\u2019 to be deployed alongside conventional warfighters, the creation of a Cyber and Electromagnetic (CyberEM) Command cohering, but not executing, military action in this arena, as well as the creation of a \u2018digital targeting web\u2019 to <\/span>enable m<\/span>ore rapid, integrated battlefield decisions. The Review also recommends that at least 10% of the MOD\u2019s equipment procurement budget is spent on novel technologies each year, to enable rapid commercial exploitation.<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n

8. China is a \u2018sophisticated and persistent challenge\u2019.\u00a0<\/b><\/b><\/p>\n

Having already moved the UK closer to China, and without the prominent internal China hawk wing that consistently challenged the last Government\u2019s China policy, this Review hasn\u2019t been plagued by debates about whether or not to declare China a \u2018threat\u2019 in the way the Integrated Reviews were. Instead it opts to refer to China as a \u2018sophisticated and persistent challenge\u2019.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Nevertheless, the Review does highlight some of the threats China poses, focusing particularly on Chinese technology, its rapid military modernisation and growth in nuclear weapons. Despite identifying these challenges, the Review does not identify any direct solutions to them, although the Government will hope that efforts to modernise the UK\u2019s own capabilities, particularly in cyber and technology, will help mitigate some of these challenges indirectly.<\/span><\/p>\n

9. Public opinion matters.\u00a0<\/b><\/b><\/p>\n

A highlight, and welcome innovation, in the Review is the inclusion of quotes from members of the public who engaged in the Reviews\u2019 \u2018Citizens Panel\u2019 throughout the Review process. The panels and quotes reflect a renewed recognition of the importance of domestic consent for international decisionmaking. This is also reflected in a number of the recommendations, including around the need for a \u2018\u2018National Endeavour\u2019 public campaign around nuclear deterrence, as well plans for two years of public outreach events and improved education about the armed forces in schools. Domestic consent for foreign policy decisionmaking has always been a top priority for BFPG and it is great to see its importance recognised. Stay tuned because BFPG\u2019s annual public opinion survey be back soon, featuring analysis of public perspectives of many of the issues covered in the Review.<\/span><\/p>\n

10. \u2026But public and parliamentary scrutiny could be better.<\/b>\u00a0<\/span><\/b><\/p>\n

All 144 pages of the Strategic Defence Review dropped in Parliament at 5pm on a Monday, just as wonks, journos and politicians had begun to close their laptops for the day, and after days of endless leaks and major press statements from the Prime Minister and Defence Secretary earlier in the morning. The result has been days of media coverage of the big headlines – like defence spending – and much less scrutiny, in public and in parliament, of the detail. This is only compounded by the fact the Review is, as these Reviews often are, long and unwieldy. Reading it is a slog, and while the <\/span>two-page version<\/span><\/a> of the Strategy (which I\u2019d definitely recommend reading) is very welcome as a more accessible digest, it is to the detriment of the strategy that the full version is not more digestible, and that public and parliamentary scrutiny were not prioritised more highly in the launch of the Review. If the Government wants a whole-of-society response to defence, it has to start by enabling and encouraging proper scrutiny.<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

BFPG Director Evie Aspinall summarises the key takeaways from 2025 Strategic Defence Review and what it means for the future of UK defence and security.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":92,"featured_media":21552,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[133,169],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-21983","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-articles","category-uk-perspectives"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/bfpg.co.uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/21983","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/bfpg.co.uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/bfpg.co.uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/bfpg.co.uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/92"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/bfpg.co.uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=21983"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/bfpg.co.uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/21983\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/bfpg.co.uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/21552"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/bfpg.co.uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=21983"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/bfpg.co.uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=21983"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/bfpg.co.uk\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=21983"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}